CO537-4999 — Page 252

(8651) Wt. 15174/D85 30m 6/48 C. & Co. 745(8)

TOP SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM

WARNING The text of this message must be thoroughly paraphrased if it is to be published or otherwise communicated to persons outside the British or U.S. Government Service. If re-transmitted unparaphrased, the originator must mark it to be sent in "O.T.P." (One-Time Pad).

Reid 9/5/ay & seem to Mr Side bollen. Los will probably take today: Ilove equal fimcos sectore it, r Enfined. Fr. R. Ju 9/6/49.

PRIORITY

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FROM: G.H. Q., FAR EAST LAND FORCES

ΤΟ : MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LONDON

SEACOS 902

ACOS

From FEDSEC.

IZ 1339 TOO 061530GH

(060900A)

TOR 070955A

6th May, 1949

From Commanders-in-Chief for Chiefs of Staff.

We have further considered our air requirements at Hong Kong and we wish to draw attention to the paramount importance of maintaining air superiority there in the event of external aggression.

77

2. We consider that in the event of a major attack being developed by Communist Chinese Forces we should require a minimum of four figher squadrons at Hong Kong to meet the essential requirements of air defence and army support. So far as air defence is concerned we consider that (number?) small successful air raids on Hong Kong might have internal repercuss- ions sufficient to nullify the value of the substantial army reinforcements now being made available. Moreover British prestige in the Far East should not be subjected to any further risks due to inadequate air strength.

3. With a reinforcement of two fighter squadrons to this theatre we could at once bring our strength at Hong Kong up to two Spitfire squadrons and still retain two fighter squadrons for operations in Malaya but able to reinforce Hong Kong at short notice.

4. We therefore recommend that this theatre should be reinforced forthwith with two fighter squadrons. We further recommend that these squadrons should be equipped with Hornets for the following reasons.

(A) They can fly direct between Malaya and Hong Kong and will therefore enable us to adjust the balance of forces in these areas at very short notice. This is essential.

(B) Both short and long range fighters will be needed in defence of Hong Kong if an offensive is to be carried to the numerous potential enemy irfields.