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to achieve greater clarity about the way in which the first Chief Executive will be chosen. OMELCO want the first Chief
Executive to be "elected by Election Committees which are democratically constituted and by means of a democratic election
process".
Under the current draft of the Basic Law, the selection
procedure is not spelt out There is a risk that, unless it is, the
first Chief Executive will in effect be a nominee.
MEANS OF ACHIEVING THESE OBJECT IVES
3. If all or any of these objectives are to be achieved, there will have to be a serious negotiation in which the Governor has significant cards in his hand to play. There is frankly very little available. Sir P Cradock deployed the carrot of substantive improvements in bilateral relations and of the UK helping
to lead the international consensus towards China's rehabilitation.
The Chinese do not appear to have taken this up; and in any case this is not a card which the Governor can himself play. The Chinese
might be attracted by an undertaking to do more on subversion, eg new legislation in Hong Kong, but the political implications of this are very unattractive. The only real card the Governor can play is to indicate a willingness to settle for a slower rate of democratisation in 1991, in return for the improvements in the Basic
Law listed in para 2 above.
4.
This option would be consistent with the principle of steady and gradual constitutional development which we have hitherto advocated for Hong Kong; and would hold out the best hope of continuity and
further evolution after 1997.
5. It is fairly improbable that an acceptable package could be
negotiated. If it could, it would involve agreement on our part to settle for fewer than 20 directly elected seats in 1991, say 15. Whether such a concession would be politically tolerable in Hong Kong (or the UK) would depend on the rest of the package.
6. It is clear that the Governor would be most reluctant to go to
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