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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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TILUCO. 882

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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begin with, in order to be sure of meeting afterwards with no failure or disappoint- ́ ment; we may gradually add to that little, if we are prudent and wise; but if we pretend, at the very outset, to be placed on the same footing with other Colonies which have become inured to elective institutions long since, we run the risk of obtaining nothing.

We hope we shall be forgiven for having dwelt on this subject at such length; but the foregoing remarks will not probably be found too elaborate, when the importance of the question to which they refer, is borne in mind, and when it is remembered that they will serve for the elucidation of the other questions submitted for our study.

II.

The elective element being admitted in principle, what should our political

constitution be?

Should the Council of Government be suppressed, or should we simply introduce elected members into it, whilst retaining the two elements which now exist? In the latter event, what should be the numerical proportion of the three elements ?

What should be the duration of the mandate of the elected members.

There are British Colonies of which the constitution is copied from that of England, and in which there is an upper and a lower house; there are others in which there is only one Assembly divided into official members and a larger number of elected members; there are others again in which, besides the official and elected members, there are also unofficial members nominated by the Government. There is not a single Colony which possesses an Assembly composed exclusively of elected members.

No doubt it would be exaggeration to ask for two Assemblies for Mauritius; our community is too small, it has not yet acquired sufficient political vigour to admit of a representative Government of so advanced a form. The Sub-committee considers that for the present we should be content with one Assembly, consisting of official members, of unofficial members nominated by the Government and of elected unofficial members.

Your sub-committee further suggests that the three fractions of our Legislative Council be equal in number.

If your sub-committee firmly believes that the population of Mauritius can easily govern itself, or rather that it can take an active part in the management of its affairs, still it cannot ignore certain practical truths the force of which you will not fail to admit. The first is that, in political matters, violent and radical changes generally end in discomfiture and mortífication; whereas, by advancing gradually, it is, as a rule, possible to found something durable and productive of beneficial results; this last mode of proceeding has further the advantage of being in harmony with the traditions of Great Britain. In addition to this, there is the consideration that a large number of our colonists who countenance a reform of our constitution, are in favour of the introduction of an elective element into it, but only provided such element be accom→ panied by a counterpoise which will effectually prevent it from ever becoming a cause of disturbance.

The only system which meets all these exigencies and which reconciles the opinions of all, is that which we recommend.

It is only right that the Government should be represented in the Legislative Council, and, when the grave interests which are committed to its charge here, aro taken into consideration, it may be said with reason that it should be still more strongly represented in a Legislative Council in which the Colony will have its representatives. The unofficial members nominated by the Government, but chosen from our own midst, will form an equiponderating force between the Government and the elected members. Stimulated by the elected members, restrained by their official colleagues, moderate through their love of stability and not prone to intemperance, but still attached to the community by various ties and stimulated by public opinion, which, feeling itself more powerful with such an auxiliary as the elective principle, will become more pressing and more active, being so situated, they will lean towards the Goverment when the elected members want to go too far, and will give the latter a majority for all just and useful measures that may be claimed by the Colony.

By maintaining such equilibrium between the three fractions of the Legislative Council, we will prove to our rulers that we are not rash and blundering innovators; but that, while we solicit a more liberal political regime, we do not seek to sap the foundation of our Government, and we are fully alive to the necessity of offering to

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that Government guarantees of order and security. On the other hand, we entreat all those who would fain have Mauritius endowed with parliamentary institutions more akin to those of England, to remember that the introduction of the elective element into our Legislative Council will be no slight victory, and that by means of it, we shall be able to watch over and even effectually control our Government, and to prevent acts of injustice such as those we have often to submit to. This new element will give to the Council more vigour, more energy, and more authority than it at present pos- and will enable it to exercise greater influence than it does now upon the decisions of the Home Government concerning us. The Council will feel that it has■ firmer hold on our affairs and on our finances, and it will act accordingly.

Nesses;

The sub-committee is convinced that the system they propose will work without collision or clashing. It is not because the various members of the Legislative Council will derive their powers from different sources, that they will give themselves up to angry and bitter discussions, and that their deliberations will in consequence be hampered and rendered barren of effect; those who fancy that such will be the cass allow themselves to be influenced by fears purely chimerical.

In order that the unofficial members chosen by the Crown, and the elected members, may preserve their full independence and liberty of action, we are of opinion that the former should be nominated for life, and that the elected portion of the Council, should be renewed every four years. For the same reason, the Government should not be allowed to nominate, as unofficial members, public functionaries, either actually in office or drawing a pension.

III.

What is to be the mode of election? Should the election be entrusted to certain bodies, or to the members of the community without distinction? Should it be direct or of two degrees? What should be the electoral franchise?

The questions, which your sub-committee is now about to examine, are perhaps those which have given rise to the most conflicting opinions. Some have suggested that the unofficial members of the Council of Government not nominated by the Crown, should be elected by the Chambers of Agriculture and of Commerce; others have contended that they should be elected by those two chambers and by other corporations or other corps, such as the bar, the medical profession, &e.; others again have thought of a more general system of indirect election according to which there. would be two bodies of electors, the first of which would be established with a fran- chise more or less high or more or less low, and would elect a certain number from their midst, who would, in their turn, elect the members of Council. Others again have gone so far as to maintain that the right of the electors should be limited to a list of names from which the head of the Government would choose the providing members of the Council.

All these systems have been rejected by the sub-committee; they would only produce a lame and artificial representation, and are characterised by complications which are repugnant to common sense and to truth.

To give to the electors, whoever they may be, merely the right of designating members to the Government for its choice, would be to make the composition of the Legislative Council depend on the Executive, and to sot in opposition to the object which it is meant that our intended reform should accomplish; just as, if we were to confer upon the Chamber of Agriculture and the Chamber of Commerce the exclusive right of choosing the elected members, we would be vesting them with an exorbitant right, and would be paving the way for the rise of a petty oligarchy, which would lead to abuses quite as serious as those which we have now to confront. The Chamber of Agriculture, the constitution of which is at present uncertain in consequence of the transformation that has recently taken place in connexion with sugar estate property, would be simply the organ, not to say the tool, of a very small group, and in that respect there would be very little difference between the Chamber of Agriculture and the Chamber of Commerce, the latter representing chiefly the aristocracy of trade, or, in other words, a very small number of merchants. If those two Chambers were con- verted into electoral colleges, there would be no reason for withholding the same privileges from the corps of barristers, notaries, attornies, doctors, chemists, journalists, printers, cabinet-makers, &c., which would extend the right of voting to a multitude of groups on unequal and incongruous bases, for there are very few professions or trades which do not, de facto if not de jure, form bodies or companies (they have only to enter F 2

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