CO537-(33-34) — Page 666

اسيا

PUBLIC RECORD.OFFICE

Reference :-

C.0.597

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO

2

attended by great difficulties, and that, in view of the action of Her Majesty's navy, which cannot be left out of sight, there is no reason to apprehend that "alone and this Station will be called upon to stand, for any length of time, unaided," as contemplated by the Royal Commission.

When the defences lately constructed are fully armed and adequately manned, Hong Kong, with Her Majesty's ship "Wyvern," two gun-boats, "Esk" and "Tweed," and the four torpedo-boats which will in all probability be available, should be able to resist any naval attack that is likely to be directed upon it.

"A raid by two or three ships," as referred to by the Local Com- mittee, would scarcely be attempted.

At the same time, the Colonial Defence Committee are aware that there would necessarily be a strong temptation to destroy such an important station by a coup de main, carried out by a land force suddenly thrown upon the south of the island, and this contingency was before them in laying down the strength of the garrison (see Colonial Defence Committee's Memorandum No. 31). The land force requisite for such an operation could only come either from Vladivostock or Cochin China. As regards the former, under present circumstances it appears clear that the requisite force could not be spared without undue risks; but the completion of the project of the Siberian railway would necessarily alter the aspect of this portion of the question. Saigon is much nearer, and for a voyage of three and a-half days troops could doubtless be crowded together. As an elementary condition of success, it would be necessary that a force thus embarked should be able to evade Her Majesty's navy, and count upon two or three days of undisturbed action at Hong Kong. Hence, even if the French were not occupied with internal troubles, the risks would be considerable. Finally, the ground to be traversed by a force landing at the south of the island is rough and difficult, lending itself well to a determined opposition. The Colonial Defence Com- mittee consider, therefore, that when the garrison as laid down in their Memorandum above referred to is provided, the defence of Hong Kong may be regarded as secured for the time being.

Having above laid down what appear to them to be the general conditions of probable attack on Hong Kong, the Colonial Defence Committee proceed to consider the scheme of defence drawn up at the Station.

This scheme has been very carefully drawn up, and reflects much credit upon the Local Committee. In certain respects, however, it appears to require supplementing.

The Colonial Defence Committee fully concur in the opinion that an attempt to capture Hong Kong by a coup de main must be taken into con- sideration. In view of the formidable opposition which the new defences when completed and armed should be able to afford to direct naval attack, this alternative would necessarily suggest itself to an enemy. The local scheme of defence should, therefore, deal with the measures required to meet such an attack at greater length. The probable landing places, and the communica- tions leading from them, should be carefully studied. And, further, it appears desirable to consider to what extent and in what time the defence on the land side could be reinforced by the infantry garrisons provided for North Point Battery and Stonecutter Island. Until the defences of the Lyemun Pass and the Western Channel were forced, which would necessarily be a work of time, the inner batteries would have no function to perform; while if a landing in force were actually taking place on the south side, the works on Stonecutter Island should be able to hold their own against any force which would be likely to be then employed against them. The general question of reinforcing one section of the defence by another so soon as the nature of the attack had declared itself needs, therefore, somewhat fuller treatment.

Further details appear to be required in the sectional schemes in relation to the following points :

1. The works which will require to be created in the event of war should

be stated, and estimates prepared of the labour, time, tools, and materials required in each case.

2. Similarly, it is desirable that the necessary demolitions alluded to should

he definitely decided upon.

3. It is not clear whether sufficient tools for the execution of the works,

3

as well as the camp equipment and small-arms ammunition required in the various sections of the defence, are available at the Station.

4. In the Appendix relating to submarine mines no estimate is given of the time required to lay out-

(a.) A preliminary defence.

(b.) The complete defence.

160

6. It is desirable that a scheme of transport should be drawn up, showing the requirements for putting the Station in a state of defence, and stating how they would be met.

The whole question of the guard-boat defence of submarine mines is now under consideration. Meanwhile, the number estimated as necessary by the Local Committee (sixteen) might be considerably reduced, and at the Lyemun Pass, it appears that a patrol boat for outpost service by night or in very thick weather is all that could be required.

The Colonial Defence Committee concur in the views of the General Officer commanding as to the present inadequacy of the garrison of Hong Kong. They do not, however, consider that it is at present necessary to go beyond the numbers laid down in their Memorandum No. 31 of the 31st October, 1887. Meanwhile, they strongly urge that the reinforcement of this garrison to the strength proposed by them and approved, by the Secretary of State for War should be carried out as soon as possible.

The provision of the light field and machine guns asked for by the General Officer commanding for the defence of the land front of the position of Hong Kong appears to be most desirable, and the Colonial Defence Committee recommend that they should be supplied without delay.

Finally, the Committee recommend that a copy of these remarks should be forwarded to the Governor for consideration the General Officer com- manding and the Local Committee, with a view to the modification of the scheme of defence in the direction suggested.

November 25, 1889.

}

(Signed)

G. S. CLARKE, Secretary,

Colonial Defence Committee.

PRINTED AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE BY T. MARRISON.—27/11/89,