CO537-4998 — Page 148

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TOP SECRET.

6.

Deductions.

the

(a) The requirements for fighter support against the threat

envisaged will be covered if one fighter/bomber squadron is available to reinforce the Colony at short notice,

A.A. defences are required to counter an enemy owning only a few aircraft and to protect vital areas,

(b) Any defence plan must take into consideration the vital

importance of keeping the enemy well away from KAI TAK airfield. The airfield should have effective ground and anti-aircraft defences.

ENEMY NAVAL FORCES.

It may be,

Are likely to be practically non-existant. however, that the enemy will try to land parties of saboteurs and agents from junks or sampans either on the Island, or in the NE TERRITORIES, for the purpose of dis- rupting communications and attacking Vulnerable Points. This will represent the main sea threat.

OWN NAVAL FORCES.

8.

9.

The strength of the Naval Forces in HONG KONG at any one time is impossible to forecast, but it is reasonable to expect that some Naval gunfire support will be availablo if HONG KONG is threatened.

مدید

Some Police launches would be available to help in the inter- ception and search of jun's, sampans, etc.

10. Deductions.

ther

Plans and practises should be arranged to make measures to prevent the landing of saboteurs and raiding parties as effective as possible. As complete sea protection will not be possible within the resources likely to be available it is of great importance that VPs, military and civil, are adequately guarded. Arrangements for this are already in being.

OWN TROOPS.

11.

!

(a) Regular Forces consist of three infantry battalions,

Field Regiment and ancillary units. The latter are dispersed at various static installations throughout the Colony.

(b) The H.K.V.D.C. should by April 1949, consist of:-

(1) an Infantry Battalion Headquarters and four rifle companies organised but not fully trained for operations in the field.

(ii) an unknown number of Auxiliaries up to 500, organised

and trained to relieve the Regular Army and Police of static Guard commitments.

(iii) a small Specialist Cadre for producing guides,:.

interpreters, etc., for attachment to Regular units.

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/ENEMY