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Foreign Affairs HOUSE OF COMMONS

[MR. CHURCHILL.] none of our troops were killed by the Spaniards. As a matter of fact, the sending of a division of Spaniards to fight on the Russian Front, about which Stalin spoke in very contemptuous terms, was a very small thing compared to fob- bing off the demands to allow German troops to come down and take Gibraltar. The hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. F. Noel-Baker) must have a little sense of proportion on these mat- ters and remember how many facts there are in interplay at the same time.

I say there is certainly far more liberty in Spain under General Franco than in any of the countries behind the Iron Curtain. I do not wish to live in

either sets of countries and I expect I should get into trouble in both cases, but, at any rate, we must look at these facts. The great mistake is to allow legi- timate objections to Franco and his form of Government to be a barrier between the Spanish people and the Western Powers with whom they have many natural ties, especially with Great Britain, with whom they have the unforgettable association of the War of Independence against Napoleon. There is the folly which, so far from leading to the down- fall of Franco, has in fact, consolidated his position at every stage. I was sure it would be so. They are a proud people and rather than be spurned and dictated to by the outside world, they have given allegiance to him, which he never won before, since the Spanish war ended.

I agreed at Potsdam that Spain should not be invited to join the United Nations and I am not going to shirk any of the facts. I did so in the hope of inducing Soviet Russia to give this world instru- ment generous and friendly aid in sup- port. But time has passed since Pots- dam; three and a half years have passed; and I am sorry we have a different rela- tionship with Russia from that for which we all hoped. I certainly see no reason why Spain should be excluded from the United Nations any longer. It is not for us to settle these matters alone, but I see no reason why our vote should not be cast in favour of their inclusion. Still less is it wise to withdraw Ambassadors from Spain, which was done on the authority of the United Nations, and to conduct diplomacy, as I said three years ago, through the back door, a kind of

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black market diplomacy, because every- thing has to be dealt with some time or other.

I say we should send envoys without delay to Tel-Aviv and, as soon as we can obtain the consent of the United Nations, send them back to Madrid. Ambassadors are not sent as compliments but as necessities for ordinary daily use. The more difficult relations are with any country in question, the more necessary it is to have the very highest form of representation on the spot. I venture to submit to the House that I have tried to argue this with an understanding of the different points of view on this question, but in this latter occasion the key to the problem is to think about Spain and the Spanish people and not allow their wel- fare to be restricted or their goodwill estranged by prejudices against a particu- lar man who is, after all, only a passing incident in the life of the country.

I must beg the indulgence of the House to touch for one moment upon the ques- tion of Greece. Here I will venture to address a word of friendly counsel to other countries than our own. The ques- tion of intervention by one country in the affairs of another is most anxious, doubtful and debatable, but if a great country intervenes in the affairs of a small country it should make its intervention effective. Of that I am sure. Otherwise all that happens is that it prolongs the agony. If it is thought right to go to all the criticism, opposition, expense and difficulty of intervention, it seems to me that it follows irrefutably that interven- tion should be on a scale and with a purpose and intent that will make it effective. Certainly when we intervened Foreign Secretary in those days, and my -I had the courageous support of the right hon. Friend was with me---we did so effectively, and for 40 days we fought the Communists in Athens with three or four divisions, and saved Athens from that hideous domination. what I have said will not give offence elsewhere.

I trust that

I have only one more subject to mention. I greatly apologise to the House for having been so lengthy.

Professor Savory (Queen's University of Belfast): Go on. It is magnificent.

Mr. Churchill: While our thoughts are so constantly riveted on Berlin and; the delicate day-to-day situation there,"

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must not forget the enormous events which are taking place in China, where the advance of Communism seems to gain momentum every day. There is also particularly the question of Hong Kong. I see that some reinforcements are to be sent. I hope that it will be made quite clear that British naval, air and military forces will defend Hong Kong from any assault which may be made upon it.

I cannot conceive that such an

action taken in self-defence would raise the larger issues on which the balance of European peace depends.

Finally, I wish to say one word-and it shall be only a very brief one-about the greatest topic of all which overhangs our minds, our relations with Soviet Russia. I have frequently advised that we should endeavour to reach a settle- ment with Russia on fundamental, out- standing questions before they have the atomic bomb as well as the Americans. I believe that in this resides the best hope of avoiding a third world war. I wish to make it clear-and this is the principal reason why I refer to this matter in the Debate-that I have never attempted to suggest the timing of such a solemn and grave negotiation. I have not the official knowledge necessary to form an opinion about that.

I wish also to make it plain, in view of what was said by the hon. Member for Gateshead (Mr. Zilliacus), who said that the policy of war with Russia was the policy of the Leader of the Opposition, that that is not at all the policy which I have put forward-far from it. It has always been my earnest desire, which I do not yet abandon, that a peaceful settlement may yet be reached with Soviet Russia if it is within the bounds of possibility. It is not my fault since I left office, nor do I think it is the fault of the Govern- ment, that this friendly atmosphere has not been maintained this happy, amicable settlement reached.

or

I will only venture to use words, not coined or prepared for the occasion, which express the view which I held about Russia. I will read to the House some passages from a private and per- sonal communication which I made to Mr. Stalin on 29th April, 1945. I said this:

"Side by side with our strong sentiment for the rights of Poland, which I believe is shared

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in at least as strong a degree throughout the United States, there has grown up throughout the English-speaking world a very warm and deep desire to be friends on equal and honourable terms with the mighty Russian Soviet Republic and to work with you, making allowances for our different systems of thought and government, in long and bright years for all the world which we three Powers alone can make together. I, who in my years of great responsibility have worked faithfully for this unity, will certainly continue to do so by every means in my power and in particular I can assure you that we in Great Britain would not work for or tolerate a Polish Government unfriendly to Russia. Neither could we recog- nise a Polish Government which did not truly correspond to the description in our joint Declaration at Yalta with proper regard for the rights of the individual as we understand these matters in the Western world." About Greece I said:

"In Greece we seek nothing but her friend- ship, which is of long duration, and desire only her independence and integrity. But we have no intention to try to decide whether she is to be a monarchy or a republic. Our only policy there is to restore matters to the normal as quickly as possible and to hold fair and free elections, I hope within the next four or five months. These elections will decide the régime and later on the constitu- tion. The will of the people, expressed under conditions of freedom and universal franchise, must prevail; that is our root principle. If the Greeks were to decide for à republic, it would not affect our relations with them. We will use our influence with the Greek Govern- ment to invite Russian representatives to come and see freely what is going on in Greece, and at the elections I hope that there will be Russian, American and British commissioners at large in the country to make sure that there is no intimidation or other frustration of the free choice of the people between the different parties who will be contending. After that our work in Greece may well be done."

I concluded by looking at the other side. I had at that time very good relations personally with Mr. Stalin. It was just after Himmler had made overtures to the late Count Bernadotte. I had telegraphed to Russia very promptly the information. Stalin had replied:

"You have acted exactly as I thought you would do."

That was the high point of my relation- ship with him. I finished, therefore, in this way:

"There is not much comfort in looking into a future where you and the countries you dominate, plus the Communist parties in many other States are all drawn up on one side and those who rally to the English-speaking nations and their associates or Dominions are on the other. It is quite obvious that their quarrel would tear the world to pieces and that all of us leading men on either side who had anything to do with that would be shamed before history. Even embarking on a long