337
120
Tientsin would, he estimated, involve at least two and
perhaps three Divisions. Both the Chief of the Naval
Staff and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff
emphasised the repeated recommendation of the Committee
of Chiefs of Staff that if the Japanese would not under- take this duty it was beyond our capacity, and, as recommended in Paper C.P.110 (27) the Legation and
British interests should be withdrawn from both Peking
and Tientsin.
The Cabinet were informed that no official
confirmation had yet been received of the Press reports of a bombardment of Hankow by the Japanese.
On the question of the time factor in sanctions
the Cabinet realised that there were risks inherent in
any course which was taken. On the military aspects of
the question they realised the importance of the warning
of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, but on the political
side they were warned that premature and independent
action on our part would probably result in our being
left alone and unsupported by other nations. The Cabinet
felt that, at this stage at any rate, the greatest
importance must be attached to a policy of bringing
about international solidarity.
The Cabinet agreed
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(a)
ご