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Foreign Affairs HOUSE OF COMMONS Foreign Affairs

[MR. BARTLETT.]

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said introduce but restore democratic systems after the long period of occupa- tion-whereas as Germany and Japan have never really made any effort of that kind.

If we are to see the rebuilding of German industry without careful control, one of the first things that must, and certainly will happen, will be a collapse of the French Government, and General de Gaulle will come into power. How- ever anxious General de Gaulle may be to avoid taking unparliamentary measures -as I think he is nevertheless he will find himself up against such industrial difficulties that he will have to turn himself into a dictator. That would be one result if the American policy of not dismantling German factories were to go through without being carefully checked by us.

I was glad to hear the Foreign Secretary insist that this will not happen, and I hope it will not, but surely it is true that if we see a rapid revival of Germany which brings out some of the old industrial leaders who did nothing to stop Hitler coming into power but who, on the contrary, helped him because they thought he would destroy the trade unions--as indeed he did with a lot of other things if we see that, the result in the Soviet Union might be disastrous. The fear of the revival of Germany is the one thing which might drive the Soviet Union into some insensate act of aggression. After all, German troops occupied one-third of European Russia in a very brutal way indeed. Therefore the revival of Germany, as some of the Americans would like to see it happen, would be more likely than anything else to lead the Soviet Union into some idiotic action which might plunge us into another war. Also, if there is one thing which would drive the satellite states in Eastern Europe more and more into the arms of Russia, it would be the belief that we were restoring, without great care and control, the industrial capacity and productivity of the Ruhr.

It seems to me there is a similar danger in the Far East against which we must carefully guard ourselves. Those of us who have been to China have great sympathy--I think we all have great sympathy-with the efforts of the Nanking Government. After all, in the

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last 20 years they have carried out remarkable change. Unfortunately, as the years have gone by the change has been less and less welcome, but it should be remembered that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek carried out one of the most remarkable unifying campaigns in that immense country that can possibly be imagined. Nevertheless I am con- vinced that that Government is finished. I am convinced that no effort can prop it up on its feet again and that we are to have, for the greater part of China at any rate, a Communist or so-called Communist régime.

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The great danger there is again that the Americans, in their impatience to get quick results, may say to themselves that they have poured million upon millions of dollars into China to help Chang Kia-shek and the only result has been that they have become unpopular both with the Chinese Communists and the Nanking Government. Having de- cided that, they may say to themselves some of them say in regard to Europe, The French are hopeless "- that the Chinese are hopeless, and that therefore they should build up Germany and Japan again. In my opinion, the greatest danger about the advance of the Chinese Communists is not so much what they will do in China but what the effect of their success in China will be on American policy in Japan. One finds that General MacArthur has a great confidence that Japan has become democratic, but that confidence is not shared by all members of his staff and especially by those of them who have lived in Japan for a long time. One fears that, as a result of this failure of American policy in China, we may get all the old industrialists in Japan brought out again and Japan built up in the same way as some people would like to see Germany built up.

us.

Those are two points which I have ventured to put before the House be- cause I think they bring out, not only the dangers of American policy, or the policy of some Americans, but also the opportunities given to

I would urge that, on every possible occasion, the Foreign Office and the British Gov- ernment should remember, and should constantly remind the Americans and ourselves, that this iron curtain is not a vertical barrier separating certain

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Foreign Affairs 9 DECEMBER 1948 countries, but a horizontal barrier At the present time, with our hopes separating certain peoples of different and fears focussed on Europe, and par- political conceptions of democracy in ticularly on Germany, there is a very real every country, and I therefore suggest danger that we may not accord a suffi- that the best weapons to use are not the cient degree of importance to the military weapons.

startlingly rapid advance of Soviet Power in Asia. I do not for a moment mean that we should relax our efforts in the West; on the contrary, I think we should redouble them, but, if these efforts are to achieve their purpose and give the world some hope of peace and stability, it is vital that they should be accom- panied by equivalent efforts in the East.

We are engaged in a cold war, and we have to get the proper military weapons in readiness in case its nature changes, but the greatest danger to the world at present is that we should think that those military weapons are a cure in themselves, and not the final desper- ate remedy. They are not a preventive, and what we need at the present time is a preventive campaign. It is the easiest thing in the world at present to be an extremist, but I believe that the British have a very great potential influence which they are not exercising to the full at the present time. I do not think they have decided sufficiently clearly what is their policy in Germany and Japan, and, in consequence, we are not living up to the immense responsibilities thrust upon us by a great and long political experience.

8.3 p.m.

Mr. Fitzroy Maclean (Lancaster): I have listened with great interest to the speech of the hon. Member for Bridg- water (Mr. Bartlett), and I want later to take up one

or two of the very important points he made. But, since, for the moment, we are fortunate enough to have a representative of the Foreign Office on the Front Bench, I would ven- ture, first, to touch quite briefly on some aspects of the speech of the Foreign Secretary.

I listened carefully to every word of the not very inspiring speech with which the right hon. Gentleman opened the Debate, and the thing that struck me most about it was that, in the course of a survey lasting an hour and a half, the Foreign Secretary of what, after all, is still a world Power, should have thought fit to confine his remarks to one con- tinent, indeed, to one small part of a continent, and that at a time when things are happening in half-a-dozen other places which directly threaten not only the British Empire but democracy itself. People used to say during the war, "You never hear the one that hits you," and it seems to me that that is what is going to happen to the Government, if they do not look out.

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In recent months, the advance of Soviet power in Europe has suffered a series of notable checks: in Germany, where the carefully laid plan to force out the Western Powers has merely produced deadlock and has greatly augmented Soviet unpopularity with the German people; in France, in Italy and in Greece. Even beyond the Iron Curtain, there are signs of less unquestioning obedience to the dictates of Moscow. Meanwhile, Marshall Aid has proved effective, Western Union has become a reality, and, in the Atlantic Pact, we shall at last have a properly constituted military alliance, with a guarantee of active American participation.

In other words, the point has been reached in Europe where the Russians can advance no further without risking a war, which they must realise they will lose. It is, of course, possible that war will nevertheless be the outcome of the present crisis, but, from what we know of the rulers of the Soviet Union, it would be surprising if they were deliberately to take such a risk, especially when it is considered what tempting alternatives lie open to them. Soviet policy is in its essence expansionist, and it is based--- and we should be quite clear about this- on the irreconcilable antagonism of the Communist and non-Communist world. But the Kremlin is not in a hurry. Its policies are long-term, and they are based on the assumption that the capitalist system is, in any case, doomed to destruction.

Mr. Gallacher: That is correct.

Mr. Maclean: Its policy, therefore, is and always has been cautious, flexible and realistic. I hope the hon. Gentle- man opposite will agree with that definition of it. And so, it is only logical

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