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Appendix III to Cabinet 28 (27).
Cypher Telegram to Sir M. Lampson (Peking), No. 326, dated April 26, 1927.
IT is now clear that we cannot count on the active collaboration or support of the United States Government in prosecuting our demands for satisfaction for the Nanking outrages. The United States Government are not prepared to agree to or even to discuss any form of sanction and decline to send any reply to Mr. Chen's notes of 14th April.
2. The attitude of Japan is still uncertain, as a result, no doubt, of the change of Government and of the preoccupation of the new Government with the financial crisis, but it seems unlikely that it will differ much from that of the last Government. He has acted 3. Chiang Kai-shek's position is more difficult to determine. with vigour against the extremists, and so has somewhat relieved the tension at Shanghai and Canton and even somewhat improved the situation at Nanking. would appear, therefore, unwise to do anything to antagonise or weaken him, but it is too early yet to found a policy upon his final success or even upon his goodwill if successful.
It
4. The various sanctions which have been suggested would appear to me either impracticable or ineffective or likely to injure innocent parties or the less hostile sections of Nationalist China rather than those directly or indirectly responsible for the outrages.
5. There remains, however, one possible course which seems to me worthy of serious consideration, namely, the reoccupation of the Hankow concession and its return to British administration, whether exercised by the military or by a reinstated British Municipal Council.
6. One advantage of this course is that the action to be taken concerns British interests alone, and could therefore be appropriately taken by His Majesty's Govern- ment acting alone. A further advantage is that it strikes directly at the prestige and interests of the faction responsible for the Nanking outrages. Further, the Japanese have already landed detachments in their concession and are holding it in force; by acting now we should be aligning ourselves with them.
7. The reoccupation of the concession would not imply the abandonment of the policy outlined in my December memorandum or in the treaty revision offer of January. His Majesty's Government would be still prepared to negotiate the return of the concession so soon as there appears a Government able and willing to carry out its undertakings. Those given by Mr. Chen at the time of the signature of the Hankow Agreement have, however, been flagrantly broken by the forcible occupation of the Chinkiang concession by Nationalist troops, by the failure to give effective protection at Hankow, Kiukiang and other places, and lastly by the Nanking outrages. I feel, therefore, that the cancellation of the agreement made with Chen and the reoccupation of the concession are amply justified if deemed expedient.
8. Our appropriate advisers are being consulted on the military aspects of the question. I should at the same time be glad of your views on all the political issues involved, such as the possible reaction of such reoccupation (a) upon Chang Tso-lin and the North; (b) upon Chiang Kai-shek and the more moderate Nationalist elements; (c) its effect on the struggle between the moderates and the extremists?
9. Would you consider it a fatal objection to reoccupation were it to be necessary, for military reasons, to withdraw the garrison again at low water even though no arrangement had been made in the meantime with any Chinese authority for the future administration of the concession, or would you advise reoccupation notwithstanding the possibility of this contingency? Also bear in mind that so long as the garrison is at Hankow it may be difficult to withdraw the defence force from the International Settlement at Shanghai.
10. Sooner or later we hope to get on to terms of amity with a genuine Nationalist Government or Governments of China. We do not want to take action which, however justifiable now, might place yet another formidable obstacle in the way of good relations. The precedent of Japan's Hankow garrison 1911-22 is not encouraging. You will remember the strong anti-Japanese feeling which it aroused.
Repeat to Shanghai for Commander-in-chief.