CO537-(205_1260-1262) — Page 256

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CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet

● that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright

(E) Infiltration of large numbers of agents into

the Chinese population to organiso strikes, civil unrest and boycott.

(F)

Interruption of food and other supplies to the

Colony from China, to lend weight to the political campaign for recovery of Hong Kong.

PROBABLE FORMS OF ATTACK

7.

As regards () (including mining) and (3), wo havo already sid in paragraph 2 nhove that the possibility of a major war between China and ourselves is negligible, and, thoro- foro, a direct assault by land could only come from a Provincial War Lord should one crisc in Southern China to challenge the rule of Chiang-Kri-Shok. odc weapons would not be available to Buch leader and direct ssault by his forces would be illorganised. The possibilit; of such an attack occurring ean bo cxcluded so long as a garrison of approximately its prosent size is available an detorront. If, however, the present garrison were reduced to a mere token force for guard duties, etc., an attempt by a China Lord to force his way across the frontier could not be excluded.

8. Individual raids by pirates for personal gain tako place continually even, in posco time, but are likely to increase in the ovent of )(B) or occurring 9. Atta

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dorim Aictions with the coton foot frontier pron, and (e.. the Canton-Kowloon railway), rather than in the colonial territory itself. For this reason, and because in the event of civil war there is always the possibility of an influx of armed deserters, strong military and police patrol of the frontier would be necessary.

10. Of all forms of attack (E) carried out in conjunction with (F) is most likely, and is also in keeping with Chinesc character and history. This type of attack is also the most difficult to meet, The movement of Chinose to and from Ilong Kong cannot be properly controlled and, as an cxample, Chinese entries into the Colony at the present It moment excced departures by about 30,000 por month. would not be difficult for the Chinese to match this influx with the smuggling-in of large quantities of small arms and light morters.

INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION

11. As regards C.-in-C., Hong Kong's recomendation regarding an intelligence organisation, we agree that a Joint Intelligence Committee should be mintained in Hoa; Kong: Civil authorities to be represented as well

We ape that services of reliable

as the threu Survicos.

agents for reporting from the mainland are essential, and wo assume that they will be operated by an appropriate secret organisation. Wo suggest further that close liaison

be maintained with H. L. Consul-Guneral at Canton cand H.M. Embussy in Chinc. by the appointment either of an Embassy official to be attached to the Hong Kong Government, or of a liaison officer who would travel between Hong Kong and the Chinese capital.

(Signed)

H. h. CACCIA

E. G. N. RUS!BROOKE

C.E.R. HIRSCH (for D.M.I.) R.E. VINTRAS (for A.Ç.A.S.

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