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CO 537/1260

N

restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' larms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright

SECTION VI

-12-

HONG KONG DEFENCE PLAN

AIR 1TAN

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TOP SECRET

INTRODUCTION.

The following plan for the air cafence of Hong Kong is based

on the assumption that during the next five years the likely strength

of any attack in the Colony would not exceed two or three divisions of enemy troops whose air support would no provided by a wasting air force with no backing.

2.

The first essential in the air aspect of the defence of Hong Kong is the paramount iportance of reducing onomy air attack to the minimum. The Colony pros: rin a congested and vulnerable target viera oven desultory raids ui well cause considerable material damage and would have an adverse effect on civilian morale.

SCALE OF AIR TICK

3.

The scale of air attack on the Colony which it is considered can be mounted and in relation to which the strength of a defensivo fighter face should be planned is very minute as compared with recent experience in air warfaro, It my roll be that an opposing air force

will consist of a melium range twin-engined bomber force supplemented by modified transport aircraft. The bomber force may be supported by modium range fight r of thu Tomahawk type, in addition to which there is also the Fobability of the deployment against us in the early stages of long range oscart fighters of the ustang type.

4.0

Although from the above it my appear that it is possible that we may be threatened by a modern air force omipped with efficient aircraft, there are other factors which should be taken into account vic: assassing the striking power of such an air force. These factors

aro:

(a) A high rato of unserviceability.

(4)

Inefficient maintenance by unskilled and badly trained ground

or CVS,

Indifferent pilots, aircrew and controllers,

(c)

(a)

Poor training.

(e)

(f)

5.

Badly maintained and ly operated airfield faollitics.

Non-existent production and equipment backing.

Taking into account the above factors, it is considered that casualties in the enemy air forces will be excessive, Operational casualties will be high and bad maintainance and bad flying coupled together will, it is estimated, account far as many aircraft as will be lost on optional sorties.

cm

Ref.:

CO 537/1260

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be subject to copyright

restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions al supply o

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that you National Archives' leaflet

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