is no doubt that public knowledge of a bargain with the
Russians over Mr. Brooke will pose problems for us in the
SECRET
- 5 -
I
SECRET
handling of the Grey case, possibly with the Chinese but
almost certainly with sectors of the public here.
(a) The Chinese are bound to be impressed by our willingness
(b)
to bend the law in respect of the Krogers and,
particularly in the sour climate of Sino-Soviet
relations, to contrast it with what has been said to
them about the impossibility of prematurely releasing
convicted prisoners in Hong Kong.
to further pressure by them in the
This may well lead
matter of the whole
problem of convicted "confrontation" prisoners in Hong
Kong, and possibly even to attempts to strike bargains
for other British subjects now in detention in China.
We must accept that there is some risk that they might
put up their price for Mr. Grey to include convicted
prisoners other than the newsworkers. But I personally
doubt if they will do so in view of the firmness with
which they have established the link between Mr. Grey and
the newsworkers. (In any case, all this is perhaps
rather a possible argument for firmass and delay in the
Brooke case rather than for immediate concessions in the
Grey case.)
Those in this country directly involved in the Grey case
(1.e. Reuters, certain sections of the press and the Grey
family) may press the more strongly for an early bargain
with the Chinese. But I am by no means certain that
public opinion generally would come to the conclusion that
because we had in very special circumstances made
SECRET
- 6-
1
SECRET
concessions to the Russians about the Krogers, we
should necessarily follow this up by caving in to the
Chinese over the convicted newsworkers. Moreover,
there are important and relevant differences between
the Brooke and Grey cases which could be demonstrated, some with the
general public, others more selectively. The Governor makes the point
that the two cases carry very different implications for the security of
the territories
9.
concerned.
It may be helpful if I list the other respects
in which I see important differences.
(a) What is envisaged in the case of Mr. Brooke is in effect
an exchange. The Chinese have throughout refused an
exchange in the case of Mr. Grey. Their terms are the
release of the newsworkers unconditionally in Hong Kong. (b) We shall in
any case have in effect complied with these
terms in a matter of some thirteen weeks from 1 July.
Thus on the terms the Chinese have put to us, the end of
Mr. Grey's ordeal is in sight.
(c)
The bargain over Mr. Brooke would involve the exchange of convicted
prisoners (albeit for offences of very different seriousness). In the
case of Mr. Grey on the other hand we should be releasing convicted
prisoners in exchange for someone who has been accused of no
irregularity. (d) The difference in numbers involved is important:
a married
couple for one in the case of Mr. Brooke; eleven for one
in the case of Mr.
Grey.
SECRET
- 7-
1.
SECRET
(e) The Krogers are in a very special and restricted
category of prisoners, whereas the newsworkers are
eleven among 254 communists who are serving sentences
for offences arising out of the 1967 troubles.
(f) Even if Mr. Grey is released, there are still twelve
other British subjects detained in China. Concessions
10.
to the Chinese over Mr. Grey might encourage the Chinese
to put a price on other heads, something which they have
not hitherto done and which we would want to avoid.
All this seems to me to provide an adequate justification
to the public here for refusing to accept a deal over Mr. Brooke
as good grounds for proceeding to a deal over Mr. Grey - Such
criticism as we would incur for dragging our feet is likely
to be much less damaging than the criticism if it became known
that the Governor had been overruled on an issue which he
regarded as central to the security of Hong Kong.
11. A postscript.
If the foregoing line of argument is
accepted I would nevertheless see some advantage in our telling
the Governor that if he were to decide, as September approaches,
that a time had come when the premature release of the
newsworkers by a matter of a few weeks would be regarded by
the Chinese as a gesture of accommodation rather than an act
of weakness, he should not exclude this.
Copies to: Private Secretary
Mr. Godden
Mr. Baker
Sir A. Galsworthy
Sir T. Brimelow
Mr. Carter
Mr. Giffard
James May
(James Murray)
18 June, 1969.
SECRET
- 8-
1
Ukr
FEC 16.
Far Eastern Department
pajanyo
3 July, 1969.
I enclose a copy of an article which appeared in the Sunday Express of
29 June reporting the views of a Hong Kong Government official on a
"deal" with the Chinese over Anthony Grey.
2. Apart from the fact that the article contains a number of errors of
fact the exaggerated toue in which it is written "relations with China
have tremendously laproved in the past six months" and "there is no
doubt that China has acted honourably" is not very helpful at this stage
in the Grey 0882. It would sean likely that the authors of the article
had received assistance in their detailed reconstruction of events in
Sino/British relations this year and I presume it was the sans official
whose opinions are reported in the opening paragraphs.
3. I realise from the problems which we encounter with the press in
London how difficult it is to preserve some balance in reports on the
Grey case. But I hope that local correspondents in Hong Kong can be
encoureged to exercise some restraint when reporting the case during the
next three months.
R. J. T. Nolaren, Esq.,
HONG 106.
(C. Wilson)
Copy to:
J. N. Allan, Esq., Peking.
MR M
Мизкач
Tsx. 4/68.
ne of the
With the Compliments of the
Political
R
Adviser JUL 1769
Hong Kong FEL 130
は
12/
Political Adviser
SECRET
Mr. K.C. Jay telephoned on Tuesday, 10th June to say that he would like
to see me in the near future: accordingly I made arrangements to see him
the next day (wednesday, 11th June) at 11 a.m.
854
Referring to our meeting on 4th June, Jay said that he had now received
a message directly from Prize Minister CHOU En- lai: on the surface, Jay
warned, the message was not very good but if studied carefully - and
reading between the lines it would be seen to be favourable. Briefly,
the Prime Minister allegedly had written that he had been very
disappointed at the unsuccessful attempts to negotiate with the H.K.Ġ.
over the question of the newsworkers and Anthony Grey: it seemed to CHO☺
that (as usual) Chairman MAO had been right and he (CHOU) had been
wrong: that dealing with the imperialists was a matter fraught with
difficulties as they would see only their point of view and act
accordingly. In spite of this rather gloomy appreciation of the
situation, however, CHOU had then gone on to say that nevertheless he
would appreciate Jay's assessment of the present situation in Hong Kong
and any advice that Jay would care to offer as to possible future
action.
3.
Jay's explanation of this message from CHOU was that firstly he had no
alternative course but to say that Chairman MAO was right: equally, it
was clear o Jay that CHOU was disappointed that nothing spacific had
come from the Chinese proposals for a deal over Grey: in particular
in particular - and this is pure Jay speculation Jay felt that the Prime
Minister vas disapminted or even frustrated that he had not received
information earlier from us that we vere considering the setting up of
the long-tern Board of Review to consider confrontation prisoners, etc.:
if we had given this prior notice, Jay feels that it would have given
CHOU time to prepare Chairman" MAO for a "change in policy", possibly
leading to special arrangements over the newsworkers. At this stage I
repeated, as I have done so often, the line that there was no question
of "a deal", that the setting up of the Board of Review was a reflection
of our assessment of the present security situation, etc. etc. Jay once
again said that he certainly understood (with difficulty) our stand on
this but was sure that Peking, and in particular Prime Minister CHOU and
Chairman MAO, would never be able to follow this line of reasoning. Jay
believes that a ray of hope lay in the request from CHOU for Jay's
assessment of the present situation and for his advice as to the future.
Jay is convinced that the message really boiled down to this request and
her believed CHOU really wishes the channel to remain in being but that
it should be used more meaningfully.
4.
-
Jay said that he had already replied to CHOU CHOU's request was written
in such a way that he clearly needed an urgent ansver. Jay said that his
reply was along the lines that, whilst Chairman KÃO vas as usual
undoubtedly right, nevertheless he vas equally convinced that CHOU was
not wrong: that he was of the opinion that the channel had been of
benefit to Peking as vell as the H.I.G. and that it could continue to be
of value. He claimed that be again repeated the advice t hat now that it
was known that the 11 newsworkers would definitely and legally be
released by
/contd.
SECRET
SECRET
October, it was very much in China's interest that Grey should be
released before the last newsworker (WONG Chak) vas released from prison
in October: he had argued that the detention of Grey had attracted a
great deal of publicity not only in Hong Kong and Britain but all over
the world and that by releasing Krey soon the Chinese Government would,
he expected, appear in
favourable light.
5.
W
my new
Tory; whi
Find be
And even
Mix
Later in the discussion Jay spoke briefly of the reception which FEI
Yi-aing had received in Peking and in particular by CHOU En-lai: it was
Jay's understanding that FEI had been severely criticised on the way in
which he and his hench- had directed the confrontation with the H.K.G.
and that he was also criticised for his way of living in Hong Kong which
in Peking's view was not appropriate for a senior communist.
6.
As promised at our last meeting, I handed Jay a list of the 11
newsworkers showing their "earliest dates of release":
he was clearly pleased to receive this information and said that he
would pass it on to the appropriate authorities.
7.
As agreed with you and H.E. I then spoke to Jay briefly about Lord
Shepherd's visit. I emphasised that it was really a routine visit, part
of a long and arduous world tour that Lord Shepherd was undertaking.
Lord Shepherd had come to Hong Kong after attending the SEATO meeting in
Bangkok and, among other things, had taken a short rest here. He had, of
course, held discussions with H.E. and senior official and unofficial
members of Government and undertaken a fairly full programme: this in
spite of the fact that he was rather unwell during his stay in Hong
Iong. There was general agreement on matters discussed and no radical
changes were proposed: his main interests were to do with labour
legislation priorities and technical education.
8.
Other matters discussed were:-
I explained that Hr. Healey
(1) Visit of Mr. Denis Healey: would only be in Hong Kong for one full
working day and that, although he would be having brief discussions with
H.E. and C.B.F., the main purpose of the visit was to visit the troops;
(2) Ir. Denson's visit to Shanghai, etc: I said that we were pleased to
learn of the approval given to Hr. Denson to make these visits - an
encouraging sign;
(3) Action against 17 officials of the Waterworks Union: In discussing
Das Jay said that his information was to the effect that neither Peking
nor the local communists regarded this as a serious matter and that we
could assume that the communists would not be "too difficult' over this;
(4) South China Iron Works: Jay handed to se copies of documents, mainly
letters from the Legal Department, about these land transactions. It was
Jay's opinion and that of the Bank of China that the land exchange had
already been completed
/contd...
SECRET
SECRET
except for one or two sinor legalities, along the lines of a specific
and definite offer made by Mr. McRobert of the Legal Department in 1960.
It was clear that this had been a very Long drawn out affair with delays
on the part not only of the solicitors for the South China Iron Works
but also on the part of Government: as late as April 1964 Mr. McRobert
had confirmed that Government would abide by the proposals made to the
S.C.I.V. in 1960. Included in the documents vas a copy of a receipt for
money paid to the Treasury for the land conversion. These papers are now
with P.A.C.S.(L), who will be making comments in the next few days.
le
(J. Cater)
13th June, 1969.
C.C.
Mr. J. Murray, CMG (London) Mr. J.B. Denson, OR (Peking) D.S.D.
H./A.I.G. I.8.5.
SECFET
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Group...
Fco....
21..
Class.
Piece.
4.8.2.......
not yet-tamustone
Following document(s) trap
viterned & closed
Folio 253 - Letter 1/7/69
"
E/253
"
4/6/69
and closed until . . . .
Ky Holder 6.7.99
2010
?
+
CYPHER/CAT A
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP COPY
рафент
IMMEDIATE FOREING AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO PEKING TEGRAM NUMBER 207
24 JUNE 1969.
(FED 13
2/7
B
+
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO PEKING TELEGRAM NO 207 OF 24 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO HONG KONG, WASHINGTON AND POLAD SINGAPORE.
ANTHONY GREY.
GREY'S LATEST LETTER TO HIS MOTHER CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE: QUOTE
I AM SO HAPPY TO TELL YOU THAT SOME CHANGES WERE MADE IN MY DAILY LIFE
ON 30 MAY. ON THAT DAY, I WAS TOLD THAT FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF EACH
MORNING AND AFTERNOON, I COULD LEAVE MY ROOM, IN WHICH I AM LIVING, AND
GO TO EITHER THE COURTYARD OR TO THREE ROOMS UPSTAIRS: I COULD ALSO HAVE
MY PORTABLE RADIO, AND ACCESS TO ALL MY BOOKS. IN ADDITION I WAS TOLD I
COULD CLOSE THE DOOR OF THE ROOM IN WHICH I SPEND THE MAJORITY OF MY
TIME. THE PERIODS IN WHICH I AM ALLOWED TO GO OUTSIDE OR UPSTAIRS ARE
10.30 A.M. TO MIDDAY, AND 4 P.M. TO 5.30 P.M. MY WALKING IN THE
COURTYARD IS NOW NOT ENTIRELY SUPERVISED, SO I AM IN THE YARD ON MY OWN,
AND THIS IS MORE RELAXING, AND LISTENING TO THE RADIO TOO, MAKES A VERY
BIG DIFFERENCE TO MY DAILY LIFE. UNQUOTE.
2. HE INDICATED THAT HE WAS LISTENING TO MUSIC AND HAD HEARD THE
COMMENTARY ON THE THAT HE IS LISTENING ALSO TO THE BBC NEWS
CONFIDENTIAL
QUOTE POP UNQUOTE
DERBY, WE ASSUME THEREFORE BULLETINS.
/ 3. THIS IS
+
וּ.
CONFIDENTIAL
2
-
3. THIS IS GOOD NEWS AND MARKS A CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT IN GREY'S
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT. FROM THE CHEERFUL TONE OF THE
REST OF THE LETTER IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CHANGES HAVE IMPROVED HIS
MORALE. WE MUST HOPE THAT THE CHINESE WILL PROGRESSIVELY RELAX THE
RESTRICTIONS ON GREY'S FREEDOM AS HIS RELEASE APPROACHES, ON THE LINES
ENVISAGED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 2258 OF 11 DECEMBER
1968 (NOT TO ALL). AS THE CHINESE DECISION FOLLOWS THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF
THE REDUCTION OF WONG CHAK'S SENTENCE AND MORETON'S INTERVIEW WITH THE
CHINESE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE CHINESE HAVE TAKEN
THE POINT THAT ALL THE NEWSWORKERS WILL BE OUT BY EARLY OCTOBER AND ARE
THEMSELVES PREPARING FOR THE
RELEASE OF GREY.
4. IN VIEW OF THE GREY FAMILY'S PAST INDISCRETIONS WITH THE PRESS AND IN
ORDER TO AVOID A DRAMATIC PRESENTATION OF THE LETTER, REUTERS
PERSUADED MRS. GREY TO ALLOW THEM TO RELEASE THE INFORMATION IN A
QUIETLY WORDED STATEMENT. THIS WAS ISSUED TODAY.
STEWART
FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION:
P
FAR EASTERN DEPT
CONFIDENTIAL
+
I
I
I
Registry No. F FF
DEPARTMENT
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegggprshould
reach addresseC(8)
た
эх
Xx
#
24/6.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
(Date)..
Despatched
120
--------pakokupH
----‒‒‒‒ading...NIH------.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret Sheet
Confidential
Resched Unclassified
PRIORITY MARKINGS
Flash Immadiara. Priority Routine
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
En Clair. Cólo Cypher
Draft Telegrøn to:-
PERING No. 207
(Date) _34/6.
And to:-
CYPHER
[Security if any
Security classification
[ Privacy marking
[Codeword-if any)
Addressed to
]
telegram No. 207
And to
Hi, shu-M JAA
CLLLLLLLLLL
repeated for information to
Routine to
CONFIDENTIAD
PEKING
24/6
----- 17
(date)
11-1----11י
WASHINGTON,
Labbat------as, crass banque: +
RONG KONG
POLAD SINGAPORE
PRI LA LA LA Spa Ho▬▬▬DIL DILJOJILLLOJ
Repeat to:-
WASHINGTON POLAD SINGAPORE
Saving to:-
Distribution:- FCO/WHI
FED
HKD
CONSULAR DEPT. NEWS DEPT. IRD
Copies tack- IFD
Saving to
Anthony Grey.
Grey's latest letter to his mother
contains the following passage:
"I am so happy to tell you that some changes were
made in my daily life on. May 30th.
On that day,
In
-----וי
I was told that for an hour and a half each morning
and afternoon, I could leave my room, in which I
am living, and go to either the courtyard or to
three rooms upstairs; I could also have my
portable radio, and access to all my books.
addition I was told I could close the door of the
root in which I spend the majority of my time.
The periods in which I am allowed to go outside
or upstairs are 10.30 a.m. to midday, and ↳ pim. to 5.30 p.m. My walking
in the courtyard is now
L
not entirely supervised, so I am in the yard on my
own, and this is more relaxing. And listening to
CONFIDENTIAL
the radio too, makes a very big difference to my
daily life."
2.
He indicated that he was listening to "pop"
music and had heard the commentary on the Derby.
We assume therefore that he is listening also to
the BBC news bulletins.
3.
This is good news and marks a considerable
improvement in Grey's conditions of confinement.
From the cheerful tone of the rest of the letter it
is clear that the changes have improved his morale.
We must hope that the Chinese will progressively
relax the restrictions on Grey's freedom as his
release approaches, on the lines envisaged in
paragraph 2 of Hong Kong telegram No. 2258 of 11
December 1968 (hot to all). As the Chinese
decision follows the announcement of the reduction
of Yong Chak's sentence and Moreton's interview with
the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires, it would appear that
the Chinese have taken the point that all the
newsworkers will be out by early October and are
themselves preparing for the release of Grey.
4
In view of the Grey family's past indiscre-
tions with the press and in order to avoid a
dramatic presentation of the letter, Reuters persuaded
Mrs. Grey to allow them to release the information in a
quietly worded statement.
This was issued today.
Juan Jone
(24
Juwe
0327 17 E.W.A 5.,LIO. 164M 3-67. CONFIDENTIAL
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
MR. MURRAY
With the Compliments of the
Political Adviser
Hong Kong
130
The 11 "Newsworkers" : earliest dates of discharge
Ini iration provided by Commissioner of Prisons 6th June_1969
September 3rd 1969
1.
W Tai Chau
2.
LI Siu Hung
3.
CHAK Nuen Fai
4.
POON Wai Wai
5.
CHAN Yim Kuen (female))
6.
LAW Yuk Wo
7.
WONG Yat Lau
8.
CHAN Chi Fung
g.
NG Choi Shing
10. WONG Ling (female)
September 6th 196P RECEIVED IN
IR G 12/N9.50 26 JUN 1969
FC 130/1
September 12th 1969
October 3rd 1969
11.
WONG Chak
A.F. MADDOCKS Political Adviser 9th June, 1969
Distribution
H.E.
Hon.C.S.
D.S.
Hon.A.G.
P.A.(2)
A.P.A.(4)
H./A.R.G.
P.A.C.S.(S)
C.of P. C.P. D.S.B.
F.C.O. London
PEKING
WASHINGTON
D.I.S.
R.1.0.
A
Ялгобиле.
S. J. Foleston $y 2016
Mo Carter 2576
To Warfon 2016. To Boyd/
По
力
Enci (sary)
!
----
Reference.
|
!
По Пукан
(841) - (842).
The internal evidence in
Thera
reports ( particularly the reiterated
h
question
Gu
1. Why
braved wi
Ihm mattere
Hong Kong shout or have
The negotiation
through the Jay channel) points strongly,
I
i
9 think, 1
a deduction
12 and
G
thoroughly piqued Jay (and
possibly Le Cho-chih) who