CO537-4999 — Page 97

2 June 1949

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JIC/FE(49) 21 (Final)

From the time at which the Communists decide to force the issue, attempts must be expected at both internal and external sabotage of ships; this is likely to be aimed as much at merchant shipping as at warships.

40.

From this period onwards channels adjacent to Communist-held territory will be liable to nine laying. This may well be "amateur" in the extreme, but, as has already been shown in the nanoi area and Pearl River, can be effective against small ships.

41

In addition to the larger craft described above the Communists have acquired a small number of landing craft. These could be used to carry raiding or invading troops, together with the large number of junks, sampans and the like, which are available and in the use of which the Communists have already shown themselves adept.

42.

There is no submarine threat unless assistance is obtained from Russia. It is not in line with present Soviet policy to grant such a request at the stage envisaged.

THREAT IN THE EVENT OF WAR BETWEEN THE ALLIES, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE C.C.P.

Land Threats

43.

In the event of a war between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union the Chinese Communists would undoubtedly be allied to the latter country from the outset, and would in general take directions from the Soviet High Command. The Soviet Union is unlikely to send any field formations south of the Yangtze Valley, although the expulsion of the British from Hong Kong would be one of their subsidiary aims. There is little doubt that this task would be allotted to the C.C.P. and that Soviet material assistance and tactical advice would be. available.

44.

Under these conditions the method of attack and forces employed will be similar, but it is likely that Soviet command, technical and material assistance would be on a considerable scale.

Internal Threat

45.

The entry of the Soviet Union into a war against the Allies, bringing with it greatly im reased threats of attack by land, sea and air, would strongly influence the waverers amongst the Chinese sections of the Hong Kong Defence and Police Forces and civil defence services. and, unless there are convincing signs of our ability to hold the Colony, large-scale desertions must be expected. This, at a time when fifta column activities would be at their height, would provide a serious complication. The effect of air raids on an overcrowded population would have a grave effect on morale and would increase to a large extent the already heavy burden thrown on civil defence and public services.

Air Threat

46

The threat from Chinese Air Forces would be no greater than that described in paragraphs 32 to 36, except that a stiffening of Russian personnel might be introduced and a small flow of essential materials be

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