CO537-(205_1260-1262) — Page 593

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airfield constructed on that

d on a military and a commercial

thorities are willing to accept the

borders of this territory on the

should, from the Service point

ew, be regarded as paramount.

1 л

my confidential despatch

f the cost of the proposed air-

try.

I trust that the consideration

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CO 537/1261

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject la copyrigh

for any representations which may

ibje ct.

a ti ons that I have had with the

ast Asia and more recently with

including the Air Komber for Supply

re to be apportioned equally

y of Civil Aviation and the Colony,-

ne third of the total cost, the

ith proposals that are already under

would be regarded by the Air Ministry

also consider such an apportionment

taken as a basis for discussion, but

ragraph 10 of my despatch of the

of the scheme should be given as

ance should be made the subject of

ment and thereafter of a public

delay, and should not await final

sament of the cost.

have the honour to be,

sir,

tobedient, humble servant,

00 102

COPY

COPY FOR SECRET RECORD

IN THE DEPARTMENT.

Org registrest on 120 23727.46

D.0.(46) 26th Meeting

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CO 537/1261

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES”

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restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyngi

4.

CABINET

DEFENCE COMMITTEE

EXTRACT from MINUTES of Meeting held at

10 Downing Street, 8.W.1., on WEDNESDAY,

2nd OCTOBER, 1946 et 4.0 p.m.

INDIAN FORCES OUTSIDE INDIA

D.0.(46) 112.

THE COMMITTEE had before them a report by the Chiefs of Staff examining the implications which Would arise if a demand by the Indian Government to withdraw Indian forces from overseas had to be conceded,

and outlining the arguments which might be used to dissuade the Indian Goverment from pressing such a demand.

LORD MONTGOMERY Baid that so far as the Army

was concerned, if the demand was acceded to it would create a very complicated problem as, even with present Indian forces available for occupation duties, it was still difficult to find sufficient British forces to meet our commitments. Nevertheless, if the demand was received, a beginning could be made by retuming two battalions of Indian infantry from the Middle East. A recent telegram received had expressed the Indian Government's wish to withdraw the Indian brigade from Basra by the end of the year.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA said that the Viceroy had always taken the view that such a demand would eventually be made, though it had not so far materialised.

We must, therefore, be prepared for this demand and he hoped the memorandum would provide the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief with sufficient arguments at least to delay this demand until international conditions were more settled.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that it would be possible in certain cases, e.g. Iraq, to put forward a convincing case for the retention of Indian troops as they were there to protect Indian interests and nationals. The case for retention in Burma and Malaya was more difficult to justify. He asked what plans were being prepared to recruit and train local forces.

LORD MONTGOMERY said that the War Office hoped to raise two divisions locally recruited in Burma, incorporating a British element. In Malaya, apart from small local forces, the intention was to maintain a Gurkha division, with a British element. The last intention was, however, complicated by uncertainty as to whether the Indian Government would wish to retain Gurkha foroes for use in India. Until this was settled, the long term plan for raising a complete Gurkha division would be delayed. As regards Hong Kong, a Commando Brigade was at present stationed there. It was proposed that this brigade would shortly be withdraw but would be replaced by two battalions of British troops. The ultimate hope was for all British forges to be withdrawn from Hong Kong and internal law and order mai tained by an efficient gendarmerie modelled on the lines of the Palestine Police Force. In his opinion, the maintenance of law and order in the port of Hong Kong was of great importance, and it was not the intention to withdraw the British garrison until the gendarmerie was fully efficient and capable of carrying out the tasks required of it.

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