00 102
96th Mutin,Minute 3)
Ref.:
CO 537/1260
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Office. covoring
Defence Committee,
the policy that the
of Hong Kon,:
soon as possible, ility for ensuring
end local protection
uerillas when
.son was withdrawn, by Tolice Force
covering a revised
submission to the
rel by the
t the memorentum
table from the
t the Amiralty were
tish troops shoull be hey were not satisfied
ul in Hon Kon entirely
Chief and Governor
led thrt some ritich
1:00 During his visit to >rted this view. The
mising well. The situa- beginning,er the war,
wwnership of Hong Kong was of our administration and
so China. At present the
Colony was improving
and the Chinose. This
or incidents by Britich
Itic presonce provided a idling which tho Chinose orces and replace thom
the er et held in such
the population & disrespect
3.
damage our prestige and
the reel that
rrrisoning Hon Kong
however, that there
vailabl to find a
forced previously to
rison of Hong Kon anl
lucemento. Tho
licy that Hon Kong should
ing, Minute 1.
·
00 103
be onsitered to be an undefended port. There woul1 be
a danger that, if some token British force were maintained in Hong Kon, in the event of trouble in the Far East, such British forces could not be withdrawn and the same situation might arise as at the beginning of the war with Jayan.
SIR WILLIAM DICKSON Baid that as regards the military risk involved in withdrawing British forces from Hong Kong, once police forces wore adequately trained to take over responsibility for security,
a portion of our forces at Singapore could be called
on at short notice as a re-inforcement for Hong Kong to deal with 1 cal emergencies. Such a re-inforcement might consist of, say, a British battalion and two fighter squadrons. Provided facilities were maintained at Hong Kong,
it should be possible to utilise such forces for the protection of Hong Kon, at short notice. As regards prestie, he a rood that it would be better to 'retain British forcos in Hong Kon ́. It was necessary, however, to weigh this factor arminst the repercussions on other ther.tres of finding such a British rrison.
LIEUT.-GENERAL SIMISO sail that it was hoped
that the Indian rigdo now at Hong Kong would be allowed by the Inlian Government to remain there until the police forces were doruntely trained to take over. With the present sitution in India, however, no guarantee coula le iven that the Intian bride would be allowed to remain. He a reed with the suggestion that re-inforcements for iion: Kony could be mado nvailable on a limited scale in an nergency from Malaya. The Inna Turce which could thus be available would probably, kovever, be limited tottalion, as it was not unvionged that more than a brigade of British troops would be atationed in Malaya.
SIR RHODERICK MCGRIGUR Enid that as regards
the Commando brigade alrely in Hong Kong, this
bri, ndo was rapidly ruin; down owin to demobilisation
and other causes anl, in any case, it would be necessary
to withiraw it for specialisud training.
In discussion, it was suggested that further consideration
of this matter mi, ht be deferred pending a decision by the Dufunco Committee on tomoranda by the Secretary of State for War on the Size of the Army as at 31st December, 1946.
THE COMMITTEE:-
Aproud to defer consideration of
this matter until a decision had been taken by the Defence Committed un the size of the Army as at 31st December, 1946.
nt D.O. (46) 91
-5-
Ref:
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
1
5
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