CO537-6564 — Page 40

2

that its control proceeded from Peking would cut the ground

from under the Communists' pretensions that the party was

of a Malayan character and would reveal it as a Chinese

undertaking pure and simple. This might gain it some

additional local Chinese support, but it would forfeit any

hope of Malay, Indian, Tamil or Indonesian support, and

would also damage its propaganda value in the world at

large.

Nevertheless, official British publicity should

in

not attribute direction of the Communist Terrorist Movement

in Malaya to the Peking Government, unless and until that

government engages in acts which demonstrate that it is,

fact, directing the campaign or makes a clear statement to

that effect.

5.

It is desirable to keep separate the issues of

Communist subversive activities in Malaya and the relations

of H.M.G. with the Peking Government. It is therefore

important to continue to emphasise that our recognition of

the Peking Government has been accorded because the latter

has become the effective Government of China. Through

official channels the line on internal developments in China

should be that what happens there is the business of the

inhabitants of the country.

6.

We may continue, however, to make it clear that our recognition and, if our policy develops in that direction, our possible support of the Peking Government's candidature

at U.N.O.

do not mean that we approve of Communism.

?

For

we consider Communism to be the means whereby the Russians,

and their Chinese Communist friends, seek to expand and to

dominate all Asian territories. As such, Communism is

the enemy of all genuine nationalism, since it seeks the domination of nationalism by alien influence.

This alien influence has, through the agency of Communism,

/established

Page 40Page 41