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CIT!

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference :--

C.O. 882/10

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH--NOT TO

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that an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council, without a second chamber, or other safeguards, is constitutionally impossible, and we do not believe that a second chamber can, at the present time, be constituted so as to be both efficient and valuable, or that satisfactory safeguards can be devised.

While fully realizing the disadvantages of the official majority, we are unable to recommend that it should be abolished.

9. The Constitution of the Electorates.-Two main questions arise in connexion with this subject, namely, whether the representation is to proceed upon a racial or a territorial basis, and, if the latter, whether provision is to be made for the special representation of racial or other minorities. We think that, so far as is practicable, true progress lies in the direction of eliminating racial distinctions in public matters, and that the territorial basis should be adopted. In view of the fact, however, that the several races have still very distinct interests and feelings, provision must be made for the special representation of those communities, the European, the Burgher, and the Mohammendan, which, being in a minority, are not likely to have any representative returned for the territorial divisions. It will be remembered that the memorial above-mentioned, after approving of the territorial system, excludes Europeans, Burghers, and `Mohammedans from the provincial electorates on the ground that they are to have a separate representation. The Committee most strongly opposes the acceptance of this suggestion, which, on examination, appears to result in pure racial representation. The franchise in such a scheme is confined to the Sinhalese and Tamils, and, as the two races are grouped in well-defined areas, Tamils will ordinarily be returned for two provinces and Sinhalese for all the others; that is to say, that, out of the twenty-one elected members, at least twelve are to be Sinhalese elected only by the Sinhalese, without the possibility of any influence or interference by other races. When, in addition to this, it is remembered that the memoralists ask for two unofficials on the Executive Council, to be elected by the Legislative Councillore, and therefore, in all probability, also Sinhalese, it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that the scheme outlined in the memorial may be a definite attempt to acquire the practical adminis- tration of the country by one section of its inhabitants. We are supported in this view by the Mohammedan member, who said, in the Legislative Council, on 11th December, during the debate on the reform proposals: Let there be no doubt, Sir, that we are in favour of a large increase in the number of representatives. provided the territorial representative basis is election and not dependent on nomination, and provided, also, that the electorates are not confined to the Sinhalese and Tamil constituents only, but embrace Europeans, Burghers, Mohammedans, and others of every electoral area. If this is not done, the principle of territorial representation would reduce the form to an absurdity, and would result in the unjust prepon- derance of voting power in the hands of the Sinhalese and Tamil communities.' We regard it as essential to real territorial representation that all persons within any electoral area should have the right of voting, nor do we consider that the separate additional representation of minorities should in any way affect thie fundamental requirement.

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10. The Nature of the Franchise.-The extent of the franchise is, from the point of view of the various religions, a matter of peculiar importance in Ceylon, where so many of the educated classes are Christians, while the majority of the peasantry are Buddhists or Hindus. A narrow franchise, practically confined to educated persons, might result in the return chiefly of Christians, while a wide franchise would probably secure a Council composed of Buddhists and Hindus. We have not, however, considered the matter from the point of view of religious interests, but merely from that of the general capacity of electors to exercise a wise choice and escape the influence of possible corruption. On the one hand, it may be argued that the peasantry is not yet capable of appreciating the value of a vote. and may be subjected to improper influences. On the other hand, the view may be entertained that the average villager is by no means without common sense where his own interests are concerned, and will soon learn the importance of a secret hallot, while from the point of view of possible corruption there may be safety in large numbers. As a compromise between these two views, we suggest that the proposals of the Reform League in this respect should be adopted, with such modi- fications as will be mentioned below, when we discuss our scheme in detail.

11. The Executive Council.—We agree with the memorialists, that the present Executive Council is too large, and that the presence of Government Agents of

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Provinces, whose official administrative acts may at any time become the subject of comment or investigation by the Council of which they are themselves members, is undesirable. We cannot, however, approve of the reduction of the official members to two. It seems to us that there would be no practical value in a Council which did not include a military adviser, a legal adviser, a financial adviser, and a general administrative and revenue adviser. We think that there should be two unofficial members of the Executive Council, but consider that the proposal to vest the choice of them in the Legislative Councillors is based on a failure to appreciate the constitutional difficulties involved. The suggestion was made in India and is discussed in the Montagu-Chelmsford report, which exposes its impracticability. Whether or not the members of the Executive are officials or unofficials, Europeans or Ceylonese, they must stand together as one Government and take collective responsibility. If some of them are responsible to an independent electorate, how are they to act in a conflict of views between the permanent Government and that electorate? Personally, they might no doubt resign; but that course would offer no solution when their successors would be chosen by the same body, and, presumably, be expected to voice the same views. Ultimately, therefore, either the Legislative Councillors are to govern the country against the will of the Governor, who, never- theless is responsible to the Secretary of State, or else the Governor is to be in the position of having to rule in conjunction with Executive Councillors, whose wishes he may be continually forced to override. Dealing with the suggestion of elected Executive Councillors, the Montagu-Chelmsford report says (paragraph 161): "Election would deprive the Governor of all discretion in making recommendations as to his colleagues.. When ability in administration ought, generally speaking, to be the test, nomination by those who are in the best position to judge must be far more satisfactory.... Further, the scheme involves the association of individuals in the Government who, while sharing in the same degree the same responsibilities, yet derive their authority from different sources, being responsible to the Secretary of State in the one case and the Legislative Council in the other; and hence, in the event of a divergence of view, there is no way of securing the unity of action required." We, therefore, advise that the unofficial members of the Executive Council should be nominated by the Governor.

12. The Colonial Office.-As stated before, the constitution of this. Office does not make any provision for the association with the officials in England, of anyone having a personal knowledge of the Colony, and we believe that in practice no such person is consulted. It appears, on the face of it, impossible for the affairs of any country to be controlled satisfactorily by men living six thousand miles away, who have never seen either the country or the people whom they control. opinion that the blunders which are made from time to time, in important matters, We are of might be avoided if there were associated with the Secretary of State persons having long personal acquaintance with the Colony. The Secretary of State for India has a Council, of which nine members must have had long and recent service, or residence, in British India. We are further strongly of opinion that it is necessary to press for a reform of the system under which Colonial affairs are handled in London, and in particular that the affairs of this Colony should be directed by a Council, presided over by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, composed of officials and unofficials with experience of Ceylon. present in possession of sufficient information to enable us to make detailed pro- We are not at posals. They may be framed at a later date, after consultation with persons more intimately acquainted with the affairs of the Colonial Office. We would, however, suggest that subordinate officials in London should be drawn from the various Colonies, and that such senior officers as may be recalled from Ceylon for service in England should, after five years' service there, retire on full Colonial pension, and so make way for new men. In this manner the Secretary of State would be supplied with a staff of officers having an intimate knowledge of the Colony's affairs and needs.

13. Summary of general principles.-Having explained the chief problems which presented themselves for solution, and the manner in which we approached them, we think that, before setting out the particulars of our proposals, we should summarize briefly the conclusions at which we have arrived, for unless those con- clusions are accepted the scheme detailed below must necessarily fail to meet with approval. The general lines of policy on which we are agreed, and which we put forward for acceptance by the Council, may be stated in the following pro positions :-

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