SECRET
An overt attack by the Chinese is less likely than an
attempt to get the Colony by subversion. Our ability to ·
preserve law and order depends essentially on maintaining the confidence of the Chinese population in the British intention to stay. The majority are politically inarticulate. Their
wish is to trade and survive. They do not wish to be on the losing side and once their confidence started to slip the
process would be accumulative and there would be an increasing tendency to transfer allegiance to Peking.
Garrison
5. At the end of 1966 British military forces in the Colony were 6 major Army units, four fighter aircraft and three
coastal minesweepers.
6. The Army units were to have been reduced to 5 major units during 1967-68; but this decision was never publicly announced and has never been implemented because of the disturbances in the Colony in 1957. The garrison was in fact reinforced by one battalion from Singapore during the earlier stages of the dis- turbances and its strength remained at 73 major units until June, 1968, when one battalion was withdrawn. The fighter air-
craft were withdrawn in March 1967 and air cover has since been
provided from Singapore. The naval vessels (which were to have been withdrawn) have been retained.
Future Garrison
7. Her Majesty's Government's decision to withdraw their
Forces from Singapore and Malaysia by the end of 1971 will
mean that it will thereafter not be possible to reinforce the
Hong Kong Garrison from those sources in time of need. This
situation will entail keeping a higher level of forces in the
Colony itself. Accordingly, the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, on 29 May, 1968, approved proposals that the future
garrison in Hong Kong should consist of:
Royal Navy
Army
2 frigates
5 mine counter-measures vessels 1 small tanker
7 major units
SECRET
/RAF
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