00084
ikely if hostilities
it of CHINA and a
iderod to be
ilt force, we do not consider
NO
operation of any size against
the deterioration in the
, consider that the provision
ent for landing small forces
ensuring internal security.
of opposition specialised
NESE War Lord in possession
necessitating an assault
a most likely operation
For this purpose it is
one battalion should be
2
Ref.:
Please note that this cov
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflat
id subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyngh
ng aircraft and transport
e to a provincial War Lord,
lenge the rule of CHIANG
by a provincial War Lord
on of approximately its
rent."
a War Lord capable of
mentary form of
dern arms and equipment.
.K. and the U.S.A. have
. on a major scale. In
1 ax JAPANESE equipment LONG.
00085
2
Ref.:
cms
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(5)
As a result it is unfortunately only too probable that a War Lord who contemplates insurgent action is likely to be adequately equipped.
Furthermore the effective strength of the present garrison is NOT a sufficient deterrent, as is suggested. The bulk of the troops in the Colony are employed on guarding V.Ps, both military and civil, police work and internal security duties - these comitments will continue until such time as the police force and local auxiliary forces are up to strength and sufficiently trained to relieve the Garrison of these commitments.
Paragraph 3 (g)
"Sporadio guerilla attacks as a result of internal unrest or
civil war in 6cuth CHINA are nost imrobablo, In the event of
aivil war, however, strong military and police patrol of the frontier
would be necessary to prevent the influx of armed deserters".
COMMENT.
This is not agreed to.
Considerable mmbers of guerillas are alroady known to be operating in TAIPENG Peninsula. In addition there are appreciable number■
of "demobilised" Communist troops in the vicinity of
the Now Territories. Action by the nationalist forces
to round up these elements is likely to produce the very result which has been taken in the paper 'most improbable',
Paragraph 8 (b).
as being
"The Army Garrison should be progressively reduced from its
present strength of two Brigades, The first stage in this
reduction should be reached by January, 1947, when the strength
of the local police force should be sufficient to allow a
reduction to one Brigade. Reduction below this strength should
be possible thereafter but this will depend upon the situation
in CHINA, and we are unable to forecast the stages by which
this reduction might be made",
COMMENT.
It is emphasised that, while the CHINESE continue to use KOWLOON âu a transit port (up to 8000 men at a time), and until the police force reaches its pre-war strength of 2,100 fully trained men, NO reduction in the BRITISH Garrison can be contemplated.
An estimate of the date by which the Police and Auxiliary Force will have reached a satisfactory operational standard will be notified later.
N
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of
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1,100
can
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cms
Ref.:
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
N
restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leafe! Please note that this copy is supplied subject in the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyngh
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