foreign countries in the past in respect of Gibraltar,
Cyprus, British Honduras and the Falkland Islands,
and it would scarcely be possible to attempt to meet
such renewed claims with the plea that the retrocession
of Hong Kong was a matter of political expediency.
The retrocession of Hong Kong would also seriously
affect the trade interests of this and other countries,
including China herself. Under British administration
the Colony is of great value to British, Chinese and
other trade interests in China and throughout the
Far East, as it constitutes a base providing
conditions in which business can be transacted with
reasonable security. If Hong Kong were given up to
China, there would be no such base and British and
other trade interests would be placed in the
greatest difficulties.
8. So far as concerns the defence aspect, the
present agreed policy with regard to the defence of
Hong Kong is briefly that, since the Colony cannot
be defended against attack by a major power in
occupation of the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong should
be regarded as an undefended port so far as fixed
defences are concerned, but that plans and preparations
should be made to enable the necessary mobile defences
to be introduced at short notice should we require to
use Hong Kong as an operational Naval and Air base
in the event of a war in the Bacific, during which
China was in friendly hands. The present and
future garrison of Hong Kong, augmented by reinforcements
from South East Asia, is considered strong enough to
repel small scale aggression by a hostile Chinese
war lord. There would therefore be some advantage,
from the defence point of view, in the retention of
Hong Kong.
9.
Mention should also be made of the assurances
concerning our intentions with regard to Hong Kong
which
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