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Peking on the basis of a negotiating brief below 18 seats. He is no
doubt concerned that even if he were able to secure improvements in
the Basic Law, he would still be accused in Hong Kong of not having
tried hard enough to negotiate a satisfactory figure for 1991. He would have to tell ExCo that it was Ministers' judgement that a
package of the kind outlined above, involving significant improvements for 1997 and after, was in Hong Kong's best interests.
ALTERNATIVES TO A SERIOUS NEGOTIATION
6. If Ministers decide against a serious negotiation with the
Chinese the alternatives seem to be as follows:-
(a) Press for Chinese
to settle for 18
afree
reement to 20 seats in 1991 but be ready
7. The Governor would continue to argue in favour of a move to 20
seats in 1991, while hinting that he would be ready to settle for 18, eg by emphasising the importance we continue to attach to the principle of convergence with the Basic Law. However, such a stance would not strike the Chinese as a serious negotiation, nor as a
willingness on our part to compromise. They would be even less
inclined to offer concessions on the Basic Law on this basis, nor
indeed willingly to settle for 18 seats even if we were.
8.
(b) Indicate to the Chinese that we intend to move to 20 seats in
1991 but leave open the timing of an announcement, possibly
until much closer to the promulgation of the Basic Law
We are most unlikely to get anything useful from the Chinese in response to an offer of this kind. We would need to weigh very carefully the risks in a unilateral decision which undermined convergence and which would most probably lead to a further suspension of Sino-British co-operation over Hong Kong, just at the moment when the JLG is beginning tentatively to return to normal
business. It is Britain and Hong Kong, rather than China, which have most to lose, directly and immediately, from a break-down in
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