CO882-(2-3) — Page 152

CO882 & CO885 Colonial Office Confidential Prints 理藩院機密印刊 All

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference -

C.O.882

2 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC-

10

victory of one party and the plundering and killing or driving away of the vanquished. The Rajah wrote to me, complaining of these disturbances, which, he justly said, were most injurious to his country, but, at the same time, he expressed himself satisfied with the result of the struggle, and I trusted that matters would soon settle down and mining go on as before. Up to the middle of the year, I heard of no further changes in Laroot.

12. I will now proceed to state briefly what is the present condition of these three countries.

13. At Laroot, I have just learnt from the Acting-Lieutenant Governor that serious riots broke out last month. The defeated party having obtained assistance, attacked their former opponents, and, after a severe struggle, in which it is said thousands were killed, succeeded in driving them from the place and taking possession of the mines. I have not yet received full particulars from Mr. Campbell, but it is clear that considerable assistance in junks, men, and arms, was given by some of the Chinese in Penang, and I am not satisfied from the reports I have received that due diligence was used by the authorities to prevent this. Mr. Campbell has stated to me that the Superintendent of Police boarded a large junk in Penang Harbour, which he found full of men and arms, and which had received a Port Clearance from the Harbour Master. A few days days after, Mr. Campbell went to the mouth of the Laroot river in Her Majesty's ship "Nassau," and sent Captain Speedy up the river in a small steamer which he borrowed for the purpose. Captain Speedy, on his return, reported that he had found the river blockaded by several heavily-armed junks, the crews of which refused to give any account of their proceedings, but which evidently belonged to the now victorious party, and amonget which he recognized the junk that had been just before permitted to leave Penang. He was allowed to bring away with him two Chinamen whom he found tied in the hold of one of the vessels, and who, on examination, proved to be two coolies belonging to the other party who had been captured coming down the river, Although I have not yet received Mr. Campbell's explanation of his proceedings in this matter, I see no reason why these facts should not be stated to your Lordship.

14. I have heard nothing as yet from the Rajah of Laroot, but I anticipate that, after complaining of what has occurred, he will acquiesce in the present state of things as he did in the last. In the meanwhile, Penang is inundated with some 2,000 wounded and starving Chinese fugitives, and the most important traffic-that in tin-with Perak and Laroot, almost entirely put an end to.

15. From Perak I have heard nothing very recently, except complaints of the Rajah Muda, who, if he can muster force enough, may be expected to attack the Bandahara before long, and try to drive him from the throne he has assumed.

16. In Salangore, I regret to say that matters are not by any means in a satisfactory or hopeful condition. When Rajah Mahdie escaped from Johore, he made his way up the Linghie River, which forms the northern boundary of Malacca, and with the connivance of the Datu (Chief) of a small territory called Sunghie Ujong, through which the northern branch of this river runs, he made his way to the interior of Salangore and joined bis brother rebel chiefs.

17. Although bringing neither men, arms, or assistance of any kind, his mere presence seems to have acted strongly on his party, and the result was a series of attacks on Tunku Koodin, ending in the recapture of the forts at the mouth of the Salangore River, which gave them the entire possession of that river, and, later, of two forts on the upper part of the Klang River, which gave them the control of a considerable portion of

that river.

18. Tunku Koodin, being now hard pressed, applied for assistance to the Bandahara of Pahang, the territory to the north of Johore, on the east side of the Peninsula. The Bandahara, having ascertained from me that I had no objection to his aiding Tunku Koodin, promised to send a large number of his people to his assistance, who it is intended shall cross over from the interior of Pahang to the interior of Salangore and Klang, and attack the enemy in rear, whilst Tunku Koodin operates against them from the rivers in their front.

19. Whilst this was going on Tunku Koodin, irritated with the favour shown to Mahdie by the Datu of Soonghie Ujong, prevailed on the Datu of Rambow, a country lying between Sunghie Ujong and Malacca, to reassert some old claim which he had to a place called Sempang, in Sunghie Ujong, and on the banks of the Linghie River, and to offer it to Tunku Koodin, that he might erect thereon a fort, and thus prevent his enemies from receiving supplies by the Linghie River, which communicates in its interior with the Langkat, Klang, and Salangore Rivers. As the immediate effect of this would be to prevent the Sunghie Ujong people from getting in their supplies, or getting out their tin, of which there are considerable mines, in some of which the Malacca people are interested,

}

11

they immediately applied to me for protection, offering to hand their country over to the British Government if we would accept it.

As I had an

20. Thinking that my interference might tend to bring about some arrangement of the matter, I sent the Colonial Secretary to the Dâtu of Rambow, who at once expressed his willingness to leave in my hands the entire settlement of his difference with Sunghie Ujong. To this Sunghie Ujong readily assented, and taking with me Tunku Koodin, I proceeded on the 29th ultimo to Sempang, where I met the Datu of Sunghie Ujong, but not the Dâtu of Rambow, who I suspect must have misunderstood the day, as I know he left his own country for the purpose of meeting me some time before. appointment with the Sultan of Salangore on the next day but one, and the day after was the "Ramazan," or great Mahommedan fast day, when no business could be transacted, it was impossible for me to wait, and I was glad to find that after discussing matters with the Tunku and the Dâtu, the latter stated his determination to do all in his power to prevent any assistance whatever from reaching Tunku Koodin's enemies. With this assurance the Tunku expressed himself satisfied, and the idea of his occupying the Linghie River was allowed to drop.

21. Although I have not since heard from the Dâtu of Rambow, I do not anticipate that he will raise any difficulty by pressing his claim to Sempang when he finds that it will not assist his friend Tunku Koodin,

22. A very few days before I started for Linghie I had received a letter from the Sultan of Salangore, complaining of the inconvenience that he and his people suffered from ships and boats taking tin out of, and bringing provisions into his country, being stopped at the mouth of the rivers. Although he did not name Tunku Koodin, it was evident that his complaint had reference to the blockade which I have before stated that the Tunku had found it necessary to enforce. Feeling that this offered a very favourable opportunity of coming to a distinct understanding with the Sultan as to Koodin's position, and to the Tunku as to his own prospects, I wrote to the Sultan to say that if he would assemble his sons and chief men, I would come up to Langkat on the last available day, the Ist of November, and talk over matters with them. I accordingly went to Langkat on the 1st instant, accompanied by Tunku Koodin, and knowing that Mahdie was in the neigh- bourhood, and that some of the Sultan's relatives and people were ill-affected towards the Tunku, I thought it prudent to ask to be accompanied by the armed boats of Her Majesty's ship "Zebra," and an escort of a few of the 80th Regiment.

23. Before landing I had a long interview with Tunku Koodin. I pointed out to him the apparently precarious nature of his position, that although he had the nominal support of the Sultan, and was well backed up by people who were satisfied of his ultimate success, and who readily advanced him money merely on the prospect of his eventually restoring peace to, and opening up the trade of the country, yet that he had immense difficulties to contend with in the open hostility of the rebel Chiefs, and lukewarmness, if not treachery, of the Sultan's sons. I reminded him that he was then in a worse position than he was twelve months since, and that although I had given, and was ready to continue to give, him all the support in my power, it must evidently be very questionable whether he could hope eventually to drive out his enemies, and establish himself firmly in the Government of the country as the Sultan's Viceroy. I suggested to him that if he did not feel very Banguine of success it would be better for him to retire from the contest while he could do so without loss or disgrace, and that if he decided on this I would in our interview with the Sultan pave the way for his doing so in an honourable and satisfactory manner.

24. Tunku Koodin, whilst acknowledging the justice of much that I have said, stated that he did not consider his situation desperate so long as he had the prospect of the aid which had been promised him from Pahang. He admitted that this was his last chance, and stated that if that failed he was quite ready to hand back to the Sultan the trust he had given him, asking only to be recouped the expenses he had incurred in endeavouring to carry it out. He said that if I wished it he would adopt this course at once, but that he would prefer having a chance of making one more effort for success.

25. I did not think it necessary to accept this offer, and was glad to find in our interview with the Sultan that he professed the greatest trust and confidence in Tunku Koodin. The complaints about the blockade were abandoned on Tunku Koodin's expla-- nation of the difficulties which compelled him to adopt this step, and his assurance of bis readiness to do everything the Sultan desired to prevent inconvenience to him or his people. At my suggestion it was agreed that any little difficulties of this nature should be left to be settled by Tunku Koodin and the Sultan's youngest and favourite son Rajah Yacoop, and the interview terminated by the Sultan expressing in the strongest manner his confidence in, and regard for, Tunku Koodin, and his satisfaction at the understanding which had been come to.

Comments

Approved members can add comments, bookmarks, and private notes.

No comments yet.

Private Research Note

Private notes are available after approval.