CO882-(3-4) — Page 599

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference →→

] © T | | TcO. 882

חח!!

4PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO

•

42

"wants and circumstances of the Colony, and only be acceptacle to the large majority of the Colonists, &c.," this statement is assuredly not consistent with the reality. A largé majority of the community is Indian, and I believe cares very little about the constitution of the remaining population, of which the bulk is as incapable of forming an opinion on constitutional wants as the Indians. I have much respect for the small minority remaining, but they must represent themselves as what they really are, not as a majority. With three independent members added, who I hope, would act as the unofficial members of this Board have always acted, hold it their first duty to see the ordinary government of this Colony effectively carried on and when any extra question arises, will give it full consideration and independent advice. The feeling of the population will be better represented than it would be if you had this so-called elective legislation. I am not prepared to vote for the change.

The Hon. the ACTING PROCUreur-General said

--

I have I have assented to the principle of the first resolution as to the introduction of an elective element in this Council, because I think the principle is a just one. said that in my opinion the section of the community interested in the reform movement representing the property, intelligence, and education of the island, having to bear the largest part of the public expenditure, should have its proper share of But I must vote against the second influence in the administration of Colonial affairs. resolution because if it is allowed, the whole power of government in this Colony will be put within their reach, and it is neither just nor reasonable, but it would be dangerous to make to them such a large concession.

The resolution declares that the Council should be composed of 21 members, 11 Let us see how the Colony at large would officials, 7 unofficials, 7 elective members. be represented in such a council. The population of Mauritius may be broadly divided First the European race, including all people who can trace in three races of men. their origin either wholly or in part from European parents. Next the African race, comprising the former slave population and their descendants, and finally the 250,000 Indians, who are either indentured labourers or have settled permanently in our midst. I say none but the people of European origin would be represented in such a Legis- lature as is claimed, with the high franchise proposed, the elective members would How many African Creoles or certainly not represent the Africans and Asiatics. Indians will you find with a fortune of Rs. 5,000, or in receipt of a salary of $40 a month, or paying a monthly rent of $20 which supposes an income of four or five times as much, that is, of about 2001. a year? yet such is the high franchise required by the reform committee and by the petitioners in their memorial to the Queen. I suppose, although no mention of the franchise is made in the resolution, we must take the memorial as being one. document with this resolution, and that the franchise contemplated by the honourable member is the one defined in the previous documents. (Sir V. Naz: The resolution does not define the franchise which will be determined subsequently.)

What does my honourable friend reject the franchise fixed by the committee? But this high voting qualification was purposely adopted by them and by the petitioners. If we reject the basis then adopted, on what are we to proceed in this debate ? does my honourable friend think a lower qualification, the 107. franchise for instance, would be acceptable to those who have signed the memorial ? I am sure if he had put forward such a proposition at the meeting there would have been a scission at once. For, do we not all know that a considerable number of persons apprehended that the elective system would put power in the hands of the Indians, and therefore looked upon a bigh voting qualification as an essential safeguard?

Sir, in spite of the dissent we have just heard, I am justified in reading all those documents: the reports of the reform committee, the petition, these resolutions together and in saying that this very high voting qualification is an essential part of the proposed reform. I therefore repeat the people of Indian and African origin would have no share in the selection of the elective members. Then, would those men be represented by the nominee members? But it has been found impossible by the late Lieutenant-Governer to discover in the Indian population a man to whom a seat in the Council could be offered. The nominee members can be chosen only from the Therefore in the proposed Constitution, the majority of 14 They would people of European race. members must exclusively represent the people of European race. represent no doubt the most enlightened and wealthy part of the population, but that cannot entitle them to an absolute power of imposing laws and taxes on upwards of

43

250,000 men whom they cannot represent. Such a power the two groups of independent members, the elective and nominee members, could at any time possess themselves of, if they choose to agree on common action and thus form a majority against the Govern- ment. The hon. member has referred to other Colonies and particularly to Natal, where the elective members have a large majority over the Government. But does he remember what the franchise is in those Colonies? For instance in Natal possession of 501. personality gives a vote, here you would require Rs. 5,000 or ten times as much. Is there any possible analogy between the political system of such Colonies and that which is proposed for Mauritius? Take if you like a low voting qualification, such as the 101. franchise, and then your elected members may perhaps claim to govern and legislate for, the whole country. But it cannot be so if you restrict the suffrage to a small minority, however enlightened and influential it may be. The honourable member

says further, but the nominees will not combine with the elective members to form a coalition against the Government, and it is a reflection on them to say they will. I mean nothing offensive to any one, and make no reflection on any one; but I say, when you place a large political power within the grasp of a party, it is not unreasonable to expect that it will be tempted to take possession of that power. It is evident that if those 14 members only choose to do so, they may form a majority against the Government; and the Government must then be at their mercy. It may be said, if they pass an unjust law, the Governor may refuse his assent. I admit that. Or it may be said, if they oppose a just measure, it may be forced upon them by Order in Council. I admit that also. But what about the Budget? This Legislature having been once established by the Queen, the Government will have to apply to it for supplies. By refusing them, the majority can put an irresistible pressure on the Government, and the latter will practically be compelled to do as the majority wishes. Who then would have the power of vindicating the rights of the great majority of the population, of all the Africans and Indians not represented in the Legislature, if a question arises on which the interest of the majority thus formed, are opposed to theirs? Those thousands of men, who form the most numerous and the poorest part of the population are like mere children,-devoid of education and incapable for a long time to come, of political rights, they cannot protect themselves, but must look to the Crown to protect them. Sir, I think the Crown should not renounce and abdicate the power of doing so.

.

But I may be asked, how then would you give effect to the first resolution as to the introduction of an elective element in the Legislature? I shall briefly state how I think effect could be given to that principle. I consider the Government should retain the control it now possesses over legislation, and that the number of nominee and elective members together should not exceed the number of official members. A Council of 20 members might be formed, ten official members, five elective members and five unofficial, appointed by the Crown. We have nine districts including Port Louis. Give one representative to Port Louis, and four to the eight rural districts, or one member for two districts.

It will be objected that the Governor would then retain the power of forcing measures upon the ten unofficial members by means of ita majority of officials, including the Governor's vote. No doubt the power would be retained. But after all, is there any serious danger of its being abused? I remember only one instance- no other has been mentioned in the debate of a Government measure being passed against the unanimous vote of the unofficial members. I refer to Article 284 of the Labour Law. But it must I think be admitted that whatever objections may be made against that provision, the Government acted in the interest of the Colony when it insisted on its being passed. For that measure was required by the Indian Government, and if it had been rejected, they would probably have stopped immigration. Sir, I see no reason to believe that such a system as I have suggested would be worked otherwise than in the liberal manner indicated by Lord Derby with reference to the Legislature of Malta, in his speech in the House of Lords last year.

On all matters not affecting Imperial interests, the decision arrived

at unanimously by the ten independent members of the Council would generally be accepted by the Government.

In such a Legislature, the classes that press for a reform of our Constitution would, by means of their five representatives, have a direct voice and influence in the Govern- ment of their country; their interests must also be protected by the unofficial members named by the Crown, who, in spite of all that has been said, can be relied upon to oppose Government measures which they consider mischievous; and on the other hand, there could be no risk or danger of injustice to the classes that would not be represented.

F 2