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approximately 4,000 strong, and on the 5th August the advance to Peking was com- menced with an international force some 20,000 strong with 70 guns. After considerable fighting Peking was relieved on the 14th August.
During the course of these operations the total number of allied troops sent to China amounted to no less than 94,000 men, the British contribution being 21,000.
A more detailed account of these operations is attached as Appendix (D), but the above summary will suffice to show that the defence of the Legations at Peking might well involve a very considerable commitment, even with the whole-hearted co-operation of all the Powers.
5. At the present time the international forces available at Peking and Tientsin
are:-
PEKING.
U.S.A.
Great Britain
France
Italy
Japan
Total
TIENTSIN.
405
162
U.S.A. Great Britain
248
France
104
156
Italy Japan
1,075
Total
823 806
1,066
344
336
3,375
6. Such a force is, of course, quite inadequate to ensure the safety of the Legations and to keep open the long lines of communication from Peking to Tangku (the port of Taku) viâ Tientsin, and considerable reinforcements must be envisaged, before the maintenance of the Legations at Peking can be viewed with equanimity. Of these reinforcements, presumably Great Britain would have to provide her quota, which would entail measures of mobilisation, since Section A of the Reserve ie., that portion of the Reserve which is liable to be called up for immediate service overseas has been absorbed in furnishing the contingents which have already been despatched to China.
7. We are, therefore, firmly convinced that no attempt should be made to retain our Legation and Legation guards in Peking, beyond the point when they can withdraw without requiring assistance from extraneous sources in the form of additional troops. The decision as to when this point has been reached must, of course, rest with our Minister at Peking, and we recommend that he should be instructed on no account to run the risk of being beleaguered in such a way as might involve the despatch of a relief column to extricate him and his Legation.
Defence of Tientsin.
8. As already mentioned there are at the present time 3,375 international troops at Tientsin. We estimate that to protect the Settlement itself an additional force of at least one brigade is required. But it will not suffice merely to protect the Settlement; the lines of communication from the sea must also be kept open. These run to Tangku (the port of Taku), where large ships cannot approach nearer than 8 miles to the shore, or via Tangku to Chinwangtao, a distance of approximately 170 miles, where there are harbour facilities. In order to keep the line of communication from Tientsin to Tangku open, we consider that approximately five brigades will be necessary, making a total reinforcement of two divisions in addition to the 3,500 troops already at Tientsin. This estimate considerably exceeds that recommended by the foreign commandants at Tientsin (vide Appendix C) for the protection of Peking and Tientsin and the line of communication from Peking through Tientsin to Tangku, and we cannot agree with them that a further 5,000 men will suffice to guard the railway line from Tangku to Chinwangtao, should it be considered necessary to keep the latter open as a port for reinforcements.
9. As our contribution towards this international force of two divisions we might possibly have available the one brigade at present under orders for China, but its availability for this purpose cannot be relied upon. In any event, it will not reach Hong Kong its present destination-before the middle of May, and its rôle on arrival must be governed by the circumstances obtaining at that time. The
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situation at present appears to be developing rather more favourably for the Northerners, but there is no guarantee that this trend will be maintained. Rapid and violent fluctuations must be anticipated, and according to the march of events, the Brigade, now under weigh, might be required at Shanghai or Canton more urgently than at Tientsin.
10. The answers to the questions put to us in regard to Tientsin are therefore as follows:-
(a.) We can make no contribution to the defence of Tientsin until the end of May, when, if the situation in other parts of China permits, we may be able to provide a maximum of one Brigade.
(b.) The use of this Brigade for the defence of Tientsin is dependent upon the provision by the other Powers of the balance of the two Divisions which we consider the minimum force necessary for holding Tientsin and keeping open the lines of communication to Tangku.
11. In this connection, we would point out that our contribution is not disproportionately small, having regard to the fact that we are bearing a much greater portion than any other Power of the responsibility and cost of the defence of Shanghai.
2, Whitehall Gardens, S. W. 1,
April 11, 1927.
"
(Signed)
BEATTY.
G. F. MILNE
H. TRENCHARD,
[16014]
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