202
10
DISTRIBUTION OF CHINESE NAVAL FORCE.*
TIENTSIN DIVISION.
Armourcladat
Corvettes
(Built in Europe.)
Sloops or gun vessels (Elswick build)
Gunboats
Frigates
Gun vessels
SHANGHAI DIVISION.
(Built at Shanghai.)
Gunboat (thinly armoured).
Corvettes
FOOCHOW DIVISION.
(Built at Foochow.)
Sloops or armed transporta..
No.
==
::::
:::
Gun vessels..
Gunboats
Transports
(Built in England and America.)
Gunboats
CANTON DIVISION.
Gunboate
REVENUE SERVICE.
Gun vessel.. Gunboats..
::::
:
Total No.
of guns.
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:
7
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2
:::::
27
이미
:
10
11
76
11
the greater part of the Federal Navy, which at the close of the war numbered nearly 300 vessels of all kinds. Such facts are sufficient to show that the task of blockading the Chinese coast is no light one, especially when it is considered that such an operation would have to be carried out at a distance of many thousands of miles from the home country.
The great development of torpedo warfare at the present day would tend to increase the number of vessels required, in that it would probably be necessary for a blockader to lie off at greater distances from the outlet to be closed, and in any case to exercise a still greater degree of vigilance. This class of warfare is one likely to be extensively employed by the Chinese, and to it they have devoted a good deal of attention. They are in possession of some torpedo boats, manufactured in Europe, which they have no doubt used as patterns for the production of others, and they are known to possess & number of launches, torpedoes, and a quantity of suitable explosives. Foreign officers, possessing a knowledge of torpedo tactics, have also been engaged by the Government.
In the foregoing remarks no account has been taken of the despatch boats, &c., which would be required to supply the vessels employed in the blockade, nor has any calculation been made of the number of vessels which would be necessary as reliefs for vessels requiring repairs, or temporarily absent from the blockading squadron. It may be presumed that no incon- siderable number would be wanted, as the positions of the squadrons would be at very appreciable distances from their bases of supply.
Admitting, however, that the naval resources of France would prove equal Bases of to supplying the numerous fleet required to undertake the task above sketched supply, &c. out, there remains a further difficulty to be encountered in the absence of harbours suitable for refuge, refitting, supply, &c. At present Saigon is the only French possession in the China seas; but although this port possesses facilities for repairing and refitting to a limited extent, and contains stores of coal, it is too far removed from the scene of operations to serve as the sole point of support of the blockading forces. The approximate distances from Saigon to the points likely to be closed are-
[Canton, 1,000 miles Saigon to the Yangtse, 1,800 the Peiho, 2,500
5 days. 9
"
""
121
32
Experiences
War.
Grand Total
It will thus be seen that the fleet of China comprises some 76 vessels, and of these 35, or roughly one-half, are so armed as to be formidable antagonists. If it be conceded, that one-half the latter number of French gunboats would suffice for the task, even then, at the very lowest possible computation, some 16 or 17 additional gunboats would be required, so that the minimum number necessary may be stated at from 25 to 30 vessels.
It may thus be concluded that a simultaneous blockade of these three points is hardly possible unless the present naval force is considerably increased; or that if such an operation is projected, it will be of an extremely limited character.
The experiences of the American War would seem to point to the of American necessity of employing a much more considerable force if an efficient and complete blockade is to be maintained. The number of vessels necessary to close the harbour of Wilmington has already been given, and it may not be out of place to state the disposition of the South Atlantic squadron at the close of the same war. On a coast line of 300 miles from Georgetown to St. John's River, there were stationed 36 vessels guarding 14 inlets, and of these no less than 12 were needed to close the entrance to Charleston harbour alone. The whole Confederate coast line to be blockaded was 3,000 miles in extent (about the same as that of the Chinese seaboard), requiring the services of
• Admiralty Foreign Intelligence Committee (No. 12), Bepsomber 1888. (Confidential) Full details of the various vessels will be found in this paper.
† Have not yet left Germany. 山
ib otoutize
Taking into consideration the fact that, if no intermediate station were established, these distances would be practically doubled for the vessels going and returning, it may be predicted that one or more central points would be occupied, which would afford refuge and supplies of various kinds to the vessels engaged in keeping up the communications.
A glance at the map of China will show that the Island of Chusan occupies Chusan. a position nearly midway between the Peiho River and Canton, and is in This island was tolerably close proximity to the mouth of the Yangtse. occupied by the British forces in the Chinese War of 1840-42, and the anchorage of Ting-hai affords tolerably good protection to a limited number of large vessels. Supplies of food are also represented to be fairly plentiful. Our experiences of the climate are, however, far from encouraging, though it is to be presumed that improved sanitary knowledge would in all probability prevent recurrence of similar losses at the present day. It is, however, doubtful whether, in spite of its admirable strategical position, the island is the most suitable point for the purpose in question. The approaches to the island are by no means free from danger, being studded with the numerous small islands which constitute the Archipelago of the same name, and no coal supply is to be found on the spot. Its occupation nevertheless might be productive of benefit, in that it would check blockade runners from resorting to the numerous small anchorages afforded by the various islands, a course of action which their proximity to the mouth of the Yangtse would render highly probable.
The port of Kelung in the north-east of the island of Formosa, lying about Kelung. half-way between Canton and Shanghai* is easy of access, well sheltered in all
* Approximate distances:-Canton to Kelang, 600 miles; Kelung to Shanghai, 300 miles.
PUBLIC RECORD.OFFICE
Reference :-
C.O.537
33
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO
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