00 144
.
t all times and is likely
situation developed as
tacks as a result of
civil war in South China
.c. In the event of civil
ng military and police
itier woull be necessary to
of armed deserters.
ɔng
under modern conlitions Hong Kong ack by a major power in
.nland. We should not, therefore,
such attack, forces or defences ired or else overrun and lost.
tever, arise in which we should
in operational naval and air base
cific, in which China was in
t mobile defences against
or rir could be moved into
rt notice, in the same way as
d base from which it was
preparations being made to
te intro luce? at short notice.
ve agroo that our future policy car it as an undefende port concerned.
Ref.
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet,
Please note that this copy is supplied subject la the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright
ur internal security,' as a
non leterrent to an attempt at
8, Bom forces will be required le timo.
8 for garrison luties in
th; totul forces available
w of the small size of the
it is essential to koop
ng stations such as Hong Kong nforcements from elsewhere
ssary.
ong Kong
cy Bot cut in the previous
at Amex II C.-in-C. Hong Kong's
r conclusions are:-
Fleet baso on Hong Kong icient local protection,
the suppression of piracy violence. Certain
pult with advantage be nt Hong Kong, which woull ervice shoul this be
n Mooting.
00145
2
Ref:
CO 537/1260
“THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
~
restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed "Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leafer
He that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright
(b) The .mny garrison should be progressively reduced from its present strength of two Brigades. The first stage in this reduction should be reached by January 1947 when the strength of the local police force should be sufficient to allow reduction to ono Brigade. Reduction below this strength should be possible thereafter but this will depend upon the situation in China, and we are unable to forecast the stages by which this reduction might be mudo.
(૨)
dotachment of half a Flying Boat Squadron is sufficient air garrison for the Colony, reinforcements, if required, being drawn from elsewhere within the theatre.
The provision of fighter, .. and naval
defences are affected only by our long term policy of providing for the possible nood to use Hong Kong as an operational naval and air brise. Those parts of C.-in-C. Hong Kong's defence plan should, therefore, be examined by the Defence of Bases Committee and the service Ministries.
(d) The establishment of a Joint Intelligence
Committee at Hong Kong should be authorised.
(e) The question of the formation of voluntour or auxiliary Forces including a police reservo should be considered by the threo Servico Ministries and the Colonial Office.
Recommendations
9. We recommend that:-
(a)
copy of this paper should be sent to 0.-in-C. Hong Kong.
(b) The Defence of Jases Committee should bo
invited to recommend the scale of defences to be provided for Hong Kong to implement our long term policy, taking this paper inte account.
(c) Tho question of the formation of volunteer or auxiliary Forces including a police reserve should be considered by the three Service Ministrios and the Colonial Office.
(Signed) J.F. STEVENS J.H.N. POETT
Offices of the Cabinet and
Minister of Defence, S.4.1.
J.H. EDWARDES-JONES
8TH APRIL, 1946.
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