CO537-(1262-1649) — Page 948

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CO 537/1649

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet.

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright

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(a) The danger of the Chinese Government, in ignorance of our attitude, committing itself publicly in the near future to demands for the return of Hong Kong.

(e) The danger, in the absence of any move from us, of our position in Hong Kong being progressively undermined by Chinese propaganda and political activities in the Colony.

(f) The possibility, if we left the initiative to the Chinese, of our being forced, as a result of the tactics envisaged in (e), to concede more than if we took the initiative ourselves.

(g) The lack of adequate security of tenure in the leased territory in present circumstances for the construction of any new projects, e.g. new airfield, involving substantial expenditure.

Arguments against

(1) Unless we are going to offer substantial concessions, an approach on our part may do more harm than good to our long term objective-and our relations with China and the United States.

(11) We should put ourselves in a false position by initiating negotiations, since it is the Chinese themselves and not we who are not satisfied with the present position (subject to (g) above).

(iii) A formal approach from us would be inconsistent with what the Minister of State told Dr. Wellington Koo in the course of the conversations referred to in the fourth paragraph of this memorandum, namely that he (the Minister of State) thought it unlikely that the Secretary of State would desire to open any new subject of conversation in the early future, that is, until India, Egypt, Palestine and other questions were settled and out of the way. The more immediate preoccupations of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs are presumably no less now than they were in June when this conversation took place.

(iv) Generally speaking, the existing uncertain political situation in China seems to make it undesirable to negotiate with the present Government any important matters which can be defurred.

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Ref.:

CO 537/1649

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet. Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright