1972-HKRS28-16-20_Part02 — Page 23

Addition of

new sections

15A, 15B and 15C.

1955, c. 71. **71.

(5) Every decrce of divorce shall in the first instance be a decree nisi and shall not be made ab- solute before the expiration of three months from its grant, unless the Chief Justice by general order, or the court in any particular case, fixes a shorter period.".

7. The principal Ordinance is amended by adding after section 15 the following new sections—

"Provisions

15A. (1) If at any stage of proceedings for to encourage divorce it appears to the court that there is a reason- reconcilia- lion.

able possibility of a reconciliation between the parties

la 1909 « ss,

* 30(6)1

to the marriage, the court may adjourn the proceed- ings for such period, as it thinks fit to enable attempts to be made to effect such a reconciliation.

(2) The power of the court to adjoura under subsection (1) shall be additional to any other power of the court to adjou proceedings.

(3) Where the parties to the marriage have lived with each other for any period or periods after it has become known to the petitioner that the respondent has, since the celebration of the marriage, committed adultery-

(4) if the length of that period or of those periods together is six months or less, their living with each other during that period or those periods shall be disregarded in determining for the purposes of section 11A(1)(a) whether the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent; but

(b) if the length of that period or of those periods together exceeds six months, the petitioner shall not be entitled to rely on that adultery for the purpose of section 11A(1)(a). (4) Where the petitioner alleges that the respond- ent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with him, but the parties to the marriage have lived with each other for a period or periods after the date of the occurrence of the final incident relied on by the petitioner and held by the court to support his allegation, that fact shall be disregarded in determining, for the purposes of section LLA{1}{5), whether the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent if the length of that period or of those periods together is six months or less,

Decfer to be refused in certain circuso stances, 1969 4. 55. *. 4.

5

(5) In considering for the purposes of section HA(1){(c), (d) or (e) whether the period for which the respondent has deserted the petitioner or the period for which the parties to a marriage have lived apart has been continuous, no account shall be taken of any period or periods together not exceeding six months during which the parties have resumed living with each other, but no period during which the parties lived with each other shall count as part of the period of desertion or of the period for which the parties to the marriage have lived apart, as the case may be.

(6) References in this section to the parties to a marriage living with each other shall be construed as references to their living with each other in the same household.

15B. (1) The respondent to a petition for divorce in which the petitioner alleges any such fact as is mentioned in section 11A(1)(e) may oppose the grant of decree nisi on the ground that the dissolution of the marriage will result in grave financial or other hardship to him and that it would in all the circum- stances be wrong to dissolve the marriage.

(2) Where the grant of a decree nisi is opposed by virtue of this section, then-

(a) if the court is satisfied that the only fact on which the petitioner is entitled to rely in support of his petition is that mentioned in section 11A(0(e); and

(5) if apart from this section it would grant a

decree nisi,

the court shall consider all the circumstances, includ- ing the conduct of the parties to the marriage and the interest of those parties and of any children or other persons concerned, and if the court is of opinion that the dissolution of the marriage will result in grave financial or other hardship to the respondent and that it would in all circumstances be wrong to dissolve the marriage it shall dismiss the petition.

(3) For the purposes of this section hardship shall include the loss of the chance of acquiring any benefit which the respondent might acquire if the marriage were not dissolved.