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Far East
18. These arguments emphasise the importance of the third group of studies, relating to the Far East. Since the scope for substantial savings in Europe and the Middle East is so narrow, we have considered whether any substantial prospect of direct financial savings arises in the Far East. Furthermore, the extent of the savings in the Far East will have a significant effect on the size of the financial savings in the United Kingdom to which the fourth group of studies relate, since decisions on the commitments we should continue to
undertake and the forces we should maintain in the Far East will
significantly affect not only the size but also the composition of the forces to be stationed in the United Kingdom. There are further
effects on the facilities to be maintained in this country, for example,
storage and workshops.
The United Kingdom Base
19. Studies Nos. 11 and 12 on the size of the forces needed in the
United Kingdom and of the facilities required are in progress but they
cannot be carried to a conclusion until decisions are taken on the
overseas theatres. Redeployment of forces from overseas theatres to the United Kingdom does not by itself produce large budgetary savings; these would be achieved as a result of the consequential reorganisation
and disbandment of forces in the United Kingdom.
Study No 7
20. Within a general policy of not announcing fundamental changes in our existing policies only one year after the completion of the Defence Review there are various possible reductions we might make in our force levels in the Far East. Study No.7 has been prepared on the basis that
Defence Review force levels should be reduced by about a half, on the
assumptions set out in Annex A. These are broadly that we should assume that Indonesia is unlikely to indulge in military adventures of a kind which would involve us under the Anglo/Malaysia Defence Agreement; if
she did, we could expect considerable notice. For the defence of Malaysia and Singapore, we should only keep in the area forces adequate
to maintain a point of entry and to ensure the local security of our
facilities. It was further assumed that we should retain some aircraft
with a nuclear capability and should contribute to a Commonwealth Stratègic
Force.
21.
Briefly, this study has
A summary of Study No. 7 is at Annex D. considered two main options: ̧· Case A, a mainly maritime presence, and Case B, a mainly land/air presence. Both of these show a saving (on Defence
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