CO537-5000 — Page 9

Col. Field surprised that

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донова

On reconsidering the telegram at No. 161 I felt some concern that (apparently) the proposed battalion from Malaya was going to be the only military force concerned with internal security in Hong Kong during the period (extending up to December) while the rest of the troops were being trained for their more active role against an external attack. In the light of the very true comment at the end of para. 3 of the telegram (that internal security operations call for careful reconnaissance and preparation), this seemed to me to be a very disquieting situation. A further point (para. 4A of No. 161) was that the battalion was only to move from Malaya if internal unrest appeared "imminent. There

seemed no provision for meeting a sudden situation of internal unrest (apart from the troops whose training was regarded as overriding consideration).

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I have accordingly discussed the matter with Colonel Field (G.S.0.I to the D.M.O. at the War Office).

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Colonel Field has however explained to me that the "internal security" role in Hong Kong is regarded as a task for 4 battalions. To this task the Commando brigade (3 battalions) has already been allotted. The Guards battalion from Malaya is envisaged as a reinforcement to this brigade if the situation shows signs of requiring it.

This explanation throws an entirely different light on the picture and I accordingly agree that we can now concur in the draft signal enclosed with No. 166.

Sep 49.

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