CO537-6046 — Page 312

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which might easily occur if we have to take a decision not to admit Chinese in Malaya. A further factor is that it is becoming clear, from the discussions which are now in progress with representatives of the United States State Department that there are very much wider divergencies than the Foreign Office had feared in the British and American approach towards policy in regard to Communist China and (unless these difficulties are resolved in the talks between Mr. Bevin and Mr. Acheson next week) they may conceivably lead to some modification of our own policy towards China, with repercussions on Hong Kong.

b

It is conceivable that these developments may have some effect on the Governor's view, not only as to the size of the unofficial majority which is to be conceded (which I agree should be put to him) but also the whole question as to whether this is an appropriate time to be going on with these Constitutional developments.

I therefore recommend that we should again put all these considerations in a telegram to the Governor asking for his further opinion.

5th May, 1950.

I

apree

with X. My

own view is

that this is a most inopportune

time for dealing with constitutimal

changes in a

Colmy which may

be described as in

state of

cold siege. Nevertheless

و

think that something will have to be done, though I showed

hope that we could at

Ний

stage

get away

with

a

вале

18:

unofficial majority including some

nominated

and some elected

members. I attach a summary o

position. C. d. J. 5.5.50. в. 1.2.5.5.50:

Orgon 54494/5019. Tel. from Bernacchi

20

for.

Mt 5+494/50 21 for.

tel. 688.

tel 704

the

да

5-5-50

6-5-50.

9-5-50