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THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
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restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject
(a) A direct land assault by a Chinese army of
up to 75,000 men, led by a Southern War Lord is a potential threat.
(e) Piracy on local shipping is a possibility
at all times.
(f) Guerilla ermy night march on Hong Kong
as the result of internal unrest or civil war in China.
Summary of Joint Intulligence Sub-Committee Report
We attach at Annex Il a report by the Joint
3.
Intelligence Sub-Committeo, in which they examine Sections II and III of the Commander-in-Chief's appreciation,
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This report shows that:-
There are
(n) The J.I.C. ngree with C.-in-C., Hong Kong
regarding China's aspirations, indications, however, that the Chinese will not confine themselves to purely diplo- matic means in bringing; pressure to bear for the recovery of Hong Kong.
(b) direct land assault on the New Territories, coupled with ineffective air raids on port or military installations (which might havo some offect on civilian morale) and limited mining from junks, is only likely in the futuro if open hostilitios break out with the Central Government.
The possibility of this within the next ten years is so remote as to bo negligible.
(c) Modern arms and equipment including aircraft
and transport, would not in all probability be available to a provincial War Lord, should one riso in S. China to challenge the rulo of Chiang Kai-Shek. The possibility of an attack by a provincial War Lord can also be excluded as long as a garrison of approximately its prosent size is available to not as a detorrent.
(a) The most likely form or attack is by
infiltration of a large number of agents into the Chinese population to organise strikes, civil unrest nnd boycott. This might well be carried out in conjunction with the interruption of food and other supplies to the Colony from Chin, to lend weight to the political campaign for recovery of Hong Kong. (c) The movements of Chinese to and from Hong Kong cannot be controlled; arms up to and including L.E.G. and small mortars can be smuggled into the Colony in large quantities.
Annex I of J. P. (46) 10 should be attached
to this paper since no amendment has been made to this Annex.
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