be able to get back. I will endeavour to obtain and telegraph to you figures showing extent of British interests, but an approximate idea of their magnitude can be gained from a "Report on Future Government of British Municipal Area" drawn up by a British advisory committee at Tien-tsin which was forwarded to you viầ Siberia on 23rd March in my despatch No. 236 and should reach you in a few days. It is also for consideration whether independent evacuation of Tien-tsin would not play into the hands of our Japanese commercial rivals.
In any case, decision to be taken is one of such importance that I think it essential that ground should be prepared by some Governmental statement in England before any step is inaugurated by this Legation.
I have dealt so far mainly with Tien-tsin, but your telegram under reference refers also to evacuation of Peking. I assume this to refer not only to evacuation of British nationals, but also of Legation. With regard to nationals, I am of course taking normal precautions regarding their safety in case of trouble and am already encouraging such of them as can do so to leave quietly for their summer holidays. As regards Legation, I quite see that His Majesty's Government would be unwilling to leave it inadequately protected at the risk of repetition of Boxer episode, but, on the other hand, I earnestly trust that risk of this possibility will not be exaggerated and that against it will be weighed the enormous loss of prestige which independent withdrawal would undoubtedly involve.
I propose to await your observations on this telegram before taking any action under authority given in your telegram under reference, but matter is pressing.
(Repeated to Shanghai, Commander-in-chief, Hong Kong, Tokyo and Tien-tsin.)
APPENDIX (C).
Decode telegram from Sir M. Lampson (Peking), No. 642, dated April 8, 1927.
MY telegram No. 634.*
Following resolution received to-day from foreign commandants at Tien-tsin:
"Foreign commandants at conference 6th April unanimously agreed to make the following recommendations to their respective Ministers :----
"(a.) Considering state of uncertainty which prevails in North China, it is desirable that strength of each foreign contingent be doubled forthwith.
(b.) If Southern anti-foreign movement looks like spreading to North China it would be desirable to immediately increase strength of foreign forces to 20,000 men with most up-to-date equipment, including aviation units, in order to ensure adequate defence of Peking and Tien-tsin and to keep open communica- tions between the former and Tangku (minimum demand). In view of importance of mines at Tongshan and possible necessity for keeping open Chin Wang-tao as a port for reinforcement it may be necessary to guard railway between [group omitted] and Tangku. In this case additional [? 5,000] men would be
L needed (maximum demand).
66
"(c.) Further, commandants are of the opinion that the more troops are on the spot the less likely will it be necessary to take military action, and to this end submit best solution would be to increase garrison in North China forthwith to maximum of 25,000 asked for in paragraph (b) above.”
These were discussed at meeting to-day of Japanese, American, French and Italian Ministers and myself, and it was unanimously agreed strongly to recommend them to our Governments.
Japanese Minister, who has special sources of information, gave us gloomiest forecast of the future unless some such step was taken, and evidently has reliable information that terrorist methods of Nanking may be, and almost certainly will be, repeated here and at Tien-tsin if and when the South get here unless steps are taken betimes to be in readiness.
We were not
I took an opportunity to tell them your instructions to me. prepared to take the defensive steps alone; we were already carrying more than our share elsewhere, and it was the turn of others. But I felt little doubt that if other Powers were prepared to play up over North China we should be ready to
[16014)
See Appendix (B).
D
80