/5. I HAVE
SECRET
5. I HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER OUR RESPONSE SHOULD INCLUDE A SUCCESTION
THAT THE HONG KONG GOVERMENT VOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE SYMPATHETIC
CONSIDERATION TO ANY LESS FAR-REACHING CHIKESE PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVING
CONTACTS IN HONG KONG DETWEEN LOCAL CHINESE OFFICIALS AND THE HONG KONG
COVERMENT. I HAVE DECIDED AGAINST THIS. A CLEAR-CUT REFUSAL AT THIS
STAGE WILL PROVIDE A MORE SOLID BASIS FOR FUTURE DISCUSSION WITH THE
CHINESE SHOULD THEY DECIDE TO PRESS THE ISSUE. ANY HINT THAT WE MIGHT BE
PREPARED TO COMPROMISE WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE THEM TO KEEP PRESSING.
DOUGLAS-HOME,
(COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET |
FILES
F.E.D.
HKI OD
H. AM DEFT:
P.U.S.D.
P.S.
P.S./MR ROYLE
MR WILFORD
SIR L MONSON
COPIES TO:-
SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE
-2-
+
SECRET
+
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PUSD MATERIAL
ATTACHED
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SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET
31
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Mr Wilford Mr Logen Private Secretary
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To Evans. meeting
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
ட:
1. The Secretary of State minuted on Hong Kong telegram
(3-) No 398 of 9 May: "I hope we are getting our Ambassador's
advice urgently". Mr Addis has given us his further views
3) in Peking telegram No 450 of 17 May. Sir Murray MacLehose
138
has commented (Hong Kong telegram No 423) on Mr Addis's
views; the Governor's arguments are, I think, conclusive.
Mr Royle has minuted: "I feel we should stick to our
decision for a clear-cut refusal".
2. In Hong Kong telegram No 424 Sir Murray MacLehose
draws attention to a report
The report, a copy of which is attached,
is clearly important. I agree, in the light of it, with
the Governor's assessment that a polite but firm refusal
of the Chinese request for official representation in Hong M
Kong would stand a fair chance of being accepted. I also
agree with him that in communicating our refusal to the
Chinese we should argue the case as little as possible.
A simple but courteous "No" without giving any reasons
would however only invite the Chinese to probe further.
Our response would need to be a little fuller than this.
THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF
THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958
1
SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET
13.
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23/5.
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SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET
3. At Mr Royle's meeting at 4.30 pm on 11 May it was
agreed that the following recommendations should be made
to the Secretary of State:
(1)
We should reject the Chinese proposal without
waiting for further elaboration from them or
considering any counter-proposals.
If we delayed
our reply the Chinese might publicise their
proposal, as they did when they last made it in
the 1950s; this would clearly be undesirable.
(ii) Mr Royle should himself inform the Chinese during
his visit to Peking that we are unable to accept
their proposal. The alternative course of action
(to instruct Mr Addis to take action with the
Chinese before Mr Royle's visit) is less desirable.
It would mean that Mr Royle would be open to
counter-attack during his visit; as a matter of
tactics it would be preferable for Mr Royle to
take the initiative in bringing up the issue with
the Chinese rather than to give them an opportunity
to raise it with him.
(Hi) Mr Royle should raise the matter with Vice Foreign
Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua in preference to Ch'i
Peng-fei or Chou En-lai.
Ch'iao is easier to talk
to than Ch'i and it is by no means certain that
Mr Royle would be invited to meet Chou En-lai.
(iv) Had Mr Royle not received an invitation to visit
Peking, or if the Chinese had suggested another date,
this would not have affected the need for an early
reply to the Chinese. In these circumstances
SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET
/Mr Royle
SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET
A
D
Mr Royle would have proposed to speak to the new
Chinese Ambassador soon after his arrival.
It was also agreed at the meeting that the Department
should prepare a form of words for Mr Royle's use in speaking
to the Chinese. I attach a draft. It is based on Hong
Kong telegram No 398; but takes into account Hong Kong
telegram No 424. If approved, and subject to any further
comments from Mr Addis or Sir Murray MacLehose, it will
form the basis of the brief on this subject for Mr Royle's
visit to China. I also attach 2 draft telegrams to Peking.
5. Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department concur.
22 May 1972
Six
of worth
Co
Sir L Monson
Mr Evans
Mr Laird
numbered copies wilt which I
Mr Wyatt
RBR Hervey
Far Eastern Department
L. Monson has suggested
revival from
for para 2 of the "form of works'
agree.
Stin
incorporated the beer ma wittin.
with
Kun Will
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SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET
sent to
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'S 253
CYPHER/CAT A
FM HONG KONG 180910Z
CONFIDENTIAL
++
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 423 OF 18 MAY INFO PEKING.
ندر
*
PS by Keyli Wife Belford. Buy Lhows.
PEKING TELEGRAM 450 TO FCO: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG
KONG,
J
I DO NOT WANT TO ADD MUCH TO THE ARGUMENTS IN MY PREVIOUS DESPATCH AND
TELNOS 31 TO PEKING AND 393 TO FCO THE SNAG KH AMBASSADOR'S PROPOSAL
LIES IN CHCU EN-LAI'S PHRASE TO MR WILSON QUOTE LET ALONE THE FACT THAT
OVER 90 PER CENT OF THE HONG KONG POPULATION IS CHINESE UNQUOTE. IT IS
OVER THE RIGHTS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE REPRESENTATIVE IN CONNECTION WITH
THIS BASICALLY REFUGEE OR HONG KONG BORN POPULATION WHOSE CORFIDENCE WE
HAVE TO RETAIN, THAT ALL THE TROUBLE WOULD ARISE.
2. THOUGH IN THEORY THE CPG MIGHT GIVE US ASSURANCES OF NON-
INTERVENTION QUOTE IN MATTERS WHICH ARE THE PROPER PREROGATIV!" OF THE
HONG KONG GOVERNMENT UNQUOTE (TO QUOTE HM AMBASSADOR) SOOMER OR LATER WE
WOULD FIND THAT THEIR VIEW OF WHAT WAS PROVER FOR THE HONG KONG
GOVERNMENT AND THE REPRESENTATIVE RESPECTIVELY WAS QUITE DIFFERENT TO
OURS.
3. EVEN IF A SATISFACTORY DEFINITION COULD BE DRAWN UP IN GOOD FAITH IN
ADVANCE, WHICH I BELIEVE IMPOSSIBLE, NO OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE COULD
RESIST INDEFINITELY LOCAL PRESSURES TO BECOME INVOLVED IN HONG KONG'S
INTERHAL AFFAIRS.
4. NOR IS IT REALISTIC TO ENVISAGE THAT A SITUATION THAT HAD GONE WRONG
COULD BE RIGHTED BY THE EXPULSION OF A CPG REPRESENTATIVE. APART FROM
THE PHYSICAL PROBLEM INVOLVED
CHINA BUILDING WAS VIRTUALLY A FORTRESS
IN 1967 THE BANK OF SUCH ACTION WOULD
PRECIPITATE THE CONFRONTATION WITH CHINA WHICH WE WANT TO AVOID.
-
L
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NACLEHOSE
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JAS-ETC
200
1
PRIORITY CYPHER CAT A
KING 170712Z
SECRET
Mr. Evans (FED,
SECRET
I still feet
we should
Mick to our decision fo acles aut refumat.
TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 450 OF 17 MAY INFO ROUTINE GOVERNOR
HONG KONG.
HONG KONG TELNO 398:
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
AR
1. KEY ISSUE IS WHETHER THERE IS ANY CHANCE OF SECURING TERMS
FOR CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG WHICH WOULD WORK OUT ACCEPTABLY
FOR US. IF THERE IS SUCH A CHANCE THEN IT IS WORTH
WHILE TAKING CHANG WEN-CHIN UP ON HIS OFFER OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON AN
EXPLORATORY BASIS WITHOUT COMMITMENT. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, YOUR
DECISION IS THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE AT ALL OF GETTING THE CHINESE TO
AGREE TO AND ABIDE BY ACCEPTABLE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THEIR
REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG THEN IT IS BETTER THAT WE SHOULD GIVE THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT A FIRMLY NEGATIVE ANSWER SOON AND STICK BY IT.
2. PARAGRAPH 15 OF HONG KONG DESPATCH OF 5 MAY STATES'' IF THE CHINESE
REPRESENTATIVE WERE TO CONDUCT HIMSELF LIKE ANY OTHER REPRESENTATIVE
HERE, KEEP OUT OF LOCAL AFFAIRS, REFRAIN FROM MANIPULATING THE LEVERS OF
CPG INFLUENCE AND FROM DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CHALLENGING THE POSITION
OF THE HONG KONG GOVERN- MENT, HE WOULD BE A POSITIVE ASSET IN MANY
PRACTICAL AND POLIT- ICAL WAYS''. MY RECOMMENDATION FROM THIS POST MUST
BE THAT IT 1S WORTH OUR WHILE TO SEEK THE AGREEMENT OF THE CHINESE
GOVERN- MENT TO REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG ON PRECISELY SUCH RESTRICTED
LINES. I SUGGEST SHOULD SPEAK TO CHAN GWEN-CHIN ON THE LINES OF THE
FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH.
3. I HAVE NOW LOOKED UP THE EARLIER FILES TO WHICH HE REFERRED AT OUR
LAST MEETING. NEITHER THE ORIGINAL. PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 1956 NOR ITS
REPETITION TO MR ERROLL IN OCTOBER 1957 ( PEKING TELEGRAMS NOS 132 OF 25
FEBRUARY 1956 AND NO526 OF 31 OCTOBER
1957) GIVE A PRECISE IDEA OF WHAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD IN MIND.
SPEAKING TO MR HAROLD WILSON ON 25 FEBRUARY 1958, HOWEVER, CHOU EN-LAI
WAS MORE EXPLICIT ** CHINA HAS STATE ENTERPRISES, BANKS AND OTHER
PROPERTIES IN HONG KONG, WITH NEARLY 1,808 EMPLOYEES, LET ALONE THE FACT
THAT OVER 90 PERCENT OF THE HONG KONG PULULATION IS CHINESE. WE HAVE
MANY BUSINESS MATTERS ON WHICH CONTACTS HAVE TO BE MADE WITH THE HONG
KONG AUTHORITIES. IT IS
SECRET
209
!
1
}
SECRET
IT IS REASONABLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CHINESE GOVERNMENT
REPRESENTATIVE THERE.'' WE SHOULD BE READY TO AGREE THAT CHINESE
REPRESENTATION ON SUCH A BASIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IN PRESENT
CIRCUMSTANCES.
WE SHOULD FIRST, HOWEVER, HAVE TO BE SATISFIED THAT THE CHINESE
REPRESENTATIVE WOULD NOT IN PRACTICE EXCEED THE DEFINITION OF HIS
FUNCTIONS GIVEN BY
PREMIER CHOU TO MR WILSON: AND THIS LIMITATION OF HIS FUNCTIONS WOULD
HAVE TO BE MADE CLEAR TO THE INHABITANTS OF HONG KONG FROM THE OUTSET.
WE SHOULD LOOK TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT TO COOPERATE WITH US IN MAKING
THIS CLEAR THROUGH THEIR OWN CHANNELS ALSO. IT MUST BE CLEARLY
UNDERSTOOD BETWEEN US AT THIS STAGE THAT IF AT ANY TIME THE CHINESE
REPRESENTATIVE WERE TO EXCEED THESE FUNCTIONS AND INTERVENE IN MATTERS
WHICH ARE THE PROPER PREROGATIVE OF THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT WE SHOULD
AT ONCE HAVE TO STOP DEALING WITH HIM AND ASK THE CHINESE GOVERN- >>
MENT TO WITHDRAW HIM. I COULD SUPPORT MY ARGUMENTS BY DRAWING AS
APPROPRIATE ON HONG KONG TELNO 398.
4.
IF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT FAIL TO GIVE US COMPLETE SATISFACTION ON THESE
TERMS WE SHOULD THEN INFORM THEM THAT THEIR PROPOSAL IS NOT ACCEPTABLE
AND WE SHOULD STAND BY THIS POSITION, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT FURTHER
ARGUMENT WOULD BE USELESS, I THINK A\CLEAR-CUT REFUSAL WOULD DE BETTER
BOTH FOR SINO/BRITISH RELATIONS AND FOR THE POSITION OF HONG KONG THAN A
LONG DRAWN OUT AND INCONCLUSIVE DIALOGUE.
ADDI S
FILES
FED
HKJOD
N AM D
P/S
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET/
منام
в
This would impuriible to CUATED TO:
ཨ༢ཨ་:༦
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P/S TO MR ROYI.
MR WILFORD
SIR L MONSON
- SIR PADAMS CABINET OFFICE
ཛད་ན་འཚར(?.
NYMN
2
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SECRET
210
+
PRIORITY
R/CAT A
YANG KONG 0934052
SECPET
SECRET
SG
2. AED
Pher
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TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 398 OF 9TH MÁY 1372. INFO ROUTINE
PEKING.
Am Venadori
aderci
ungently
कुछ
PEKING TELHO 481: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. 10/500
AM
IM AFRAID THAT WITH OUT INITIAL RESPONSE OF REQUESTING DETAILS AND NOW
WITH OUR OFFER TO EXPLORE FURTHER WITHOUT COMMITMENT, THE CHINESE MAY
BELIEVE (QUITE WRONGLY OF COURSE) THAT THEIR PROP- OSAL IS GATHERING
WAY. VERY SOON WE MUST FIRE A SHOT ACROSS THEIR BOWS, OR BE PREPARED TO
LET THEM SAIL OVER US,
2.
FOR REASONS GIVEN IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 31 PEKING AND DESP- ATCH OF 5 MAY I
HOPE THE DECISION VILL DE FOR THE FORMER COURSE, AND IF SO WE HAVE TO
DECIDE WHAT TO SAY. ON THIS PERHAPS HER MAJESTY'S MMBASSADOR, PEKIC,
COULD BEST ADVISE. BUT FOR HY PART SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING POINTS MIGHT BE
MADE :-
(A)
(B)
(C)
WE ARE SORRY THE CHINESE HAVE RAISED THIS OLD ISSUE AT THIS TIME. OUR
DESISE IS. FOR BETTER RELATIONS AS WE BELIEVE IS THEIRS, BUT THIS
PROPOSAL IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THE REVERSE. WE THEREFORE FEEL GFLIGED TO
SPEAK FRANKLY. MR. CHANG'S INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF MR, KWOK,
THE KUOMINTANG COMMISSIONER, AND HIS OFFICE FROM 1945 TO 1949 IS QUITE
DIFFERENT FROM OUR OWN. THIS ''ORGAN** FAR FROM BEING BENEFICIAL TO BOTH
SIDES, OR DEMONSTRATING THE NEED FOR ITS EXISTENCE, CONTRIBUTED TO AN
EXACERBATION OF RELATIOIS WHICH HMG HAS HO DESIRE TO SEE REPEATED.
A LOT HAS HAPPENED SINCE THE PREVIOUS PROPOSALS WERE MADE. IN 1956 WE
HAD AT OFFICE IN SHANGHAI, BUT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD NONE ON
BRITISH TERRITORY EXCEPT IN LONDON, AND THE FOSITION WAS THUS UNEQUAL,
SIMILARLY WHEN CHOU EN-LAI MENTIONED REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG TO MR.
DE¦SON
HE DID SO TO EMPHASISE THE ILLOGICALITY OF OUR RELUCTANCE TO WITHDRAW
THE BRITISH CONSULATE FROM TAIWAN WHEN THERE WAS NO CHINESE GOVERNMENT
REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. HOW THESE OFFICES HAVE BOTH BEEN CLOSED,
AND THERE ARE ONLY EMBASSIES IN OUR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. THIS SEEMS A
SATIS- FACTORY AND MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS SITUATION.
SECRET
/(D)
211
·
T
(D)
(E)
3.
SECRET
MR. CHANG HAS INDICATED THE PROPOSAL WAS MADE ON PRACTI GROUNDS. BUT THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT ALREADY HAVE A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF OFFICIALS IN THE
COLONY WHO DEAL WITH ALL PRACTICAL QUESTIONS OF COMMERCE, FINANCE,
CULTURE, INFORMATION TRAVEL, TRANSPORT AND OTHER MATTERS. THEY ARE NOT
HINDERED IN THEIR DEALINGS IN ANY WAY, AND THEY ARE FREE TO TRAVEL WHERE
THEY WISH WITHOUT PERMISSION, AND MEET WHOM THEY LIKE AND ENTER AND
LEAVE THE COLONY AT WILL. SOME OF THES HAVE DEALINGS WITH MY OFFICIALS
AS OCCASION REQUIRES AND VICE VERSA. THERE IS THEREFORE NO PRACTICAL
NEED FOR FURTHER
REPRESENTATION.
THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG IS ONE OF SOME DELICACY FOR BOTH THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT AND OURSELVES. HITHERTO A BALANCE HAS BEEN MAINTAINED THAT IS
WELL UNDERSTOOD IN THE COLONY. THE PROPOSED APPOINTMENT MIGHT DISTURB
THAT BALANCE. ANY SUCH DISTURBANCE WOULD HAVE AN IMMEDIATELY ADVERSE
"EFFECT IT THE COLONY AND THUS ON ANGLO-CHINESE RELATIONS,
SINCE THE CHANGE PROPOSED WOULD BE OF NO PRACTICAL BENEFIT TO EITHER THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT OR OURSELVES, WE DO NOT WISH TO RISK THE ADVERSE
EFFECT IT WOULD HAVE ON OUR
RELATIONS.
IT IS NOT FOR ME TO ADVISE ON WHETHER ALL OF THIS COULD PROPERLY BE
SAID, BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT AT THIS POINT, WHATEVER CHINESE INTENTIONS
TURN OUT TO BE, WE HAVE MUCH TO GAIN BY CLARITY AND MUCH TO LOSE BY
RISKING MISUNDERSTANDING THROUGH RELUCTANCE TO MAKE OUR OBJECTION CLEAR.
4.
I AM ALSO MOST CONCERNED TO DAMP OFF THE CHINESE BEFORE THEY HAVE BEEN
GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO FORMULATE THEIR PROPOSALS TO US IN DETAIL. ONCE
THEY HAVE DONE THIS IT WILL BE MUCH HARDER FOR THEM TO WITHDRAW. 1
THEREFORE HOFE THAT UNTIL NEW INSTRU- CTIONS ARE SENT IN THE LIGHT OF
CHANG'S DEMARCHE H.M. A/BASSADOR WILL FEEL ABLE TO SAY, IF TACKLED, THAT
PENDING INSTRUCTIONS HE CANNOT DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER.
MACLEHOSE
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED ]
[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]
FILES
PED
HKIOD
NAM D
PS/MR ROYLE MR WILFORD
COPIES TO:
SIR P ADAMS CABINET OFFICE
SIR L MONSON
-2- SECRET
212
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SUNFIDENTIAL
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[ IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 423 CE 18 MAY INFO PEKING.TRY'
PEKING TELEGRAM 450 TO FCO: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG
KONG.
ген з
3/20/2
I DO NOT WANT TO ADD MUCH TO THE ARGUMENTS IN MY PREVIOUS
DESPATCH AND TELMOS 31 TO PEKING AND 398 TO FCO THE SHAG IN
HM AMBASSADOR'S PROPOSAL LIES IN CHOU EN-LAI'S PHRASE TO MR WILSON
QUOTE LET ALONE THE FACT THAT OVER 92 PER CENT OF THE HONG KONG
POPULATION IS CHINESE UNQUOTE. IT IS OVER THE RIGHTS AND ACTIVITIES
OF THE REPRESENTATIVE HI CONNECTION WITH THIS BASICALLY REFUGEE OR HONG
KONG BORN POPULATION WHOSE CONFIDENCE WE HAVE TO RETAIN, THAT ALL THE
TROUBLE WOULD ARISE.
2. THOUGH IN THEORY THE CPG MIGHT GIVE US ASSURANCES OF NON-
INTERVENTION QUOTE IN MATTERS WHICH ARE THE PROPER PREROGATIVE
OF THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT UNQUOTE (TO QUOTE HM AMBASSADOR)
SOONER OR LATER WE WOULD FIND THAT THEIR VIEW OF WHAT WAS PROPER
FOR THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT AND THE REPRESENTATIVE RESPECTIVELY
WAS QUITE DIFFERENT TO OURS.
3. EVEN IF A SATISFACTORY DEFINITION COULD BE DRAWN UP IN GOOD
FAITH IN ADVANCE, WHICH I BELIEVE IMPOSSIBLE, NO OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE
COULD RESIST INDEFINITELY LOCAL PRESSURÉS TO
BECOME INVOLVED IN HONG KONG'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.
4. NOR IS IT REALISTIC TO ENVISAGE THAT A SITUATION THAT HAD GONE
WRONG COULD BE RIGHTED BY THE EXPULSION OF A CPG REPRESENTATIVE. APART
FROM THE PHYSICAL PROBLEM INVOLVED IN 1967 THE BANK OF
-
CHINA BUILDING WAS VIRTUALLY A FORTRESS - SUCH ACTION WOULD PRECIPITATE
THE CONFRONTATION WITH CHINA WHICH WE WANT TO AVOID.
MACLEHOSE
FILES
F.E.D.
| COPIES SENT TO NO 10]
DOWNING SÅ.
COPIES TO:-
SIR P ADAMS, CABINET CFFICE
[
HKIOD
N. AM DEPT:
P.S.
PS TO MR ROYLE
MA WILFORD
SER L KONSON
CONFIDENTIAL
213
SECRET
(FED)
TOP COPY
IMMEDIATE ~CYPHER/CAT A
FM FC 0 1716102
SECRET
TO IMEDIATE HONG KONG TELEGRAM HUMBER 391 OF 17 MAY INFO PRIORITY
PEKING.
1.
PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR.
PEKING TELEGRAM NO 452: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
WE ARE ABOUT TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO MINISTERS ON THIS SUBJECT. WE
THINK IT IMPORTANT TO REACH DECISIONS BOTH ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR
REPLY TO THE CHINESE AND ABOUT OUR TACTICS
BEFORE MR ROYLE VISITS CHINA.
2. IF YOU HAVE ANY CONTENTS ON THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE WE
SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE THESE BY 191277Z.
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILES
FED
HKLOD NAV D
PS TO MR ROYLE SIP L MONSON
ILFORD
MR
COPIES TO:
SIR P ADAMS CABINET OFFICE
VN
SECRET
37
■
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PRIORITY CYPHER CAT A
S E. CR ET
F PEKING 170712Z
SECRET
CRIVED IN
A 50
%
Fax
TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 450 OF 17 MAY INFO ROUTINE GOVERNOR
HONG KONG
HONG KONG TELNO 398:
34