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2.

Since then the Communist forces in Southern China have made substantial progress, and the risk of an armed attack against Hong Kong has increased. The Chiefs of Staff have advised that the threat of such an attack may develop at any time after the end of September next and that, if it is to be resisted, we should be ready to meet it from the beginning of September. The Chiefs of Staff have also advised that it should be possible successfully to repel such an attack if it is decided now to send to Hong Kong the further reinforcements described in the memorandum by the Minister of Defence (C. P. (49) 118).

3.

Together with the Ministers most directly concerned I have discussed this situation with the Chiefs of Staff, the Commissioner-General for South East Asia and the Commanders-in- Chief of the Land and Air Forces in the Far East. The military implications are discussed in the paper submitted by the Minister of Defence (C. P. (49) 118). My paper is concerned with the political considerations; and the proposals in the following paragraphs are put forward after consultation with the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

4.

All the advice that we have received from the authori- ties on the spot is that any failure on our part to meet this threat to the security of Hong Kong will damage very seriously British prestige throughout the Far East and South East Asia. The peoples of this area remember clearly how Hong Kong was over- run by the Japanese in the last war; and, unless they are con- vinced of our determination and ability to resist this new threat to Hong Kong, the whole common front against Communism in South East Asia, and especially in Siam and Burma, is likely to crumble. On the other hand, a clear indication of our determination to resist such an attack might well succeed in deterring the Communists from making the attempt.

5.

In the light of the views expressed in the Cabinet's earlier discussions, I have considered with the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations how best we can present to world opinion a decision to defend Hong Kong against such an attack. We are agreed in recommending that this should be presented as a decision to resist aggression. The right to resist aggression, wherever it may occur, is clearly recognised in the United Nations Charter and I therefore propose that we should base on this right our determination to resist aggression against Hong Kong. If the Communists decide to stage an attack on Hong Kong, we should then be in a position to appeal to the Security Council of the United Nations, and would be entitled to the support of the nations who are signatories of the Charter. I do not look to the United Nations for any material support the Soviet Union would certainly veto any resolution for remedial action but I base my proposal on the fact that the United Nations Organisation offers the best opportunity of mobilising world opinion and in particular our friends in support of our resistance to aggression.

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Approach to other Commonwealth Countries and the United States.

6.

Immediately the decision has been taken to send the necessary reinforcements to Hong Kong and to resist Communist aggression by armed force should it take place, we should notify the other members of the Commonwealth and the United States of our decision and of the basis upon which it rests. The fact that this decision is in accordance with the terms of the United Nations Charter should, we hope, commend itself to those powers who attach importance to the United Nations Organisation and all it stands for.

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