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Foreign Affairs HOUSE OF COMMONS [MR. BEVIN.]

recurrence.

Naturally we have taken into account the painful experience that Germany went through between the two wars, and pro- vision is being made to try to avoid a We have also made great progress in drawing up an occupation statute which will define the powers re- served to the occupying authorities when the West German Government is set up, and will indicate the basis of the future relations between the occupying authori ties and the federal and Lander Govern- ments. I regard this as vitally important. The decision for unconditional surrender in Germany left a terrible vacuum in deal- ing with that country. I was a party to it; I do not complain about it. But the situation that was left in the zone as a result of unconditional surrender, left rather a difficult and serious situation.

This occupation statute, which ulti- mately will be woven into the constitu- tion and made to fit, will lay down quite clearly the obligations of the Germans and the limitations on the occupying powers. On the other hand, it will, when agreed, make the situation much clearer for the Germans and allow them to develop. I mention this because it is a fact which I shall refer to later in my statement about Western Europe. If the Germans are to play their part, it is essen- tial to get this part of the business cleared up. Our plan, therefore, is to complete this basic law and the occupation statute at the same time, after which the two will be dovetailed together.

The way will then be clear for the ratification of the provisional constitution by the Germans, and the establishment in due course of governmental institutions for Western Germany. I know from the criticism levelled at me in previous Debates about a year or more ago by a good many persons, that they thought we were not moving fast enough in dealing with this problem of Western Germany, but I assure the House that it has not been a very easy matter to overcome. It is our desire, therefore, to press on with this procedure as fast as possible, but we must try to lay the foundations on a sound basis, if we are to see the realisa- tion of our aim, which is the establishment of a peaceful and democratic Germany. Another problem which has caused a good deal of public agitation recently is the question of the Ruhr. I know that

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hon. Members of the House and the public outside are very concerned as to what is to happen with regard to the Ruhr, but I think it is as well to remind the House of what has happened since the close of the war. For nearly two years the United Kingdom was exclusively responsible for the administration and re- habilitation of the Ruhr, and this imposed an enormous burden upon the taxpayers of this country. The devastation which has resulted from it, the problems of feed- ing, and raw materials, and all the other problems involved in getting it going im- posed a tremendous liability upon us.

Our handling of the Ruhr has given us a good knowledge of the problem, but we were handicapped earlier from 1945, 1946 and onwards-in putting forward solutions. We were always uncertain as to what the future status of the Ruhr I would and its industries would be. remind the House that in the first instance we were confronted with a proposal by our French friends that the Ruhr should be detached from Germany altogether; it should be set up as a separate state under international control. It may be a short term solution, or it may not. We took the view that this might lead to German irredentism again, that it would not be a lasting solution, and that it would create a very serious problem in Western Europe which would jeopardise what was our main aim, namely, the solidarity of the whole of Western Europe.

We therefore had to examine it in the light of this aim. We have been con- scious the whole time that if ever Western Union is to be consolidated, either in a regional arrangement or in some other form, then Germany must play a part and, in the end, it must be an equal part. We could not see, therefore, how the de- tachment of the Ruhr would assist towards ending the long struggle that had gone on between Germany and the Western Powers.

Then there came a further suggestion from France, which is still being pursued, that the Ruhr industries, if not the Ruhr itself, should be internationally owned. I must confess that I gave a lot of thought to that problem in the early days in which I occupied this office, but it raised very many and difficult complexities. We have taken the view that the first essential in regard to the Ruhr is to safeguard European security and to ensure that the

9 DECEMBER 1948

Foreign Affairs Ruhr is not allowed again to endanger the security of the West. We therefore separated the two aspects of this ques- tion. In the problem of European re- covery, Germany is taken, as I say, as an equal partner in Western Europe; as regards security, the question of control is absolutely vital.

we

We believe, however, that if attempted to impose international owner- ship on the Ruhr industries, it would lead to endless friction, it would depress pro- duction, and would make German co- operation in the great work of European reconstruction difficult if not impossible. We were convinced after long study that it would not bring peace. We had to try to restore a decent standard of living for Germany and to ensure that Germany contributes her proper share to Euro- This question of a pean recovery. standard of living for the people of the Ruhr is very vital from the point of view of competition. I do not want to take any part at all in the theory that our policy should be directed from a compe- titive point of view, but if the competitive point of view is not to be accentuated then the standard of life in that area must not be allowed to be much lower than the rest of the European countries.

We were agreed that the Ruhr indus- tries must not go back to the Nazi syndi- cates and that the people who had used them or allowed them to be used for war purposes-

Mr. Benn Levy (Eton and Slough): Or to their relations.

Mr. Bevin: Or to their relations. We thought the best way to safeguard against that was public ownership and to that principle we have stood and still stand. But the other Powers concerned did not agree to that.

Mr. Fernyhough (Jarrow): Powers?

Mr. Gallacher: The big dollar?

Which

Mr. Bevin: All Four powers, as I have explained to hon. Members before, agreed that this should be settled by the Germans themselves. That view was supported by Mr. Molotov, Mr. Bidault and Mr. Marshall. It is one thing they have been absolutely unanimous about. What could I do but agree in the face of that formid- able unanimity?

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Mr. Gallacher: Would you not fight for your own beliefs?

Mr. Bevin: On the other hand, there is grave concern in the Ruhr because this problem is not settled. If production is to be increased we cannot leave this ques- The tion of ownership much longer. workmen in the Ruhr are as keen on a settlement as we are and they dread as much as we do its going back to the Krupps or to their families or to anyone who would land them in war again. The state of uncertainty which has existed there is depressing the morale of the worker. In the end, in order to get on with the work, we agreed to what has been called the Trusteeship Agreement. If the House will bear with me I will quote from that Agreement:

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'Whereas it is the policy of the Military Government to decentralise the German economy for the purpose of eliminating ex- cessive concentrations of economic power and preventing the development of war potential; and whereas the Military Government has de- cided that the question of the eventual owner- ship of the coal and iron and steel industries should be left to the determination of a representative, freely elected German Govern- ment, and whereas the Military Government has decided that it will not allow the restora- tion of a pattern of ownership in these industries which would constitute excessive concentrations of economic power and will not permit the return to positions of ownership and control of persons who have been found, or may be found, to have the aggressive designs of the Nazi party.

It seemed to us that a basis of agree- ment was there and that we could leave it to the Germans to settle it by their elections. If I know them at all, I think it will be discovered that they will follow the very wise policy of hon. Members behind me and nationalise these indus- tries when they get the opportunity. We stand by it now, just as we did in the original conception. I ought to make it clear that all this is done without preju- dice, of course, to the right of the French Government or of any other Government to put forward at the Peace Conference any views they may hold about Germany in general and the Ruhr in particular.

I want, however, to answer a criticism that has been made of us, not by the French Government, I am glad to say, but which has occupied a good deal of the Press here, that the Trusteeship scheme was sprung on the French Gov- ernment without notice. That is not On this I need only say that

correct.