And in paragraph 4 of the same Annex they say:
"Our aim should therefore be to hold Hong Kong against Chinese Communist aggression even if Communist China declares war on Great Britain. "
The Cabinet conclusions on C.P. (49)100 are at (78). Paragraph 2(c) reads:
Ministers felt however that they could not ignore the advice they had received that Hong Kong could not be held against attack by a major power operating from the Mainland. The Government must be careful to avoid drifting into a position in which, after pouring valuable resources into Hong Kong, they had at the end to withdraw with great material loss and loss of prestige. The aim should be to reinforce the defences of the Colony for the purpose of protecting it against present dangers, but to avoid giving explicit long-term commitments which the Government might be unable to fulfil."
The reinforcements to be sent to Hong Kong as a result of the same Cabinet conclusions are intended to render the garrison, in the words of the Chiefs of Staff (paragraph 3(b) of C.0.S. Report attached to C. P. (49)100 at (75) "strong enough to hold local or guerilla attacks". The Chiefs of Staff go on to say (in paragraph 3(d)) that, should a large scale Communist threat develop, further reinforcements on a considerable scale would be required.
3. The Cabinet conclusions at (78) do not tell us whether it is the intention to defend Hong Kong against a large scale Chinese Communist attack. This important question is left in the air.
And
It is a question which the Governor of Hong Kong specifically asked in his Top Secret despatch No. 9 of the 28th February 1949 (see last sentence of (81) here) and which we have not yet answered. it is the point raised by the Commanders in Chief Far East in their Signal to the Chiefs of Staff (which you showed me this morning), in which they say that the bald statement in the 0.D.C. Paper of last January on the defence rolas of Colonies that Hong Kong is not defensible against attack by a major power needs, in the present low state of civilian morale in Hong Kong, to be amended and amplified so as to make it clear (in effect) that this does not apply to the Chinese Communists.
I mentioned the lack of a Cabinet decision on this point to Mr. Paskin and Mr. Sidebotham against today's meeting of the F. E. (0) Committee, but they were of course already fully aware of the point.
LL. I do not see, much hope of co-operation from the civilian population of Hong Kong unless it is made absolutely clear that we do proposé to
defend
Lo
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