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than the Council of the League of Nations. And Members undertake to act in accordance with its decisions and to supply it with the necessary force to carry them out. Machinery to produce this result is set up in the Charter and, if wisely used, it should prove effective.

84. Such action cannot, however, be taken arbitrarily. It is governed by the Purposes and Principles of the Organisation. These have, as a result of the discussions at San Francisco, been made more stringent, and in par- ticular the importance of endeavouring to obtain a just settlement of differences has been emphasised. So desirable a result cannot be ensured by words alone. But the Charter lays down principles of action which correspond to the highest aspirations of humanity, and it is in the light of these that the Security Council will be bound to act.

85. Such action, with one all-important exception, can only be taken when all the Great Powers agree to it. This provision was the subject of prolonged debate at San Francisco and was at first opposed by a large number of Delegations. But at least until some system is worked out and accepted by the majority of states ensuring that votes in a Council represent both the population and the real power of states, the special position which has been granted to the Great Powers for more than a century must be maintained. This fact was finally realised by all the states present at San Francisco. Accordingly the principle on which the Charter is based is that power must be commensurate with responsibility, and it is on the Great Powers that the Charter places the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

86. The Great Powers have, however, accepted great limitations on their power to act.

They themselves give solemn undertakings that they will not use force or the threat of force for national ends. They promise to submit disputes which threaten the maintenance of international peace and security to pacific procedures and, if these fail, to the Security Council itself.

If any one of them is a party to a dispute it has no vote in any judgment which the Security Council may pronounce.

In such a case at least three elected states must concur in the judgment of the Security Council. Finally, no state, great or small, whether party to a dispute or not, can prevent the Security Council from taking cognisance of such dispute and examining it and discussing it.

87. Only when enforcement action is necessary is the complete unanimity of the Great Powers always required. At least two other states on the Security Council must then agree to action. It is imperative that the consent of the Great Powers should be necessary to action in cases in which they are not a party, since they will have the main responsibility for action. It is also clear that no enforcement action by the Organisation can be taken against a Great Power itself without a major war. If such a situation arises the United Nations will have failed in its purpose and all members will have to act as seems best in the circumstances. If, indeed, a Great Power refuses to accept a judgment concurred in by all the other Great Powers not parties to the dispute and at least three other Members of the Security Council, and resolves to defy the public opinion of the world which such a judgment would express, it is impossible to predict the outcome or to lay down rules as to what ought to be done.

88. But the creation of the United Nations is designed to prevent such a situation from arising by free acceptance by the Great Powers of restraints upon themselves which would make such action impossible, and by creating a forum where their actions can be discussed and examined with a view to

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obtaining unanimous decisions. Thus the successful working of the United Nations depends on the preservation of the unanimity of the Great Powers; not of course on all the details of policy, but on its broad principles. If this unanimity is seriously undermined no provision of the Charter is likely to be of much avail. In such a case the Members will resume their liberty of action; though in doing so they would no doubt be influenced by the fact that they had been working together in close co-operation for the mainten- ance of international peace and security. But there are good grounds for believing that the Great Powers are determined to avoid actions which would destroy their unanimity, and to carry out the obligations which they have undertaken as Members of the United Nations.

89. Moreover, the General Assembly will have a real part to play in the maintenance of international peace and security. Criticism of any Power, large or small, will be completely free in that body, and it is there that world opinion will very largely be formed. It is of course true that the General Assembly cannot take action in the sphere of security; but there is no doubt at all that its discussions and recommendations will have a great influence on the course of events. Thus, it can both lay down general principles and recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations between nations " (Art. 14). As pointed out above in paragraph 24, this Article will in itself confer very wide powers on the General Assembly, and if it uses these and other powers wisely there is no doubt that the General Assembly will become a great instrument for the formulation of world opinion which it would be perilous for any state to ignore.

90. In all matters other than security the General Assembly is supreme. Through the instrumentality of the Economic and Social Council, which is elected by it on a basis of complete equality amongst all states, it will be able to provide a centre where economic, social, educational, cultural and humanitarian questions can be discussed and solutions arrived at in the light of certain accepted standards of international economic and social policy. For some of these it will set up machinery controlled by itself, including, it is to be hoped, some of that established under the League of Nations. For other questions, specialised agencies such as the International Labour Organ- isation and the Food and Agriculture Organisation are already in existence and others are projected. It will be for the United Nations Organisation, through the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, to pro- vide a centre where all these activities can be surveyed and harmonised. If others are required it will be for the General Assembly to prepare for the acceptance of Members new specialised agencies to meet the need.

91. Amongst its own agencies will be a Commission for the promotion of human rights (Art. 68). This question received much attention at the Con- ference. Many proposals were made both as to the particular rights which it should be the object of the United Nations to preserve and as to the methods which they should use for that purpose. But it was impossible to solve such problems in the few weeks at the disposal of the Conference. It was simply decided, therefore, that the General Assembly should have the duty of doing all that is possible to secure "universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion The exact methods by which this high object can be accomplished must be left to the Organisation itself to work out.

92. The General Assembly will also be the body which exercises through the Trusteeship Council, in part elected by it and in part composed of Mem- bers administering trust territories, the powers of the Organisation under the

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