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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

LIFE L

C.O.

Reference :-

882 /10

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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Governor in Executive Council is required in many cases by law, and I don't think that the removal of this requirement would be a wise or popular proceeding, but three members make a quorum, and I think that the case would be met by dividing the Executive Council into Standing Committees of three, members-e.g., Legal, (for the Gavsathawa cases), Local Government (for the by-laws), etc., and, taking their decision as that of the Council, only bring in the full Council if there was a difference of opinion.

As to discipline, I would urge that the Committee of Executive Council be 'dropped, and, instead, that cases which now come before the Executive Council should be dealt with by a Board of three men, selected from a panel consisting of all heads of departments, first-class officers of the Civil Service, and a few others, such as the Solicitor-General. This report of the Board would come before Executive Council, so that the culprit would have his case finally decided by the highest authority, while the waste of the time of these members of Executive Council for several days would be avoided; moreover, the accused person would really got a fairer trial, as an appeal from a Committee of the Executive Council to the Executive Council itself is rather farcical. Also, disciplinary cases would be disposed of more quickly-which is highly desirable.

The question of the Legislative Council is very much more difficult. The first thing to decide is this: are we going to make a genuine effort to start Ceylon on the road to self-government, or are we going to give them something which looks like a concession but which can be worked so as really to make no difference until the inevitable smash comes in India, when we can go back to real Crown Colony Government--the only Government which will ever be really efficient?

If it is proposed to take the latter course, the Governor's scheme can be so worked as to effect what is wanted, but I hope that this is not the intention, and that the idea is really to give them a genuine chance of progress on self-governing lines. (Of course, anything of the kind means a loss of efficiency and probably a set-back to the material progress of the island, but that can't be helped.)

It cannot be that is so, I consider that the Governor's scheme is impossible. worked without constant use of the "paramount importance" stick or some other method of making the nominated members vote with the Government.

If

The Governor has been unfortunate in his Executive Council at this moment. The Attorney-General is new to the East; the Treasurer knows nothing about the natives and cares less; the General is new (if the War Office had not insisted on removing Hacket-Thompson things would have been better), and for various reasons the Civil Service members of the Council are not of much use for this purpose. Where he has broken down is that he does not understand the psychology of the 'Ceylonese." The most marked characteristic of all Ceylonese, of whatever race, is an amazing vanity, and one of the forms in which it operates is to make it impossible to rely upon any one of them to do anything which will render him in the slightest degree unpopular or will enable his enemies to hold him up to popular contempt or odium. This fact strikes at the root of the Governor's proposal, which rests on a dichotomy between the Government and the non-Government men in Council. No such dichotomy is possible: the only possible division 'is between official and non-official. A non-official sitting on the Government side and voting with the Government is inconceivable in Ceylon, except very occasionally in the case of a European. The Ceylonese nominees would regard themselves as members of the unofficial opposition, and would vote against the Government regularly- even more regularly than the elected unofficials, because they would want to show their independence in order to prevent the newspapers calling them led-captains and knighthood-hunters and the rest of it. I know something of every man who could conceivably be nominated to a seat; the great majority of them I know well, and not a few are my friends, some of them really intimate friends. I assert without hesitation that there is not a single one of them, black, white, or tan, who would dare to give an honest vote on the side of the Government in any case in which the elected members took the opposite view.

I am not talking at random, but am basing my statements on experiences in the past. Here is a case in point. In the reports of debates in Council at the end of 1916. or possibly early in 1917, will be found a discussion on the conduct of Mr. Dowbiggin. Inspector-General of Police during the 1915 riots. Two days

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before that debate I was at a dinner presided over by Meedeniya Dissawa, the Kandyan member, at which Tillekeratne, the Low Country Sinhalese member, was also present. Meedeniya spoke to me at dinner about the coming motion, and begged me to find some way of ruling it out of order. He thoroughly disapproved of it and spoke his mind in very strong terms. I explained to him that what he suggested was impossible, but said I was glad to hear what he said, as, of course, he would vote against the motion. He replied: "No, I can't do that, we unofficials must support one another." Shortly afterwards Tillekeratne approached me with the same suggestion. I replied in the same terms. He also said that he could not vote against the rest. I assumed that they would give a silent vote. Reference to the debate will show that they spoke for the motion--Tillekeratne, in a most vigorous and offensive speech (for which he subsequently apologized to me, saying that his strong sense of humour had led him astray!). It might be said that these are not good cases, as Meedeniya is a coward and Tillekeratne an imp of mischief, but this isn't sufficient explanation of Meedeniya's speaking for the motion (Tillekeratne may not have meant to speak, but, being drunk, couldn't resist the temptation). And I have many other cases. Sir A. Kanagasabai, the ". whitest" native I know, an intimate friend of mine, and a man from whom any action that he thought dishonourable would be unthinkable, did just the same in 1913, on a Committee on the Salaries Commission. He told Mr. Booth that he entirely agreed with the Government members of the Committee. Then," said Mr. Booth, "you will sign my report." "No, I am going to sign whatever van Cuylenburg writes." Similarly, van Cuylenburg, who feared neither God nor man (more especially God), came to me after a rather heated meeting and observed: "The old philosopher (Ramanathan) was talking d -d rot.' Then," I asked, "why did you support His answer, which he obviously regarded as conclusive, was: "One must play to the gallery sometimes." This being the mental attitude of the leading men, is it conceivable that a nominated Sinhalese, sitting on the Government side. should take a line opposed to an elected Sinhalese, or a nominated Burgher to an elected Burgher, or even a nominated Planter to an elected Planter? Imagine the remarks of the local Press, which would say that one might as well nominate officials as unofficials who daren't vote according to their wishes! With regard to the Europeans, the case is as bad. If the elected Planter votes as the Planting community wishes, as we must assume, how could a nominated Planter vote in opposition to him? Wouldn't it be said that he was betraying his community?

Of two things, one must happen-either the nominees will vote with the elected members, in which case the Government will be in a hopeless minority; or the European elected member will vote with the Government, as will the European nominees. This would be a most unfortunate position, as it would stir up racial atrife and merely transfer the line of attack to an agitation for an increase of the Asiatic members on the ground that the Europeans are really Government

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men.

I regard this objection to the Governor's scheme as fundamental and insuperable. It would mean that, in all subjects except those dealt with as matters of paramount importance, the unofficial members would have the Government entirely at their mercy. They could carry any domestic measure they liked, unless the Government refused to allow it to be discussed (see section 11 of despatch*). There would be no use in suggesting amendments which the unofficials would have no object in accepting, and the Grand Committee system appears to me to be useless in such cases. It would be necessary to include a number of nominated members in the Govern- ment side of the Committee (for it seems to me impossible to appoint only officials in the case of "domestic " legislation), and they would vote against the Government. In the case of reserved subjects, dealt with by the full Council, the nominees would all vote with the elected members, so that if they were opposed nothing could be done except by recourse to the naramount importance clause, which could not be used often without causing trouble.

Moreover, where trouble usually comes is in amendments. A law which is not brought in as of paramount importance may be met with an amendment of great importance, which the Government cannot accept. decision as to paramount importance must be taken before the Bill is introduced. But apparently, the Therefore there is no means, when the amendment is introduced, of taking it out of

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