CO882-(2-3) — Page 366

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference -

C.O.882

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO

2 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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The law (Regulation 42) goes on to say :-" And on the expiration of such new delay (i.e., extension of delay not exceeding fifteen days), no further delay shall be granted unless, however in exceptional cases in which sickness or other good reason is shown for a further extension.

I only ask whether this does not clearly and distinctly lay down that a further extension of time is grantable beyond the fifteen days, and that too without any limitation whatever as to time, in cases where good reason for such further extension is shown; and I ask moreover whether such good reason does not exist when the Inspector of Police or other officer lawfully entrusted with the issue of passes has himself to delay the issue of the pass, or its rectification, in consequence of the inquiries which he has to make.*

14. It is important that I should particularly draw your Excellency's attention to this inaccurate representation of the law, as the regulation which is thus distorted is precisely one of the amended regulations which I have been blamed in the Report for having suggested. While the former regulations, those of the 10th November, 1868, laid down a limit of delay which could not be exceeded under any circumstances, the new Regulation 42, introduced at my suggestion in September 1869, allowed the delay to be extended indefinitely whenever good reason for it could be shown.

15. Is it any argument to say that the Officer entrusted with the duty of issuing and rectifying passes according to changes necessitating fresh entries, may unlawfully not grant the extension of delay which is due and rightly claimable in any case; and that, therefore, the immigrant is no less exposed to hardship. That would simply be an abuse of authority, and a breach of duty on the part of such officer; and there is no law beneficial to immigrants or others that might not similarly miscarry, if the officers who are entrusted with its administration misperform or violate their duty.

16. To the general conclusions of the Report, as to the truthfulness of the allegations contained in the petition, it is not my purpose to allude, especially as they are to be tested anew by the inquiry which is going to be made by the Royal Commissioners.

17. As one instance amongst many of the hastiness of the decisions come to by the Commission, and of the remarks passed in the Report, I may mention the case of Suroop (No. 8 in Petition, pago 27). This man's personal allegations, unsupported by an iota of evidence, are taken to be proved; and, therefore, judgment is passed both upon the law and on the Magistrate who administered it, although he had not been called upon for the least explanation regarding it, in the following terms:-

"This man's case is a hard one, and is another instance of the harshness and severity of the regulations carrying Ordinance 31 of 1867 into force. Under the circumstances, the magistrate's decision was most severe.'

The Honourable Mr. Antelme, alluding to this case, properly remarks: "L'enquête a été incomplète au sujet de cet Indien. Le Magistrat qui a prononcé le jugement n'ayant pas été appelé à expliquer sa décision, je ne puis admettre comme prouvé le fait avancé contre lui."

18. Another striking instance of the facility with which the ordinary rules of evidence are reversed in the Report is the account of Case 12 of the Petition (page 29). After stating that the complainant had been sentenced to a fine of 5s. for selling flowers, the Report says: "Nothing has been brought forward to show that this man's statement is untrue."

Nothing, I say, could more clearly indicate the bias of the Report. The rule Ei incumbit, probatio qui dicit is totally discarded; it is absolutely reversed; and the doctrine is laid down that the allegation of a complainant has to be taken as proved if nothing be adduced to shew that it is untrue. I ask whether this is consistent with the rules of evidence followed by the Judges of this Colony.

19. In regard to the charge of immigrants having boon frequently beaten with rattans in the depôt, I cannot help emphatically protesting against the conclusions of the Report, and declaring them to be altogether unfounded.

The Report says, "the exculpatory evidence adduced to the Commission on this head if far from being satisfactory." Not only was I never called upon to produce any exculpatory evidence, but I was not even allowed to hear the inculpatory depositions when they were taken. I knew nothing about them till the printed Report came into my hands. How can it, under such circumstances, be affirmed that the exculpatory evidence was far from satisfactory ?

True it is that the charge was in the Petition and its Appendices; but to that

* Regulation 40 describes the officers who are entrusted with the issuing of passen.

† Paragraph 137, page 45.

*

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I had only made a general reply, awaiting the special cases to examine each of them in its turn. No opportunity of doing so was ever afforded to me.

20. Although a stringent Department-Order forbidding the use of rattans by peons, under pain of dismissal from office, as far back as 1866, had been exhibited to the Commission in the Order Book of the Immigration Department, and it had been proved that a poon had actually been dismissed under the rule so laid down. The Report says, "such a practice (that of beating immigrants) should not be allowed to exist for a moment in such a Department."

Was it proved that such a practice had been allowed to exist? Was it not unquestionably proved that the practice had, on the contrary, been distinctly forbidden ?

No conclusive evidence can be held to have been adduced of the order having been infringed; but admitting that it was infringed, would it follow that the practice was allowed ? When perjury is committed before a Judge in a Court of law, is it allowed by him? When a robbery or any other offence is committed in his house, is it committed with his sanction ?

21 Another glaring instance of the errors incurred by the Commission by their not having elicited sufficient information, is the version given of the case of Ingum, an old man who wished to return to India (par. 114).

You know, Sir, too well the opinion hold, and have ever held in regard to the question of return passages, not to be able to see at a glance the injustice and impropriety of the terms in which this case is represented. It is stated thus: "One man, Ingum, complained of not being able to obtain a return passage to India after having been twenty-five years in the Colony." This, his Honour the Chairman immediately put to rights by referring the man to the Protector for a back passage.

Does this not imply that the man, though entitled to a return passage, could not obtain it ? Was it asked whether the man had ever applied to the Protector for the return passage? Whether the return passage had ever been refused by the Protector? If not, was it fair to let the assertion stand as it is given, to let him say, that he was unable, though old, and notwithstanding his having been twenty-five years in the Colony, to obtain a return passage?

I could have understood its being stated that the poor old man was not aware of his being entitled to a free return passage. But, even if so, he could scarcely allege, after twenty-five years' stay in the Colony, that he did not know where to go to ascertain whether he had a right to a free passage or not. When sent to me by the Commissioners, this man was distinctly informed by me that he was entitled to a free passage. He has not, however, taken advantage of that privilege yet. How is this to be reconciled with his complaint as to his not having been able to obtain a return passage; and with the statement made in the Report that this case was put to rights by the Chairman of the Commission ?

22. In regard to the various comments made in the Report with reference to the adoption of the system of portrait tickets, I need only say that not a single step was taken by me in that matter without the previous sanction of Government, and that those comments, therefore, reflect upon the Executive itself.

But let us see whether they are such as to reflect any deserved blame even on the Executive.

In justification of the adoption of the scheme, I need only quote the opinion entertained regarding it by the Honourable Sholto Douglas, then Procureur-General, two years after the measure had been brought into operation. He said: "The system of portrait tickets has been for some time past in operation, and has been productive of good results. Not only has it proved a check upon the use by Indians of tickets not belonging to them, and which have been stolen or purchased by them with a view to concealing their identity; but it has also proved of use in the detection of crime, the duplicate of every photograph being kept in the Immigration Department, where the portraits are taken."

I may add, that the prevention of false personation has been effected by the adoption of portrait tickets more successfully than it could have been by any other measure; and that this has not only been the means of maintaining order amongst immigrants, by hindering unlawful transfers of tickets between them, but that it has, moreover, hindered departures under falsely-assumed names, and helped in checking fraud in transfers of titles of property.

23. The rate of the charge is referred to as having been exorbitant. But what is not explained is, that when the scheme was adopted there were fewer photographers in the Colony than there are now; that as an agreement was entered into for five years