CO537-4999 — Page 213

-2-

here. "e are content to leave it to you to decide the

best method of doing this, but if possible we should like

it to be done orally.

(1) In making their appreciations, the Chiefs

of starf had it it mind that although the Communist

armies in China were greatly superior to former

Chinese armies, they were not likely to constitute

a threat of the kind which would develop if a major

power such as Russia attacked the Colony.

(ii) The British community in Hong Kong felt

great uncertainty about the United kingdom Government's ultimate intentions in regard to the Colony and the

morale of the Chinese in Hong Kong was low. In these

circumstances the Governor of Hong Kong and the

Commissioner-Ceneral in South-East Asia hac urged

that the United kingdon Government should go as far

practicable as possiblee in the direction of declaring their

intention to protect Hong Kong. Any suggestion that

the United Kingdom Covernment might abandon Hong Kong

would have obvious repercussions in Malaya, Siam and

Burma.

(iii) The advice that Hong Kong could not be held

against attack by a major power operating from the

mainland could not be ignored. It was felt that the

United Kingdom Government must avoid drifting into a

position in which, after pouring valuable resources into Hong Kong, they had at the end to withdraw with great material loss and loss of prestige. The aim should be to reinforce the defences of the Colony for the purpose of protecting it against present dangers,

but/