Count'ı
power co
override dos
1975 c. 34, 11.
(Cır. 1)
would not be defeated by a defence of limitation (whether in consequence of section 22, or an agreement between the parties not to raise the defence, or otherwise).
30. (1) [f it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree to which-
(a) the provisions of section 27 or 28 prejudice the
plaintiff or any person whom he represente; and
(b) any decision of the court under this subsection would prejudice the defendant or any person whom he represents,
the court may direct that those provisions shall not apply to the action, or shall not apply to any specified cause of action to which the action relates.
(2) The court shall not under this section disapply section 28(2) except where the reason why the person injured could no longer maintain an action was because of the time limit in section 27, so that if, for example, the person in- jured could er his death no longer maintain an action under ibe Fatal Accidents Ordinance because of the time limit under the Carriage by Air (Overseas Territories) Order 1967, the court has no power to direct that section 28(2) shal not apply.
(3) In acting under this section the court shall have regard to all the "circumstances of the case and in particular 10-
(a) the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on
the part of the plaintiff;
(6) the extent to which, having regard to the dolay, the evidence adduced or likely to be adduced by the plaintiff or the defendant is or is likely to be less cogent than if the action had been brought within the time allowed by section 27 or 38, as the case may bo;
(c) the conduct of the defendant after the cause of action arose, including the extent, if any, to which he responded to requests reasonably made by the plaintiff for information or inspection for the pur- pose of ascertaining facts which were or might be relevant to the plaintiff's cause of action against the defendant;
(d) the duration of any disability of the plaintiff arising after the date of the accrual of the cause of action: (e) the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once he knew whether or not the act or omission of the defendant, to which the injury was attributable, might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action for damages;
( the steps, if any, taken by the plaintiff to obtajo medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of any such advice he may have received.
(4) In a case where the person injured died when, be- cause of section 27, he could no longer maintain an action and recover damages in respect of the injury, the court shall have regard in particular to the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the deceased.
(Cap. 23)
(5) In a case under subsection (4), or any other case where the time limit, or one of the time limits, depends on The date of knowledge of a person other than the plaintiff, subsection (3) shall have effect with appropriate modifications, and shall have effect in particular as if references to the plaintiff included references to any person whose date of knowledge is or was relevant in determining a time limit.
(6) A direction by the court disapplying the provisions of section 28(2) shall operate to disapply the provisions to the same effect în section 3 of the Fatal Accidents Ordinance.
(7) In this section "the court" means the court in which the action has been brought.
(8) References in this section to section 27 include re- ferences to that section as extended by any provision of this Part and Part IV.",
6. Section 38 of the principal Ordinance is amended by deleting Amendmenn of subsections (1), (2) and (3)" and "substituting the following—
933יניי
T.
(1) Sections 22(2) and (2A), 27, 28, 29 and 30 shall have effect in relation to causes of action which accrued before, as well as causes of action which accrue on or after, 1st February 1977 and shall have effect in relation to any cause of action which accrued before 1st February 1977 notwithstanding that an action in respect thereof has been commenced and is pending on 1st February 1977.
(2) For the purposes of this section an action shall not be taken to be pending at any time if a final order or judgment has been made or given therein, notwithstanding that an appeal is pending or that the time for appealing has not expired.
(3) A decision taken at any time by a court to grant, or not to grant, leave under the former sections 27 to 33 inclusive (which, so far as they relate to leave, are repealed by the Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance 1976) does not affect the determination of any question in proceedings under the Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance 1976, but in such proceedings account may be uken of evidence admitted in proceedings under the said sections repealed by the Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance
1976.
(3A) In this section "action" includes any proceeding in a court of law, an arbitration and a claim by way of set-off or counterclaim.".
Section 38A of the principal Ordinance is repealed.
1. Section 40 of the principal Ordinance is amended by inserting after "prescribed by" in the places where it occurs the following-
"or under".
9. The First Schedule to the principal Ordinance is repealed.
mestic JE,
Repel of
section 384.
Ancome of
pection 40.
Repeal of First Schedul.
10. The Fatal Accidents Ordinance is amended in section 8 by Amadre. E deleting the following-
section of Le Faust
"; and every such action shall be commenced within three years after Ades the death of the person whose death has been so caused as aforesaid".
Orbance.
(Cap. 22.)
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