CO537-4999 — Page 83

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5.

Paragraph 10.

We consider that the threat from the Communist Navy has been dismissed rather too lightly. We estimate that the Communists have some 65 ships including 7 Destroyer Escorts and 17 Gunboats. Although the morale of this force is thought to be low at present it is believed that it might be welded into an effective fighting force in a comparatively short time and might be of considérable nuisance value if employed against our trade.

ANNEX

6.

7.

Paragraph 11.

(a)

We consider the capacity of the rail route Hankow-Changsha-Canton-Hong Kong to be more in the region of 4,000 tons per day in either direction (8 trains each way per day of 500 tons).

(b) No mention has been made of a likely time of advance from Nanchang-Kanchor-Shinchow along the Kan river valley. A very large number of Communist forces are disposed already in the Nanchang area.

Paragraph 20.

This paragraph presupposes the existence of a Chinese Communist Air Force. We have no`evidence that this is so, and believe that apart from a small number of defectors from the Nationalist Air Force the Chinese Communists have only some aircraft which are being used for training purposes at three schools in Northern Manchuria. It is most unlikely that Soviet aircraft would be used before hostilities exist between the Soviet Union and United Kingdom.

8.

Paragraph 29.

We consider that it is most unlikely that Soviet advisers will be attached to the Chinese forces attacking Hong Kong. It has not hitherto been the practice of the Soviet Union to render overt assistance to countries engaged in hostilities against the West.

9.

Paragraph 32.

As sortie rates are discussed in the part of the paper immediately following this paragraph it would be helpful if the strength of the combat element of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force by types of aircraft were given, i.e.

Fighter bomber Medium bomber

145

60

Heavy bomber

19

224

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