CO537-4998 — Page 127

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(B) The telegram infers that security from guerillas is being obtained to a large degree by mutual understand- ing between police and civil authorities on one side of the border and smugglers on the other. Such an under- standing whilst it may be satisfactory for the present would be imprudent and even dangerous as a long-term policy or basis for planning potential aggressors when strong enough to break their side of the tacit agreement might well find us ill prepared.

3.

Since we must be prepared to meet any of the three threats the relative time at which they are likely to occur is of prime importance. Though we consider that it is unlikely that the threats will develop so early we accept for planning purposes the Governor's view that refugee and guerilla threats may develop any time after March this year and that about one months warning should be available. We can however assume no likely date when Communist policy regarding the fomenting of strikes and internal unrest at present apparently quiescent) may change and precipitate the internal security threat. We agree with the Governor that we shall have little notice of this threat.

4.

We therefore consider at we should be pro- pared to meet the internal threat now and the refugee and guerilla threats in April at the soonest.

5.

Assuming that no unit of Hong Kong Defence Force will be available the following forces will be required to meet the threats should they arise.

Royal Navy.

(A) To meet the internal threat only 1 Cruiser and 2 Destroyers or Frigates part of whose ships companies will be required to supplement man-power for running essential services and to man harbour craft for seaward patrols.

(B) To meet the refugee threat only the existing harbour craft and about 8 additional patrol craft for which a cruiser will be required to provide crews and technical ratings.

(C) To meet the guerilla threat only 1 cruiser to supplement man-power (mainly technical) for running essential services and possibly for bombardment. 2 destroyers or frigates for bombardment and seaward patrols. Any combination of these three threats would require the bulk of the Far East Fleet i.6. 2 cruisers and at least 4 destroyers or frigates.

6.

The forces to meet these threats individually can be provided by the Commander-in-Chief Far East Station for a short period without much difficulty if the threats do not arisc simultaneously with emergency operations at Shanghai or elsewhere. If simultaneous crises do occur in Hong Kong and other areas we consider that so far as the Navy is concerned Hong Kong should be