2.
Sir Mark Young's recommendations have been
carefully studied in conjunction with the Foreign Office,
and account has been taken of the views expressed by
His Majesty's Ambassador in Nanking in the latter's
despatch to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
No.214, repeated to Hong Kong by safe hand as No.124,
of the 12th June, 1947. As a result of that study,
I agree with the view that no substantial advantage
would be gained by an attempt to secure the subordination
of the local Head of the Kuomintang in Hong Kong to
the diplomatic representative of the Chinese Government
in the Colony. As regards the longer term objective
proposed by Sir Mark Young, however, I am advised
that, whatever may be the theoretical position in
regard to the termination of one-party government in
China, in fact and for all practical purposes the
Kuomintang is still the Government party; and
consequently that any such drastic action as their
expulsion from Hong Kong would almost certainly lead
to retaliatory measures against Hong Kong by the Chinese
Government. There is also the danger that such action
might have repercussions elsewhere.
3.
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At the same time I am advised that, should
there be a deterioration in the internal situation in
China leading to a serious weakening of the authority of
the Nanking Government, or even to its complete disintegration,
then it is quite possible that in these circumstances the
expulsion of the Kuomintang from Hong Kong could be effected
That
which would be without the serious risk of retaliation that i
wincurred if
Lak
considered would exist were such drastic action/to be
taken whilst the Kuomintang enjoys de facto its present
privileged status in China.
4.
In these circumstances, whilst I fully appreciate
the extreme embarrassment which the activities of the
Kuomintang have caused, and are continuing to create,
for
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