00162
has been brought up to January 1947) to ono
timing of which we are
hen the situation in
on assault force, wo do alled upon to mount an 1inoso territory, no ition in the Chinese
ro, considor that the
required at Hong Kong.
requirement for landing
the Colony itself to ensure ding craft (see paragraph
1 Care and Maintenance,
CES
1aiders that the
ice are essential:-
>f:-
dron with P.. elcmont
win-engined Night Fighters.
1 Reconnaissanco Squadron.
raft for meteorological,
1 communciation duties.
, filter room and
12
Ref.:
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
N
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh
endations are based on the s might be made by mixed
ty, consisting of 30 to
mixed fighters. nnex I is unlikely to materialise.
hat there is justification
the 0.in-C. recommends.
nt of half a flying boat
o carry out anti-piracy arrison. Reinforcomonta lsewhore in the theatre.
00 163
N
Bat:
Please note that this co
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
N
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet.
ed subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright
14.
C.in-C. Hong Kong envisages the possible need for supply and reinforcement by air.
We do not consider that the probable scale of attack is likely to prevent normal supply and reinforcement by soa, although difficulties might arise from organised strikes, and disorganisation of local dock labour. Wo do not, therefore, consider that any special measures for air supply are necessary over and above the normal air transport services.
15.
C.-in-C. Hong Kong, raises other detailed points in his Air Plan, including the provision of fighter control organisation. In view of the J.I.C. report we do not consider that the Air defence of the Colony need be taken into account at all in implementing our short term policy. With regard to our long term policy wo recommend that theng points should be examined by the Defence of Bases Committeo and the Air Ministry, when assessing the scale of defences required at Hong Kong.
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS
Intelligence Organisation
16. C.-in-C. Hong Kong, recommends that a Joint Intelligonco Committee, including civil representation, be maintained; the services of reliable agents for reporting from the mainland aro considered essential.
The J.I.C. agree with this course, and recommend that close liaison should be maintained with H.M. Embassy in China and H.M. Consul General in Canton.
Volunteer Forces
17.
C.-in-C. Hong Kong, requests approval in principle to the formation of volunteer forces including an auxiliary air force and police roservo.
There are four factors which affect the formation of volunteer forces,
(a) They are the most economical mothod of providing a
reserve to back up the Police Force in the event of trouble.
(b) There may be a requirement for volunteer forces to
help in the manning of local defences, for which provision must be made in accordance with our long-term policy.
(c) In view of our shortage of man-power it is desirable that Colonies should have a reserve of trained man-power on which we could call in time of war.
(d) Financial considerations.
The formation of a voluntour Police
only by factors (a) and (a)
Force is affected and we consider that it would have many advantages. This is a matter primarily for the Colonial office and we suggest, therefore, that they should
bo invited to examine this.
Annex I Pare, 11
· (iv)
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