VIENS OF CON ANDERS-II-CHIEF,
APPENDIX
COLONIAL OFFICE VIEWS
OUR COMMENTS
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1.
The Threat.
By the third quarter of 1949 the following threats may exist:-
(a) Serious threat to internal
security by Communist inspired strikes, murder, arson, anâ terrorism, aggravated or caused by large influx of refugees.
(b) Thr at of land attack by guerilla
forces in addition to (a) above
(c) Ramoto threat of light scule air
attack
(a) No sea borne threat other than
by refugoos and possibly small scale guerilla landing partics
(a) It is imprudent to base any plans plans on the assumption that the threat is unlikely to develop before the third quarter
(d) Colonial Office doubt the possibility of effectively closing 200 miles of sea frontier and stress the need for considerable Service assistance.
(a) We agree that a throat may develop sooner than the third quarter of 1949.
(b) We agree,
(c) o consider that the threat of light scale
air attack is so remote that the proposed A.. Battery of the H.K.D.F, should be adequate to donl with it. s, however, this will NOT be operativo, possibly until late 1950, intorin rrangements should be made. The War Office is at the moment examining this.
(a) The O's-in-C Far East should be.
asked to comment on the Colonial Office view.
The J.1.0. consider that Communist domination in China would tend to:-
(1) bring the Trade Unions
increasingly under Communist control.
(ii) make the Chinese element of
Police Force and Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Force unreliable.
The Communists might then be able to bring the whole life of Colony to a stop whenever they wished,
Forces available to meet the threat.
(a) Army
(1) Pour Infantry Battalions (includes)
the Infantry Battalion of H.K.D.T).
Note:-
Infantry Battalion of H.K.D.P. vill not be operational until June, 1949. and one Infantry Battalion will not be up to fully trained strength until October, 1949.
(ii) One Field Regiment.
(iii) One Coast Artillery/Anti-Aircraft
Battery (H.1.D.R.).
Note:-
Unlikely to be operational before latter half of 1950
(iv) The provision of an air defence
organisation rucrulted on an aux- iliary basis.
Note:-
This has not yet been raised as a part of the H.K.D.F.
Army.
The military and civil forces available and being formed would be wholly inadequate to meet a serious threat if it should develop within the next six to nine months.
The ..D.F. cannot remain mobilisod for a prolonged period to meet a cold war situation without disrupting the woonomic life of the colony. Such disruption might well suit Communist aims and should be avoided at all costs,
Owing to the non-availability of additional forces to reinforce long long either from within the Far East theatre or from outside, the possibility of raising additional battalions of tho Malay Regiment in order to free other forces for service in Hong Kong should be extmined.
Army.
We agree with both Colonial Office comments about the H.K.D.F.
We consider that although the Colonial Office may be taking a pessimistic view, we may be forced to free a Brigade Group from Malaya for use as reinforcement in Hong Kong.
We must accept the fact that our Far East garrison must retain the present reinforcement of one Brigade Group until more stable conditions in Malaya and Hong Kong are assured or the Gurkha division and local forces are up to strength.
The malay Regiment at present consists of two battalions with a third battalion forming. It is hoped in due course to raise a further three battalions to make a total of six. While we agree with the Colonial Office suggestion to expand the Malay Regiment, we consider that the extra battalions to bo raised would not be ready to free other forces for service in Hong Kong in time to meet an emergency in the next six to nine months. This point is being oxninod as a matter of urg nay by the Wer--oOffice.
T.1.0. (48) 133.
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VIEWS OF COMMANDERS-IN-CHILF
Forces Available to Meet the Threat Contd.
7) One Brigade Group available at short notice to reinforce Hong-Kong in
emergency.
Note:-
This conuot be done until present unurgency in rileya cuasus and esun then would depend upon the re... tention in the theatre of the
quivalent of One Brigade huld specially to meet the emergency.
R. A.F.
One Fighter Squadron
(ii) On- Flying Boat Squadron,
(iii) P. R. Elament.
(iv) Tranport Element (for supply
dropping.)
(c) R.N.
Available ships of the Far East Station (for fire support).
Note:-
A.0.P. will be required;
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.