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(1) In making their appreciations the Chiefs
of staff had it in mind that although the Communist
armies in China were greatly superior to former
Chinese armies, they were not likely to constitute
a threat of the kind which would develop if a
major power such as Russia attacked the Colony.
(ii) The British community in Hong Kong felt
great uncertainty about the United Kingdom
Covernment's ultimate intentions in regard to the
Colony and the morale of the Chinese in Hong Kong
was low. In the circumstances the Governor of
Hong kong and the Commissioner-General in South-
East Asia had urged that the United kingdon
Government should go as far as practicable in the
direction of declaring their intention to protect
Hong Kong. Any suggestion that the United Kingdom
Government might abandon Hong Kong would have
obvious repercussions in Malaya, Siam and Burma.
(iii) The advice that Hong kong could not be
held against attack by a major power operating from
the mainland could not be ignored. It was felt that
the United Kingdom Government must avoid drifting
into a position in which, after pouring valuable
resources into Hong Kong, they had at the end to
withdraw with great material loss and loss of
prestige. The aim should be to reinforce the defences of the Colony for the purpose of protecting it against present dangers, but to avoid giving
explicit long term commitments that the Covernment
might/
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