1967-HKRS28-8-34_Part01 — Page 4

Jurisdiction

in presump

6. (1) The court shall have jurisdiction in proceedings for pre- tion of death. Sumption of death and dissolution of marriage under this Ordin-

ance if-

1965, c. 72, B. 14(2).

1965, c. 72, 3. 14(5).

Jurisdiction

in restitution

of conjugal

rights.

1965, c. 72, *. 40011.

Law of Hong

Kong appli cable.

1965, c. 72.

#. 14(5) & 40(2).

Power to grant relief limited to

(a) the petitioner was domiciled in Hong Kong at the date of the

petition; or

(6) in the case of a petition presented by a wife, the wife was resident in Hong Kong at the date of the petition and has been ordinarily resident in Hong Kong for the period of three years immediately preceding the date of the petition.

(2) In determining for the purposes of this section whether a woman was domiciled in Hong Kong, her husband shall be treated as having died immediately after the last occasion on which she knew or had reason to believe him to be living.

7. The court shall have jurisdiction in proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights under this Ordinance if-

(a) both parties to the marriage were domiciled in Hong Kong at

the date of the petition;

(5) the parties had a matrimonial home in Hong Kong at the

time when cohabitation ceased;

(c) both parties to the marriage were resident in Hong Kong at

the date of the petition; or

(d) in the case of proceedings by a wife, the wife has been deserted by her husband or the husband has been deported from Hong Kong under any law and the husband was im- mediately before the desertion or deportation domiciled in Hong Kong.

8.

In any proceedings in which the court bas jurisdiction under this Ordinance, the issues shall be determined in accordance with the law which would be applicable thereto if both parties were domiciled in llong Kong at the time of the proceedings,

9. Nothing in this Ordinance shall authorize the court to pro- nounce a decree of divorce, nullity, judicial separation, restitution of monogamous conjugal rights or presumption of death and dissolution of marriage marriages.

or to make any other order unless the marriage to or in respect of which the decree or order relates was a monogamous marriage.

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10. The jurisdiction vested in the court by this Ordinance shall Practice and

procedure. so far as regards procedure, practice and powers of the court be exer- cised in the manner provided by this Ordinance; and where no special provision is contained in this Ordinance with reference thereto, any such jurisdiction shall be exercised in accordance with the practice. procedure and powers for the time being in force in the High Court of Justice in England with reference to matrimonial proceedings.

PART 111.

DIVORCE.

11. (1) Subject to section 12, a petition for divorce may be Grounds for

petition. presented to the court-

1963, c. 72.

(a) by the husband or the wife on the ground that the respondent— 3. 1.

(i) bas since the celebration of the marriage committed adultery: or

(1) has deserted the petitioner without cause for a period of at least three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or

(iii) has since the celebration of the marriage treated the petitioner with cruelty; or

(iv) is incurably of unsound mind and has been con- tipuously under care and treatment for a period of at least five years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition:

(8) by the wife on the ground that her husband has since the celebration of the marriage been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality.

(2) In calculating for the purposes of sub-paragraph (ii) of para- graph (a) of subsection (1) the period for which the respondent has descrted the petitioner without cause, and in considering whether the desertion has been continuous, no account shall be taken of any one period (not exceeding three months) during which the parties resumed cohabitation with a view to reconciliation; and, for the purposes of a petition for divorce, the court may treat a period of desertion as having continued at a time when the deserting party was incapable of con- tinuing the necessary intention if the evidence before the court is such that, had that party not been so incapable, the court would have inferred that that intention continued at that time.