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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

T LITT I

C.O.

Reference :-

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC-

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In this point I beg to call your Lordship's attention to the following facts.

71

My predecessor, having been requested by Lord Kimberley to consider whether it quid be advisable to appoint a British Officer to reside in any of the Malay States, not ly engaged to place Resident in Perak and an Assistant Resident in Laroot, but, in opposition to the views expressed by Lord Kimberley, who stated that Her Majesty's Government had no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of the Malay States, inter- vened in a very decided manner in the internal affairs of Perak He collected together

majority of the Chiefs of that State and entered into a Treaty, by which one Sultan was Teposed and another set up, and that Treaty, moreover, provided that the government of the country should practically be placed in the hands of the Resident. The Treaty, if confirmed, really committed the British Government to a decided policy of intervention in the internal affairs of Perak It may be said that the Laroot difficulty rendered prompt action necessary, and so indeed it did, but there was certainly not so much reason for immediate action in the case of the Sultan of Perak, or for the practical assumption of the government of that State by a British Officer, as there was for the step I took, with a view of removing difficulties, which increased in proportion to the time they were per- mitted to remain, in the working of the system which I found in existence in Perak. subunit that the steps taken by my predecessor, without authority, in January 1874, were infinitely more vital and important than the step which I took in October 1875.

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72. My Lord, I do not advert to this action of my predecessor for the purpose of casting blame upon him, for I felt, as he did, that in dealing with Malay Chiefs, it is necessary to settle with them promptly. What I wish to point out to your Lordship is that the vastly important measures, which were undertaken, without any authority from Her Majesty's Government, in January 1874, met with your Lordship's unqualified approval, and that in Despatch to Sir A. Clarke, No. 64, of the 29th May 1874, your Lordship did not “delay the assurance that Her Majesty's Government appreciated the ability and energy he had shown," and on September 4th, 1874, your Lordship com- mended him for the ability, zeal, and tact which he had displayed in bringing about the

uccessful result which had been obtained.

73. Moreover, in replying to Lord Stanley of Alderley, in the House of Lords, on the 19th May 1874, your Lordship expressed an opinion that it could not be said, at the worst, that Sir A. Clarke had very far exceeded his duty as an English Governor.

74. Your Lordship did not then state, as in paragraph 22 of the Despatch under reply, that the "powers and responsibilities, as the Governor of the Straits Settlements cannot be held to apply to the relations of Her Majesty's Government with the Malay States, in the same manner and degree as to the internal affairs of the Colony." Nor do I find, in your Lordship's Despatches, any mention of those observations, on the subject of acting without authority and without specific instruction, which your Lordship states, in paragraph 23, it would have been equally your duty to have made to me under any circumstances. I only find that most vital and important steps were taken by my predecessor without authority; that those steps met with your Lordship's unqualified approval; and that Her Majesty's Government ratified these proceedings, by holding the Chiefs personally responsible for the engagements which they had made.

75. These injunctions had been broken through, and the step which I took was but with a view to making the policy, which had been approved of, workable, and the engagements, which had been infringed, respected. Such a step was, as I have shown, omparatively but a small one, and was but carrying out, in a modified form, the policy previously approved and commended. I considered it, moreover, a duty which I had to perform to give effect to that policy, and I believed that I should secure the thanks of Her Majesty's Government by thus relieving the system, as approved of by them, from the dead lock by which it was marked in Perak. Seeing that the first important step of intervention with its attendant engagement, which had been taken without instructions, had met with your Lordship's approval, and that "it was impossible to carry on nego- tiations with Abdullah and the Chiefs, unless I spoke and acted as if charged with full authority" (paragraph 35, No. 291, dated 16th October 1875). I did not hesitate to assume the responsibility of taking this step, which was necessary for the due fulfilment of that to which we were solemnly engaged. I could not but suppose that your Lord- ship would give me your full support in endeavouring to bring the system, as found to be workable in other Native States, to a successful issue in Perak. As stated in para- graph 35 of my Despatch, No. 291, "I took upon myself to do what, under the circum- stances, I considered your Lordship would wish to have done," and I hoped that your Lordship would have given full consideration to the statements made in that Despatch, and that those statements would have convinced your Lordship of the necessity of the action taken by me.

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No: 59 of Command Paper [C-1111], July 1874.

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76. As to consulting your Lordship by telegraph, which your Lordship suggests in considered paragraph 21, it was my obvious duty to have done, I can only say that well whether I should telegraph, and I deliberately determined not to do so.

A long despatch on the subject has apparently failed to convey a distinct view of the reasons for my action, and I considered at the time that it would have been impossible within the limits of telegraphic communication to have entered fully into the question.

Considering the step which I contemplated taking as being absolutely necessary, and one which would be sure to meet with your Lordship's approval, upon your being made fully acquainted with the facts of the case. I deemed it the best course to act without delay Regarding the matter firstly as a duty, and secondly as a means of bringing the system, as approved of by your Lordship, to a workable shape, I felt certain that not stepping far beyond the bounds of my instructions as Governor, and I had reason

believe that my action would meet with your Lordship's unqualified approbation. 77. I now pass on to consider the statement that the course which I adopted was the ignal for resistance and attack."

Was

With regard to the view expressed by your Lordship, that the murder of Mr. Birch and other disastrous consequences ensued upon the modification of policy which I adopted, such an inference cannot justly be drawn from the facts which have come to my knowledge. It was unfortunate for the success and the due appreciation of the policy, as modified by me, that Mr. Birch's murder should have followed so soon after the change had been publicly announced, but it by no means follows that even if there had been no such modification of policy Mr. Birch would not have been murdered, when he exposed himself, in the way he did, at Passir Sala.

78. Your Lordship will observe that I felt that the view night be entertained that my action resulted in Mr. Birch's murder when, in paragraph II of Despatch No. 327 of 16th November 1875,* and in paragraphs 3-10 of Despatch No. 335 of 2nd December 1875,† I pointed out reasons for the conclusion that such an inference would be unjust and inconsistent with a due appreciation of the facts of the case. I am more than ever convinced, and recent events appear to me to demonstrate, that the consequences to which your Lordship refers were caused by dislike on the part of the Chiefs to our intervention in any shape in the affairs of the State of Perak. A similar dislike of our intervention has shown itself in some of the States about Malacca, and culminated, as your Lordship is aware, in active hostility.

It cannot possibly be held that the attack upon Sungie Ujong was caused by the step took in Perak, for there is no connexion or sympathy whatever between that State and the small States of Sri Menanti, Ulu Moar, and Jumpole, which are about 150 miles from Perak, and are separated from Perak by the State of Salangore.

There seems to be abundant reason to believe that, even previous to the modification of policy which I adopted in Perak, some of the Chiefs there were considering whether they could not unite to get rid of the interference of the Resident.

79. In one of the letters found in the boat of Haji Alli (see paragraph 7 of my Despatch 334 of 2nd December last), purporting to be written by Haji Mohamed Ahlec to Kajah Haji Yahyah (a grandson of Ismail), there is this passage-"Your slave begs

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to inform your Highness, regarding the arrangement of what we are going to do, is that your Highness must come down quickly, and your slave hopes that the money your Highness must bring with him without delay, for Rajah Abdullah has given his power to Mr. Birch and Captain Kim Ching. Also I beg to inform your Highness that in my opinion, that is, if your Highness is late, it is almost impossible to carry out the arrangements of what we are going to do."

No date is given to this letter, but as Mr. Kim Ching (who had obtained a concession from Abdullah, previous to our interference in Perak) had been in Perak, having inter- views with Abdullah, about the end of July last, it would seem from internal evidence to have been written about the month of August.

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80. In another letter found in Haji Alli's possession, purporting to come from two Chinamen, and addressed to Tunku Panghina Besar Abdo Galul (Rajah Ngah, one of Ismail's chief fighting men) dated 18 Rajab 1292 August 1875, they state:-" A trustworthy man, from our friend Haji Mohamed Saleh, came and brought us a certifying letter from our friend to receive money from us; we are much surprised to hear it, without any cause to receive this money, what is our friend going to do with this money?

If we are not sure on what business this money is for, how can we send the money, for our money is put out. If there is a way that we can make more profit than we can do now, then we can remove the money; if we are not sure of the

No. 101 of same Paper. No. 100 of same Paper. C 3

No. 82 of Confidential Paper, " Eastern, No. 17."